The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Corporate Capital Structure in the Nordic Countries by Uskumbayeva, Assel
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Impact of the Financial Crisis on 
Corporate Capital Structure in the 
Nordic Countries  
 
Assel Uskumbayeva 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bachelor thesis 
December 2017 
School of Business 
Degree Programme in International Business 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Description 
Author(s) 
Uskumbayeva, Assel 
Type of publication  
Bachelor’s thesis 
Date 
December 2017 
Language of publication:  
English 
Number of pages  
 
Permission for web 
publication: x 
Title of publication  
The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Corporate Capital Structure in the Nordic Countries 
Degree programme 
Degree programme in International Business 
 Supervisor(s) 
Hundal, Shabnamjit 
 
 
Assigned by 
 
Abstract 
The aim of this study was to examine the impact of the financial crisis on corporate capital 
structure across the Nordic countries. The analysis was performed on a period extending 
from 2005 to 2017 on the basis of firm-level secondary data. The main objective was to 
determine whether the corporate capital structure had changed during the financial crisis 
and post-crisis when compared to the same in the pre-crisis sub-period.  
Secondary numerical data was collected from the official databases and financial 
statements of the companies. The usage of the SPSS software enabled performing 
descriptive, correlational and multivariate ordinary and least square regression analyses. 
Descriptive statistics provided a factual overview of the dataset. A correlational study 
provided information regarding the level of association between two variables. The 
multivariate least square regression analysis demonstrated the extent of the impact of the 
list of independent variables on the dependent. Those methods served to test the asserted 
hypotheses and to answer the research questions. 
The empirical findings suggested that the capital structure had changed throughout the 
period from 2005 to 2017. The corporate capital structure experienced changes from very 
high leverage ratios during the pre-crisis period to even higher ones during the crisis and, 
finally, to the least significant figure after the crisis. The results disclose that changes in the 
capital structure had not influenced risk and return of the companies except for return on 
equity ratio. Thereby, the outcomes indicate a positive association between the capital 
structure and return on equity.  
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 had an enormous impact on the global economy, 
and the Nordic countries were not an exception (Foster & Magdoff 2008, 11). Even 
though the economic crisis is currently believed to be over and the shaken 
economies of the world are recovering, the effects of the crisis on both the economy 
and companies are still quite evident. The primary goal of this study was to examine 
the effect of the financial crisis on the corporate capital structure. Since capital is a 
central component for conducting business and could be raised in so many different 
ways, capital structure is a topic of discussion. The financial crisis created a recession 
which, in turn, had a significant impact on firms’ capital structure. Besides capital 
structure, company’s risk and returns indicators are examined in this research. More 
precisely, the thesis aimed at finding whether the choice of capital structure 
impacted the risk and returns of the company. Risk and return relationship indicates 
the amount of return gained on an investment and the amount of risk undertaken in 
that investment (Campbell & Viceira). After an extensive literature review, the author 
realised that there existed a significant gap and inadequacy in examining the effects 
of the global financial crisis on the capital structure and its impact on firms’ risk and 
returns. Accordingly, the main research objectives were derived. The first was to 
examine whether the financial collapse had influenced the capital structure in 
companies across the Nordic countries. Secondly, the thesis was targeted to 
determine if the changing corporate capital structure had an influence over the risk 
and returns of the company. 
1.2 Motivation for the research 
Having studied numerous recently published research articles and theses regarding 
this topic, the author realised that there was no extensive material although the 
topic is of significant amount of interest, especially in the context of the current 
times. The research topic was not only of academic medium-sized enterprises or big 
corporations.  
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The motivation to study the impact of financial crisis on Nordic countries is explained 
by the author’s personal interest in particular countries even though she has interest 
in the given topic in general. Moreover, the interest is justified by the author’s 
aspiration to study finance further as a specialization in her Master degree followed 
by a career in the field of finance.  
1.3 Research questions 
The study is built upon three research questions. The main research question is 
proposed as follows: 
1. Has the corporate capital structure changed during the financial crisis and 
post-crisis when compared to the same in the pre-crisis sub-period?  
2. What type of changes has the corporate capital structure experienced? 
3. What were the effects of the changing corporate capital structure on the risk 
and return during three sub-periods?  
In order to answer the aforementioned questions, 30 non-financial companies in 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden which are publicly traded on Nasdaq 
OMX Nordic Stock Exchange (OMXN40), were considered and explored. The effects 
of the crisis were investigated by dividing the data period into three distinct time 
intervals called the pre-crisis (2005-2006), in-crisis (2007-2008) and the post-crisis 
(2009-2017) sub-periods. Furthermore, the study examined the possible 
relationships of the important determinants and the influences of the crisis on these 
determinants of the capital structure during the mentioned periods. In this respect, 
the relation of tangibility, profitability, size, growth, earning volatility, corporate tax 
and industry classification with the leverage of the firm were discussed. The 
secondary data regarding accounting and financial variables were collected from the 
corporate annual reports and other related documents; similarly, the market-related 
financial data was obtained from the Nasdaq OMX Nordic database. The key 
variables that were analysed in the current study were: risk and return and capital 
  
3 
structure. The data collected was categorised as variables which were then analysed 
by using multivariate least square analysis and correlation analysis. The analysis of 
the data was implemented with the assistance of SPSS analysis. 
Regarding the outcomes of the thesis work, the following results were revealed as 
answers to the research questions. Firstly, it was detected that the capital structure 
had experienced significant alterations within the chosen period. Thereby, when the 
figures of the in-crisis and post-crisis were compared to the same in the pre-crisis 
period, solid changes could be distinguished. Generally, the debt proportion in the 
corporate capital structure had increased by 16.76% during the crisis and declined by 
18.93% after the crisis in comparison to the pre-crisis sub-period (see Tables 2,6,10).  
The results disclosed that changes in the capital structure did not influence the risk 
and return of the companies except for the return on the equity ratio. In addition, 
the study revealed that the risks did not impact the capital structure, either. Thereby, 
the results represented only one positive association with the capital structure, 
which is the association with the return on equity. It was also discovered that 
systematic risk has a causal relationship with the return on equity.  
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
The study provides the readers with the theoretical background of the topic by 
acquainting them with the following topics: the history of the financial crisis and its 
impact, the concepts of risk and return in finance and capital structure. It forms a 
foundation for a subsequent study of the research questions. Further, the 
hypotheses based on the literature review are formed. In the next chapter, 
“Methodology”, the specific research approach is described as well as the methods 
of the data collection followed by the analysis methods used in the study. The 
chapter “Empirical findings” reveals the research results and demonstrates the 
analysis of the answers to the research questions. The last chapter, “Conclusion”, 
presents the practical and managerial implications of the results described in the 
“Results” chapter. In addition, it discusses the limitations of the research and the 
recommendations for future research.  
  
4 
2 Theoretical background of capital structure 
Since the goal of this thesis is to analyse the capital structure of the companies 
across the Nordic countries, it is essential to characterise the complex concept of 
capital structure. Therefore, this chapter aims to introduce and summarize the most 
popular concepts in the field. Foremost, the distinctive features of the capital 
structure’s constituents – debt and equity - are discussed in sub-chapter 2.1, 2.2. 
Capital structure as a concept is examined in sub-chapter 2.3, where capital 
structure’s role in a company, its determinants are reviewed. Furthermore, the 
theories of the “weighted average cost of capital” and “capital asset pricing model” 
are covered in this sub-section. The existing theories relevant to the capital structure 
are discussed in section 2.5. The measuring instruments are reviewed in section 2.4. 
The author was primarily interested in the impact of the financial crisis on the capital 
structures of the companies. Therefore, the financial crisis and its impact is 
additionally reviewed in the theoretical background chapter. Acquaintance with the 
theoretical framework is of vital importance for the comprehensive understanding of 
the research process and methodology.  
A firm requires capital in order to sustain and develop its business. In outline, there 
are two ways of fundraising: by issuing debt or equity capital. Debt financing fosters 
many benefits to a company in comparison to equity financing. However, debt 
additionally brings increased risks. Therefore, debt management has been a crucial 
task for every company aiming to optimize the benefits of debt capital and minimize 
the risk that it might bring. (Brigham & Houston 2007, 416-420.) This chapter 
addresses the primary characteristics of debt and equity financing. It provides the 
reader with the advantages and disadvantages of both options of financing a 
company’s operations for further comparison of the financing options.  
2.1 Debt 
The borrowed capital represents the financial resources, or other property values, 
involved in a returnable basis for the financing of the company development. All 
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forms of borrowed capital represent the financial liabilities of the company, which 
are subject to repayment in a certain period. (Breadley 2011, 577.) 
By issuing debt, the company receives many advantages, which under certain 
circumstances, however, may turn into disadvantages and entail deterioration of the 
financial condition of the company, bringing it closer to bankruptcy. Financing of 
assets from borrowed sources can be attractive since the creditor does not make any 
direct claims regarding the future incomes of the company. Regardless of the results, 
the creditor has the right to claim the agreed amount of the principal and interest on 
it. (ibid., 579.) 
The fundamental difference between equity and debt financing is that the borrowed 
funds are irrelevant to the structure of equity capital. Debt obligations do not lead to 
a dilution of the share of the company’s owners. In the majority of the cases, the 
value of the obligations and their maturity dates are known in advance, which 
facilitates the financial planning of cash flows. (Hamberg 2001, 107.)  
Debt is acknowledged as the cheaper option of raising funds for the company 
because of the tax deductibility of the payment for the use of the borrowed funds. 
The tax expenses are, thus, reduced creating a “tax shield” for the company. At the 
same time, the presence of costs associated with the payment for the use of the 
borrowed funds shifts the break-even point of the enterprise. In other words, in 
order to achieve the break-even point, the company has to have more sales. In 
conditions of an unstable financial situation, this may become one of the reasons for 
the loss of solvency: the firm is not in a position to provide a higher inflow of funds 
necessary to cover the increased costs. (Grinblatt & Titman 2002, 70.) 
Debt capital is characterized by the following positive properties (Efimova 2002, 294-
295): 
- sufficiently broad possibilities of attraction debt financing, especially with the high 
credit rating of the company; 
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- ensuring the financial growth of the firm if it is necessary to significantly expand its 
assets and increase the growth rate of its business; 
- lower cost in comparison to the company’s own capital due to the effect of a "tax 
shield"; 
- the ability to generate an increase in financial profitability (return on equity) due to 
the effect of financial leverage. 
At the same time, the debt capital has the following downsides (Efimova 1994, 532): 
- the use of this capital generates the most dangerous financial risks in the economic 
activity of the firm - the risk of reducing financial stability and loss of solvency; 
- assets formed at the expense of borrowed capital generate a lower rate of profit, 
which is reduced by the amount of interest paid; 
- a high dependence of the value of the borrowed capital on fluctuations in the 
financial market; 
 A further limitation of using debt is the lack of flexibility. A company with a 
significant share of borrowed capital has little room for manoeuvring in the event of 
unforeseen circumstances, such as a possible drop in demand for products, a 
significant change in interest rates, increased costs or seasonal fluctuations. 
Thus, an enterprise that uses borrowed capital has a higher financial potential for its 
development due to the formation of an additional volume of assets and the 
possibility of an increase in financial profitability. However, this generates a higher 
financial risk and a threat of bankruptcy (Berg & DeMarzo 2017, 479). All these 
moments should be taken into account in the financial analysis when evaluating the 
rationality of the capital structure.  
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2.2 Equity 
Equity capital in represented as finance earned either internally and retained within 
the firm or obtained externally by issuing new equity securities. There are three 
different types of equity that capital firms issue: (1) common stock, (2) preferred 
stock, and (3) warrants. (Grinblatt & Titman 2002, 70.) 
Common shares are one of the options to finance a company’s long-term assets. 
Common shareholders are the owners of the company, and, thus, raising funds by 
issuing more common shares has ownership and control implications for the firm. 
The individual shareholders possess power over the management of the company, 
and they can influence the decisions related to their shares. Consequently, they bear 
the risk associated with the operations of the company, and, in a bankruptcy 
scenario, the shareholders receive nothing or a very small amount of money. In the 
hierarchy of creditors, ordinary shareholders are placed at the bottom. Therefore, 
since they carry the greatest risks as lenders, the expected returns to them are 
higher in comparison to the repayments of debt. (ibid., 70.) 
Dissimilar to common shares, the preferred shares give their holders a claim on a 
company’s profits before the dividends to the common shareholders. Moreover, the 
holders of preferred shares are higher in the hierarchy of receiving money in case of 
the firm’s liquidation. Nonetheless, their claims are always junior compared to the 
claims of the debtholders. The preferred shareholders’ power on the firm’s decisions 
is also limited, and it limits their rights to vote. Preferred stock is utilized less 
frequently than common stock as a source to finance a firm’s operations. One of the 
biggest privileges of the preferred stock is that it allows companies to issue a debt-
like security without lowering the ratings on their existing debt. However, in contrast 
to a debt security, the dividends on preferred stock are not tax-deductible. (Brealey 
et al. 2011, 350.) 
Warrants are another option for firms, and they represent long-term call options on 
the issuing firm’s stock. Call options give their holders the right to buy shares of the 
firm at a pre-specified price for a given period of time. These options are often 
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included as part of a unit offering, which includes various securities suggested as a 
package. (ibid., 351.)  
Own capital is characterized by the following fundamental positive properties 
(Efimova 2002, 203): 
- the simplicity of attraction, since decisions related to the increase of equity capital 
(especially at the expense of the internal source of their formation) are taken by the 
owners and managers of the organization without obtaining the consent of other 
economic entities; 
- a higher ability to generate profits in all areas of activity, as when using it, no 
interest charge is required in all its forms; 
- ensuring the financial sustainability of the company development;  
- the company’s solvency in the long run, and accordingly;  
- risk of bankruptcy is reduced.  
At the same time, the following barriers are inherent in own capital (ibid., 204): 
- the limited scope of attracting opportunities for a significant expansion of the 
operational and investment activities of the organization at certain stages of its life 
cycle, especially during a period of favourable market conditions; 
- higher costs in comparison to alternative sources of capital formation, more 
specifically, debt. 
Thus, a company that uses only its own capital has the highest financial stability, but 
it may also restrict its limits to grow in the future (Berg & DeMarzo 2017, 479). 
2.3 Capital structure 
The acceleration of market changes, imposing entirely new, more stringent 
requirements on all subjects of market relations, is the most essential characteristic 
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of the current economy. Market changes increase in its number, and thereby 
multiply the uncertainty and the risks it entails. In these conditions, the efficiency of 
the company is largely determined by the ability of its owners and management 
team to accurately estimate market changes. Based on this estimation, it is crucial to 
elaborate an effective strategy for the company’s development. Thus, the 
management teams of companies face a number of tasks that require practical 
solutions. (Madura 2006, 527.) 
The development of modern companies cannot be imagined without introduction of 
sophisticated technology, the creation of competitive goods and services, without 
moving to new markets, which is associated with the implementation of major 
investment projects, the implementation of transactions on mergers and 
acquisitions. These operations directly determine the future competitive position of 
the company in the market and the implementation of its development strategy. 
(ibid., 527.) 
In order to finance its activities, the company can use both its own and borrowed 
capital. Companies that are provided with inexpensive long-term capital have more 
opportunities to grow and gain market share than their competitors. At the same 
time, it is important not only to attract enough funds for the development of the 
company but also correctly determine the appropriate capital structure for it. So, the 
least expensive source is borrowed capital, however, by attracting loans, the 
company increases financial risks. Financing activities at the expense of own less 
risky, however, is more expensive. Therefore, only a balanced capital structure of the 
company can ensure the proper development. (Berg & DeMarzo 2017, 478.) 
The establishment of an optimal capital structure have to meet the requirements 
imposed by both the economic situation in general and the company's management 
system, taking into account its characteristics at a particular stage of development. 
The requirements of the external economic situation are characterized by the 
uncertainty of external factors due to the influence of globalization, as well as the 
expansion of the range of possible options for investing available resources. The 
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requirements of the company's management imply effective functioning in a 
competitive environment and determination of the debt-equity ratio that would be 
optimal under the given conditions. This optimal structure of capital implies ensuring 
the financial stability of the firm, achieving the standards of its current liquidity and 
solvency, as well as the required return on invested capital. (Graham & Leary 2011, 
5.) All of the above enumerates the relevance of the topic of this thesis work. 
2.3.1 Role of capital structure in a firm 
Determination of an optimal capital structure signifies a high impact on a firm’s 
existence. Above all, capital structure decisions influence the formation of a 
sufficient amount of capital, ensuring the necessary pace of economic development 
of the company. The total capital requirements secure financing of assets necessary 
for the company. Moreover, an optimal for a firm capital structure guarantees a 
permanent financial equilibrium of the company in the process of its development. 
This equilibrium is characterized by a high level of financial stability and solvency of 
the firm at all stages of its development. (Madura 2006, 528.) 
The right combination of capital structure provides superior conditions for achieving 
maximum return on capital at the envisaged level of financial risk. The maximum 
profitability of capital can be ensured at the stage of its planning by minimizing its 
weighted average cost and optimizing the ratio of its own and borrowed capital. It is 
significant to keep in mind that the maximization of the level of profitability of capital 
is achieved, as a rule, with a significant increase in the level of financial risks 
associated with its issuing, since there is a direct relationship between these two 
indicators. Therefore, the maximization of the return on capital must lay within an 
acceptable financial risk. The specific level of risk is determined by the owners or 
managers of the enterprise, taking into account their financial attitudes to the 
degree of acceptable risk in carrying out economic activities. (Milken 2009) 
Decisions on capital structure also include company’s aim to minimize financial risk 
associated with the use of capital. If the level of profitability of the capital is planned, 
it is an important task to reduce the level of financial risk of operations ensuring 
  
11 
achievement of this profitability. Such minimization of the level of risks can be 
ensured by diversification of the forms of attracted capital, optimization of the 
structure of its sources, avoidance of certain financial risks, useful forms of their 
internal and external insurance. (ibid.). 
When planning capital structure, it is substantial to ensure a sufficient level of 
financial control over the company by its owners. Such financial control is provided 
by a controlling stake in the hands of the founders. At a stage of the subsequent 
development of the capital, it is of vital importance to evaluate the external 
resources of capital, their impact on the company and the possibility of absorption of 
the company by the foreign investors. (Hamberg 2001, 213.) 
With to the right mix of the sources of finance, the company possesses financial 
flexibility. It characterizes the ability of a company to quickly generate the necessary 
amount of additional capital with an unexpected appearance of highly effective 
investment proposals or new opportunities for accelerating economic growth. The 
necessary financial flexibility is provided by optimizing the gearing ratio, long-term 
and short-term forms of capital raising, reducing the level of financial risks, 
favourable settlements with investors and creditors. (ibid.) 
Due to the constant changes in the external economic environment or internal 
parameters of the economic activity of the company, a number of directions and 
forms of using capital may not provide the anticipated level of its profitability. This 
can be avoided by timely reinvestment of capital. (Kuznetsov 2005, 293.) 
2.3.2 Determinants of capital structure 
As Harris and Raviv state: “Several studies shed light on the specific characteristics of 
firms and industries that determine leverage ratios. [...] These studies generally 
agree that leverage increases with fixed assets, non-debt tax shields, growth 
opportunities, and firm size and decreases with volatility, advertising expenditures, 
research and development expenditures, bankruptcy probability, profitability and 
uniqueness of the product.” (1991, 334).  
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Size 
From the theoretical point of view, the size of the company has an indefinite effect 
on its leverage. Rajan and Zingales state that a large-scale company tends to make 
more decisions in favour of debt due to the diversification and decreased risk of 
bankruptcy (1995, 1451). Moreover, empirical studies do not state clearly whether 
there is a positive or negative dependence between size and leverage. For instance, 
Huang and Song (2002), Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Friend and Lang (1988) show 
the evidence of positive relations between leverage and the size of the company in 
their works. On the other hand, some studies report a negative relation, for example, 
Kim & Sorensen (1986) and Titman & Wessels, (1988). The reasoning for the negative 
interdependency between these two factors is that the availability of information 
about the size of the company for the investors positively effects on their preference 
for equity relative to debt. De Jong and Verwijmeren (2010) also argue that bigger 
companies tend to follow a target debt ratio whereas smaller companies generally 
follow a preference order due to higher levels of information asymmetry. Their 
results, however, are very often weak as far as the level of statistical significance is 
concerned. The variable determining the size of the company in this work is a natural 
logarithm of the sales of a company.  
Profitability 
There is no clear evidence of a dependence between profitability and leverage. 
However, different authors present theories on this point. The trade-off theory 
(Kraus & Litzenberger 1976) implies that companies that earn more profit tend to 
have a higher portion of debt in their capital structure because of the possibility to 
shield more income from taxes. The agency theory (Jensen & Meckling 1976) 
delineates that more profitable companies should use more debt in order to 
discipline the managers, to induce them to pay out cash instead of spending money 
on inefficient projects. Nonetheless, according to the pecking-order theory (Myers & 
Majluf 1984), successful companies prefer internal financing to external. More 
profitable companies, thus, use external sources of finance infrequently in 
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comparison to internal ones. Most empirical studies, such as Rajan & Zingales (1995), 
Huang & Song (2002), Booth and collegues (2001), Friend & Lang (1988), Titman & 
Wessels (1988), and Kester (1986) demonstrate a negative relationship between 
leverage and profitability. Return on assets is used as a variable showing the 
profitability of the company.  
Tangibility 
The tangibility of the company impacts on the decisions regarding its capital 
structure to a great extent. In theory, it is believed that the more tangible assets the 
company possess, the higher the value of the company and the lower the risk of the 
company going bankrupt. The company, therefore, is able to issue more debt (Booth 
et al. 2001, 101). Friend & Lang (1988), Rajan & Zingales (1995) and Titman & 
Wessels (1988) agree upon this issue and observe a positive relation between 
tangibility and leverage. The ratio of tangible assets compared to the total assets was 
used as a variable for the analysis of tangibility in this work.  
Growth opportunities 
Future growth opportunities for companies play a significant role in planning the 
capital structure as well. However, there exist different opinions on this matter.  
The agency theory (Jensen & Meckling 1976) documents the antagonistic 
relationship between the growth opportunities of a firm and its level of leverage 
demonstrating that firms that are growing rapidly, as a rule, utilise less borrowed 
capital (Frank & Goyal 2005). In essence, the agency theory reveals that managers 
behave rationally when trying to expand their own earning at the expense of the 
shareholders, and debt financing controls this behaviour. This leads to fewer 
investment opportunities for companies and a heightened cash flow as a result of a 
greater use of debt. 
On the contrary, the pecking order theory (Myers & Majluf 1984) declares an 
affirmative relationship between growth opportunities and leverage. It argues that 
managers are rational, but not necessarily opportunistic. Thus, in the maturity phase, 
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debts exert no more the same disciplinary effect on managers as in the agency 
theory. For the calculation of growth opportunities, the growth in research and 
development expenses was employed in this study.  
Corporate Tax 
The trade-off theory (Kraus & Litzenberger 1976) argues that a company which has to 
pay higher taxes possesses a higher leverage ratio because of the tax shield 
advantage. However, for example, Fama and French (1998) declare that debt has no 
net tax benefits. 
Modigliani and Miller advocate the tax advantage of the borrowing costs in their 
modified theory of capital structure (1963). The reasoning is that, since the interest 
expense is tax deductible, the government is subsidizing companies that issue debt 
securities for financing their operations and projects. Companies, thus, try to 
maximize their share of the government subsidy when planning their capital 
structure. Thus, when there exists an income-tax deductibility of interest payments 
at the firm level, the market value of the firm rises as a higher financial leverage is 
involved.  
Another hypothesis proposed by DeAngelo and Masulis regards the non-debt tax 
shields, such as depreciation, provisions and tax carryovers, as providers of 
additional benefits. Firms strive to exploit the tax deductibility of interest to reduce 
the tax burden. If firms also have further tax-deductible items, other than their 
debts, then the leverage effect is low. (1980, 21.) Organizations that hold before-tax 
earning consistent primarily have a higher leverage ratio. They state that non-debt 
tax shields override the debt-related tax shield and, subsequently, there is a negative 
relationship between the non-debt tax shields and leverage.  
Earning volatility 
Volatility implies the risk of a financial distress in the company. The primary 
assumption is that volatility impacts on the decision on capital structure negatively 
and, thus, the company employs less debt as volatility increases (Kim & Sorensen 
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1986). There is, however, evidence of controversial relations between volatility and 
leverage aspects. For instance, Huang and Song declare that the higher the variance 
of the assets in the company, the smaller is market risk (2002, 9). This negative 
relation is also confirmed by Bradley (1984) and Titman & Wessels (1988). For the 
analysis of earnings volatility, the standard deviation in return on assets was 
employed in this study. 
Industry classification 
Capital structure is dependent on many aspects of the economy, and the 
classification of the industry in which the company operates stands for one of them. 
Harris and Raviv (1991, 333) argue that companies representing such products as 
pharmaceuticals, instruments, electronics and food, as a rule, possess less debt in 
their financial structure while the paper, textile, steel, airlines and cement companies 
more frequently have a higher leverage ratio. In order to measure this determinant, 
dummy variables were introduced in this work.  
2.3.3 Systematic risk – Beta 
The capital asset pricing model (hereafter, CAPM) is discussed in sub-chapter 2.3.4. 
Whereas this sub-chapter expounds the concept of Beta(ß) – the prime component 
of the CAPM theory. Foremost, beta is an indicator of systematic risk. In economic 
and financial theories, systematic risk constitutes the risk intrinsic to the entire 
market risk. This is frequently entitled as “undiversifiable risk”, “volatility” or “market 
risk”, which infers the risk impacting the whole market and not particular industry or 
company. (Luecke 2002, 114.) Beta shows the responsiveness of the moves in returns 
of the particular security relative to the moves in the stock exchange or market. Beta 
that equals 1 is a market beta which serves as a benchmark for the measurement of 
systematic risks. (Watson & Head, 2010, 239.) 
The greater the beta of a particular security, the higher returns of the same security 
will be expected. The beta equals to 0.8 implies that if the market risk rises by 10 %, 
the security return will rise by 8% and, contrariwise, if the market risk lowers by 10%, 
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the security return will fall by 8%. Beta higher than 1.0 is considered as high and 
those below 1.0 as low. High-beta is also called aggressive, whilst low-beta is 
defensive. Higher-beta stocks are disposed to possess superior risk, thus, be more 
volatile, but grant higher returns. Lower-beta stocks create less risk but generally 
offer lower returns. (McLaney 2009, 199.) The idea has been disputable; some 
academics argue that the data show little dependence between beta and potential 
return, or even that lower-beta stocks can hold less risk and bring higher profits 
(McAlpine 2010).  
The beta equals to the covariance of returns of the particular security and the market 
divided by the squared standard deviation of the market. The calculation of beta 
involves regression analysis - the collection of the data on the periodic returns of the 
market and the security under consideration (Watson & Head 2010, 240): 
 =
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑚
𝑚
2
 
where:  𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑚 = the covariance of returns of security 𝑖 and the return of the 
market 𝑚; 
 𝑚 = the standard deviation of the market returns. 
2.3.4 The capital asset pricing theory 
William Sharpe proposed “The capital asset pricing theory” in 1964 - the work that 
reveals the share valuation method. It demonstrates the linear relationship between 
risk and return of an investment. This work was based on Markowitz’s portfolio 
theory and acts as a logical continuation of it. The theory is used considering the 
following assumptions:  
• all the investors behave rationally striving for maximisation of their profit; 
• information is available to investors; 
• it is possible to borrow and lend at risk-free rate; 
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• unsystematic risk is liquidated because of the investors’ diversified portfolios; 
• capital markets are perfectly competitive. (Watson & Head, 2010, 238.) 
CAPM is the most commonly used method for computing the cost of equity (often 
expressed as “rate of return”), which is inferred by comparing the investment to 
other investments with similar risk profiles. The formula is represented below:  
𝑅𝑖 =  𝑅𝑓 +  𝑖(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓) 
where:  𝑅𝑖 = the rate of return of security 𝑖 predicted by the model; 
 𝑅𝑓 = the risk-free rate; 
 
𝑖
= the beta coefficient of security 𝑖; 
 𝑅𝑚= the return of the market. (ibid., 238.) 
The rate of return predicted by the model (𝑅𝑖), shown as a percentage, implies the 
expected income earned on investment (Medina 1988, 70).  
Risk-free rate (𝑅𝑓) is an investment with no potential risk, which provides with the 
original principal and additionally minimal return over a period of time. Nonetheless, 
investment cannot have absolutely zero-risk rate in real economy because of 
inflation. (Damodaran 2008, 12, 14.) The risk-free rate given by the government 
bonds is acknowledged as the nominal risk-free rate (Stowe 2007, 49).  
As it was mentioned in the sub-chapter 2.3.3, Beta coefficient (
𝑖
) indicates 
systematic risk and demonstrates the moves of the security return in relation to 
market return.  
Whereas market return (𝑅𝑚) denotes the return of the entire market. Different 
indexes, for instance FTSE 100, Dow Jones and Nasdaq, supply the market return 
rates. Those rates are constituted from the historical performance of the market. 
(Boyte-White 2015).  
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2.3.5 Weighted average cost of capital 
The term "weighted average cost of capital" (hereafter, WACC) is used in financial 
analysis and business valuation. The WACC serves as a benchmark for company 
performance in corporate finance. The WACC demonstrates all the costs related to 
the proportion of debt and equity in the capital structure of a firm. In a rational 
financial world, every company’s primary aim is to minimize the WACC and maximize 
shareholders’ wealth. Hence, an optimal balance between various sources of raising 
funds are sought-for. (Watson & Head 2010, 259.) 
The indicator WACC integrates information about the specific composition of the 
elements of the company’s capital, their individual values and significance in the 
total amount of capital. It determines the relative level of expenses (in the form of 
interest payments, dividends and fees.) for the use of financial resources used in the 
activities of the organization. The total cost of capital, thereby, is the average value 
of the prices of each source in the total. (McLaney 2009, 282-283.) 
Another application of the WACC is its usage as a discount rate in investment 
analysis. The cost of capital is compared with the internal rate of return. For the 
project to pay off, the rate of return yield should be greater than the cost of capital. 
The WACC shows the minimum return of the organization's funds to the capital 
invested in its activities, or its profitability. The economic meaning of this indicator is 
that the organization can make investment decisions if the level of their profitability 
is not lower than the current value of the WACC. The cost of capital characterizes the 
level of profitability of the invested capital necessary to ensure the high market value 
of the organization. (ibid., 283.) 
The calculation takes into account the specific weight of each source of financing in 
the total cost. The indicator characterizes the relative level of total expenditure for 
each source of financing. The main difficulty in calculating this indicator is the 
calculation of the unit price of capital received from a particular source of funds, 
since this determines the accuracy of the WACC calculation. For some sources, it can 
be calculated quite easily and accurately (for example, the cost of a bank loan); for a 
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number of other sources it is rather difficult to do this, and exact calculation is 
impossible in principle. Nevertheless, even approximate WACC estimates are 
acceptable for analytical purposes (useful both for comparative analysis of the 
effectiveness of the organization, and for justifying the investment policy of the 
organization). Weighting can be initial or target. The initial weighting is based on the 
existing capital structure, which is recognized as an optimal and should be preserved 
in the future and can be carried out at the book value and market value of the 
sources. Target weighing is used if the organization wants to create an optimal 
capital structure for itself when the planned ratio of own and borrowed funds in the 
total volume of sources should be maintained for a long period of time. (Watson & 
Head 2010, 259.) 
In the case where the company is financed with only equity and debt, the weighted 
average cost of capital is calculated as follows: 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 =
𝐸
𝐸 + 𝐷
𝐾𝑒 +  
𝐷
𝐸 + 𝐷
𝐾𝑑(1 − 𝑡) 
where:  𝐸 = the total shareholder’s equity; 
 𝐷 = the total debt; 
 𝐾𝑒 = the cost of equity; 
 𝐾𝑑 = the cost of debt; 
 𝑡 = the effective corporate tax rate. (Fernandes 2014). 
Cost of equity (𝐾𝑒) is computed with the use of CAPM as it was defined in sub-section 
2.2.4. In order to calculate cost of debt (𝐾𝑑), the total amount of interest company 
pays on its debts for the year is divided by the total amount of debt. Effective 
corporate tax rate 𝑡 is calculated by the income tax expenses divided by the income 
earned before taxes (Miles & Ezzell).  
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2.4 Measure of capital structure 
The capital structure is defined as the relationship between debt and equity in the 
company, therefore, the level of gearing indicator is one of the methods of 
measuring it. The term gearing implies the relationship between debt and equity 
finance in a company. The higher proportion of debt relative to equity, the higher 
gearing level is. There are various methods of calculating the gearing ratio of the firm 
according to different theories (Rajan and Zingales 1995). These ratios include total 
liabilities-to-total assets and total debt-to-total assets. Total debt-to-net assets can 
further be a way to estimate capital structure (ibid.). All those ratios are used for 
more profound analysis of capital structure. Whereas this study examines only the 
phenomena of capital structure and the impact of external factors on capital 
structure changes. Hence, the ratio debt-to-equity is employed in this work. The ratio 
depicts the proportion of company capital financed through debt. Since the debt-to-
equity ratio measures a company’s debt relative to the total value of its stock, it is 
most often used to quantify the proportion of which a company is taking on 
borrowed capital as a means of leveraging in order to fund various projects. A high 
debt-to-equity ratio generally indicates company’s aggressive manner in financing its 
growth with debt. Aggressive leveraging methods are often used when risk levels are 
high. This may result in volatile earnings as a result of the additional interest 
expenses.  
With high gearing ratio, the company might potentially bring more profits compared 
to the lower gearing ratio. Nonetheless, high debt financing eventually leads to the 
increased risk and costs. Therefore, this is an issue of vital importance to estimate 
the optimal for the company capital structure and strive to reach this ratio. 
2.5 Capital structure theories 
Berk and DeMarzo explained a term “capital structure” as “the relative proportion of 
debt, equity, and other securities that a firm has outstanding constitute its capital 
structure.” (2007, 428). Companies use two types of sources to raise fund for their 
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operations: equity and debt. In most cases, the combination of equity and debt is 
chosen as an option (ibid., 428). 
Financial analysists, commentators or the CEOs of the companies strive to find out an 
optimal gearing level which would results in maximum profits for its shareholders. 
Capital structure is one the hottest topics and lays behind strategic and operational 
decisions of any company. Nonetheless, many argue if an optimal capital structure 
exists in practice. The equity–debt equation in a firm’s capital structure has hitherto 
been disputable. However, the evidence of the tax shield benefit of debt financing is 
accepted by financial analysts and managers. (Bierman 2003, 5.) 
2.5.1 Modigliani and Miller theory 
Modigliani and Miller were the first financial economists who attempted to build a 
theory of an optimal capital structure. The Modigliani-Miller (hereafter, M&M) 
theory was originally proposed in a 1958 paper, then refined and modified. Their 
theory, based on the assumption of the perfect market with no corporate taxes and 
no bankruptcy, states that the financial performance of the company is irrelevant to 
the capital structure. In addition, they also assume that there is no inflation, 
transaction costs associated with raising money and all the information is credible. In 
accordance to their work, it is proved that the firm's total value does not depend on 
the amount of borrowed funds and can be calculated from the operating profit and 
the required return on equity with zero financial leverage. Thus, according to the 
model of M&M that was proposed in 1958, the price of a firm and the cost of capital 
are independent of the capital structure. 
The Miller-Modigliani approach is built for a perfect market and can be seen as a 
paradox for a real economy. The model is only feasible if the possibility of bankruptcy 
is not taken into account. Notwithstanding, taking into account corporate taxes, a 
high leveraged firm pays less tax on its income compared to a low leveraged firm, 
because of the interest being tax-deductible, while the dividends to the shareholders 
not. Particularly, the debt interest can be offset against pre-tax profits before the 
calculation of the corporation tax bill, thus reducing the tax paid. Moreover, the costs 
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of issuing debts, which includes interests, transaction costs, all the fees, are generally 
less than issuing shares. (Arnold 2007, 391.) The criticism of the theory stimulated 
Modigliani and Miller to modify their theory. Thus, in 1963 they developed their 
initial model which took into account corporate profit taxes (Modigliani & Miller). In 
the new M&M model, it is asserted that a firm that uses a financial leverage is higher 
rated in the market, since paying interest on borrowed capital is an expense that 
involves tax benefits. Considering the tax benefits, the cost of borrowed capital is 
lower, and a higher share of borrowed capital in the total capital of the firm diminish 
the weighted average cost of capital. Thus, taking into account the profit tax, the 
financial leverage has a decreasing effect on the cost of the firm's capital and the 
increasing influence on the firm's value. 
Hence, the introduction of the tax model in the M&M model changes the investor's 
behaviour. The paradox is that in a perfect market when paying taxes on profits and 
developing a tax shield, the price of the firm is maximized at 100% borrowed capital. 
Therefore, if taxes were the only one ground that capital structure influences cash 
flow, the company would simply finance all the assets with 100% borrowed capital in 
order to generate tax deduction that is sufficient to eliminate its tax liability. 
Theoretically, it is impossible. And the reason for that is explained in the concept of 
financial distress costs, which M&M theory does not cover. (Brearly et al., 421.)  
2.5.2 Trade-off theory 
When the firm’s debt obligations exceed its ability to generate enough cash for 
repayments, the concept of financial distress costs emerges. Financial distress costs 
imply significant costs to the firm when it is not able to meet its own debt 
obligations. The costs of financial distress depend on the probability of the 
bankruptcy and the amount of costs associated with this process. With small loans, 
the probability of bankruptcy is low, and its costs are low as well. Advantages in 
taxation lead to an increase of debt share in the company's capital value. Albeit, with 
the high financial leverage, the probability of bankruptcy increases, and tax 
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advantages may not cover the growing financial distress costs. (Kraus & Litzenberger 
1973.) 
For that reason, the optimal structure of capital for a trade-off theory is defined by 
the balance determination between benefits from the tax shield and losses from a 
possible bankruptcy. Evidently, the benefits curve of the tax shield reaches a 
maximum point at a certain proportion of debt and with further increases in leverage 
starts declining. Therefore, the trade-off theory of capital structure states that 
companies can establish an optimal capital structure if the net tax advantage of debt 
financing compensates costs related to leverage, holding firm’s assets and 
investment decisions constant. There is a maximum point where the marginal benefit 
of further increases in debt declines as debt increases, whereas the marginal cost 
increases. (ibid.) 
Miller declares that higher leveraged firms enjoy more benefits because the costs 
associated with financial distress are not material (1977). Myers believes that all the 
companies implementing the trade-off theory strive to achieve the designated target 
debt-to-value ratio, which is considered to be the optimum balance. However, 
company’s managers tend to opt for debt sources of finance if they believe that the 
company is underestimated in the market (1984). Atman reviewed the theory and 
concluded that companies, which issue additional equity, signals bad news since it is 
a sign of moving away from their optimum balance of finance (1984). Leary and 
Roberts (2005) claim that companies react to equity issuances and equity price drops 
by reconsidering actual leverage towards target leverage in two to four years. 
Additionally, they declare that persistent effects of shocks on leverage are due to 
optimizing strategies as opposed to indifference regarding their capital structure.  
Ebaid argues that debt financing reduces agency costs because the company’s image 
and the managers’ wages are at stake. Nevertheless, higher leverage also implies 
that the company has higher commitment to comply its obligation payments. (2009.)  
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Furthermore, the trade-off theory denotes that the more profitable the company is, 
the lower the risks of financial distress. Consequently, those companies tend to 
employ a higher proportion of debt in their capital structure. (Myers 1984.)  
2.5.3 Pecking order theory 
Contrary to the trade-off theory, pecking order theory suggest not an optimal capital 
structure, but a hierarchy of financing sources. The theory considers the information 
asymmetry in the company which induces additional costs. Besides, transactional 
costs are also reckoned in this theory. These costs result in higher costs of external 
funds over internal ones. The ownership and management of the company being two 
separate units naturally lead to the information asymmetry. The pecking order 
theory thus documents that firms should follow a financing hierarchy in order to 
minimize information asymmetry between parties. The initial assumption is that 
companies prioritize their sources of financing, from internal financing to equity 
financing. Donaldson (1961) the first proposed that internally generated funds were 
preferred to external financing. His proposal was later developed by Myers (1984) 
who proposed a hierarchic preference order where the first resort of firms seeking 
capital is internal funds (retained earnings), followed by external funds where debt is 
preferred over equity. Retained earnings are uninfluenced by the problem of 
information. Furthermore, since companies pay interest and principal of debt, there 
is no significant impact of information asymmetry.  
Thus, the pecking order theory suggests that internal funds are used primarily and 
only when all internal finances have been depleted, companies shift to debt 
financing. When it is not rational to issue any more debt, companies will ultimately 
turn to equity as a final financing resource. The theory demonstrates that companies 
with higher operating profit employ less debt finance when compared to the 
companies less profitable. (Myers & Majluf 1984.)  
There is, however, empirical evidence that contradicts the theory. Thus, academics, 
implementing empirical research, illustrate firms that issue equity before they issue 
  
25 
debt, advocating a reversed order regarding to external funding (Helwege et al. 1996, 
Hogan 2005, Ni Yu, 2008).  
2.5.4  Agency theory 
Based on the work of Fama and Miller (1972) and Modigliani and Miller’s theory 
(1958), Jensen and Meckling (1976) developed a theory focusing on agency costs. 
The authors assert that agency costs are the results of a conflict of interest between 
equity owners of the company and its managers and a conflict of interest between 
debt-holders and shareholders. If the proportion of debt and equity is not optimal, 
the conflict of interests of firm’s management and its owners, or agent conflict, is 
aggravated. It can be manifested in the transformation of management motivation, 
the formation of an egoistic style of investment decisions, leading to the 
implementation of inefficient projects, as well as particularly risky projects. Finally, a 
too high share of borrowed capital cannot go unnoticed by its counterparties in 
business - customers and suppliers, belonging to the category of stakeholders of the 
company. The rational behaviour of such counterparties will lead them to search for 
other options, and this, in turn, will serve as an impetus to the deterioration of 
relationships, contract terms, the curtailment of volumes, the drop in revenues, and 
the reduction of cash flows. Agency theory proposes that managers prefer issuing 
debt to shares and bonds to spend future cash flows. With debt issuing, they are 
obliged to pay the principal and the interest on it. It is investigated, that debt reduces 
agency costs related to the cash flow by way of lessening the cash flow that have to 
be available for spending based upon decision of the managers. It serves as a control 
mechanism to discipline managers and limits the expropriation of private benefits. 
(ibid.) 
The agency theory argues that the firms with more profitable assets use a bigger 
proportion of their earning for debt payments thus it positively affects their credit 
rating and the company can raise its debt capacity. Similarly, more profitable 
companies as compared to their investment can also get debt advantages and 
mitigate free cash flow issue. (Jensen, 1986.) Therefore, agency theory suggests a 
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positive relation between the profitability of the firm and its leverage. Furthermore, 
this theory proves that costs associated with debt are lesser for firms those having 
more tangible assets which demonstrate a positive relationship between asset’s 
tangibility and leverage of firm. (ibid.) 
2.6 The financial crisis and capital structure  
The global financial crisis of 2008 is also known as the US Subprime Mortgage Crisis 
as well as the liquidity crisis. It was one of the worst financial crises during the past 
eight decades, i.e., after the great depression of the 1930s (Aubuchon & Wheelock 
2009). It is known as a subprime mortgage because it has happened as a result of 
increasing numbers of loans to the people and companies with a higher probability 
of default due to lower interest rate (Goodhart, 2008). 
According to Singh, the seed of 2008 financial crisis were sown during a short-lived 
recession that the US experienced at the beginning of 21th century. The surplus of 
savings generated in early 2000s in a part of the world economy were absorbed by 
deficits in the developed nations (Pol, 2009. 5). In order to stimulate the liquidity in 
the economy, Federal Reserve lowered the Federal Funds 11 times, thus giving a 
possibility for subprime borrowers to receive easy money in the form of subprime 
mortgages. For a more significant stimulus, in October 2004, the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) relaxed the net capital requirement for five investment banks - 
Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns and Morgan Stanley. It 
resulted in an increase in their leverage ratio by 30-40-times from their initial 
investment (Singh, n.d.a). It led to an increased use of the secondary mortgage 
market and subsequently to a higher number of sub-prime loans. Instead of holding 
the originated mortgages on their books, lenders were able to simply sell off the 
mortgages in the secondary market and collect the originating fees. (Petroff.) 
In 2004, U.S. homeownership reached a maximum point of 70%. Immediately after, 
the Fed started raising rates so much that, most of the borrowers were not able to 
pay back the money to their lenders (Singh, n.d.a). Consequently, the banks faced 
with a liquidity problem. Therefore, a substantial number of the banks which 
  
27 
depended on the support of the central banks and third parties filed for bankruptcy 
or took over. This correspondingly, outspread to the other companies and finally 
appeared as a global crisis (Berg, and Kirschenmann, 2010).  
Mathiason and Stewart described 2008 as “the year when the neo-liberal economic 
orthodoxy that ran the world for 30 years suffered a heart attack of epic proportions. 
Not since 1929 has the financial community witnessed 12 months like it. Lehman 
Brothers went bankrupt. Merrill Lynch, AIG, Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, HBOS, Royal 
Bank of Scotland, Bradford & Bingley, Fortis, Hypo and Alliance & Leicester all came 
within a whisker of doing so and had to be rescued. Western leaders, who for years 
boasted about the self-evident benefits of light-touch regulation, had to sink trillions 
of dollars to prevent the world bank system collapsing.” (2008). The uncertainty in 
the financial markets and the unexpected bankruptcy of large companies made 
ambiguity in the credit quality of companies by the investors and less willingness of 
the investors to invest, which in its turn led to the credit tightening by the banks 
(Fosberg, 2012). 
The Lehman Brothers collapse was one of the historical events that roiled the world’s 
financial system significantly. Many refer financial crisis to Lehman Brothers failure, 
the reason was that was the importance of the firm on the global arena and the 
extent of the collapse that spread far beyond U.S. borders. Larry McDonald, a former 
Lehman Brothers vice-president, distinguishes one factor above many others that 
played a substantial role in a Lehman Brothers failure. He recalls to the past with the 
following thoughts: “If only they - Dick Fuld and his president, Joe Gregory - had 
listened to the irredeemable logic of three of the cleverest financial brains on Wall 
Street – those of Mike Gelband, our global head of fixed income, Alex Kirk, global 
head of distressed trading research and sales, and Larry McCarthy, head of distressed 
bond trading. Each laid it out, from way back in 2005, that the real estate market was 
living on borrowed time and that Lehman Brothers was headed directly for the 
biggest subprime iceberg ever seen, […].” (Independent.co.uk 2009). 
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According to report by Supreme Audit Institutions (2010, 15), the development of 
the crisis in Europe became noticeable in mid-September 2008, when bank survival 
became doubtful, equity market plunged, export volume dropped by close to 15 per 
cent over the two following quarters, and limited access to capital became evident. 
The subprime crisis spread to the European Union due to a combination of: direct 
exposure to subprime assets, the gradual loss of confidence in a number of asset 
classes and the drying-up of wholesale financial markets. In this process, it came to 
expose ‘home-grown’ financial imbalances in, among other advanced economies, the 
European Union. These financial imbalances could be indicated with an overreliance 
on wholesale funding sources by the banking system and asset bubbles in residual 
property markets (Merrouche & Nier 2010). 
There exist many studies concerning where the crisis takes its roots and what 
actually engendered the problem. Thus, Steve Denning regards as true the fact that 
the real problem was in an urge for quick money. “Many actors obviously played a 
role in this story. Some of the actors were in the public sector and some of them 
were in the private sector. But the public-sector agencies were acting at behest of 
the private sector. It is not as though Congress woke up one morning and thought to 
itself, “Let’s abolish the Glass-Steagall Act!” Or the SEC spontaneously happened to 
have the bright idea of relaxing capital requirements on the investment banks. Or the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency of its own accord abruptly had the idea of 
pre-empting state laws protecting borrowers. These agencies of government were 
being strenuously lobbied to do the very things that would benefit the financial 
sector and their managers and traders. And behind it all, was the drive for short-term 
profits.” (Denning 2011.) 
With its tremendous impact on economies of countries across the whole world, it is 
hardly surprising when the global economic crisis of 2008 arises to have influenced 
the capital structure of companies, as Fosberg has ascertained in the case of 
companies in the US (2012). The effect of the financial crisis was to heavily disrupt 
the financial markets, diminish the amount of debt and equity capital financing 
available to businesses and to induce a severe recession in the U. S. and other 
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countries (Mizen 2008). The crisis stimulated a decline in the amount of finance 
other companies could obtain. In his work, Fosberg proves that companies have 
increased debt financing due to the crisis (2012).  
2.7 Hypotheses development 
Black & Champion describe hypothesis as conjectural explanation about a specific 
phenomenon the soundness of which is not proved (1976, 126). For a hypothesis to 
be a scientific hypothesis, the scientific method requires that one can test it. 
Hypotheses are generally derived from previous observations which cannot be 
sufficiently justified by the existing scientific theories. (Hilborn & Mangel 1997.) 
Grinnell (1988, 200) states that testing a hypothesis can only bring two types of 
results: either be proved or rejected by the authentic data. Hence, this study aims to 
provide credible data for the hypotheses testing. Hypothesis is formed with the 
purpose to create essence for the research to enhance research objectivity (Kumar 
2011, 83).  
This study comprises eight hypotheses investigated in total whereof the hypotheses 
are rejected or accepted due to the analysis that comes out from the descriptive and 
inferential statistics. The hypotheses are investigated through observing and 
comparing separately performed analysis for three sub-periods.  
Based on the review of diverse literature the following hypotheses have been formed 
over three sub-periods, that is pre-crisis, during crisis and post-crisis: 
H1: The nature risk faced by the firm affects its capital structure; 
H2: Systematic risk of a firm is affected by its capital structure; 
H3: Unsystematic risk of a firm is affected by its capital structure; 
H4: Total risk of a firm is affected by its capital structure; 
H5: Cost of capital of a firm is affected by its capital structure; 
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H6: Cost of capital of a firm is affected by its nature of risk; 
H7: Return on equity of a firm is affected by its capital structure; 
H8: Return on equity of a firm is affected by its nature of risk. 
3 Methodology 
Sunders and colleagues define methodology as a theory used for the implementation 
of the research, incorporating the theoretical and philosophical assumptions upon 
which the research is founded (2009, 595). This chapter aims to explain the steps 
taken and choices made along the process of implementing this study. By providing 
insight into the author’s considerations and choices, the reader can better 
understand them and form a critical standpoint. The methodology is based on past 
empirical research and evidence with the purpose of engendering a trustworthy 
analysis as well as reliable results. 
3.1 Research approach  
Foremost, for a research paper it is crucial to define the philosophy that the author 
follows. Saunders and others define interpretivism, positivism, pragmatism and 
realism as the main philosophies that correspond to the research objectives (2009, 
598). The philosophy of positivism was applied in this study, since this was 
considered to be the most appropriate in terms of analysis of the observable reality 
and generalization of the results that could be replicated in exactly the same 
circumstances at any other time (ibid., 598).  
The initial purpose of this study was to determine whether the capital structure of 
the Nordic countries had changed after the financial crisis and whether it had 
affected the risks and returns of the companies. In order to conduct a study, an 
appropriate research approach has to be chosen. This study followed the descriptive 
and explanatory research approaches. Saunders and colleagues categorize research 
purposes into three categories - explanatory, exploratory, and descriptive. An 
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explanatory study is used when it is of vital importance to define and characterize 
the relationship between variables (Saunders et al. 2009, 139-140). Robson defines a 
descriptive study as a study that attempts to depict an accurate profile of events and 
situations (2002, 95).  
Furthermore, a deductive approach was applied in this study as this approach is 
commonly used in combination with quantitative data for testing objective theories 
by exploring the relationship among variables (ibid., 124-125), upon which this study 
was solely based. These variables can be measured by way of analysing numerical 
data with statistical procedures (Creswell 2013, 4). The study covered the period 
from 2005 till 2017, which made this study a longitudinal study, which is commonly 
used to determine patterns within a certain period of time (Kumar 2014, 136-138).  
There exist three kinds of research: quantitative, qualitative and mixed-method 
research. With the assistance of statistical analysis, this study examined the 
relationship between different variables which, in turn, produced numerical data. 
These characteristics are intrinsic to the quantitative research (Creswell 2013, 32).  
3.2 Methods of data collection 
In order to answer the research questions, secondary data was researched in this 
work. Secondary data is data which has been collected before for studies other than 
the one being implemented. Secondary data is employed with the purpose of 
engendering primary data (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2009, 600). The data used in 
the present study was distinguished as panel data, which is a set of multi-
dimensional data comprising measurements through time. Panel data includes 
observations of multiple phenomena acquired over multiple time periods from the 
same firms. 
The financial information of the companies was drawn from secondary sources: stock 
market databases and the companies’ annual reports. The database Nasdaq OMX 
Nordic was accessed with the purpose of retrieving information concerning the 
companies’ stock prices. This web-site comprises the historical prices of the 
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companies’ shares across all Nordic countries. The Nasdaq database and companies’ 
financial statements are the official numerical corporate data. Therefore, the 
financial data was considered reliable and precise. A total sample of 30 companies 
was investigated. Banks and financial institutions were excluded from the research 
because the regulations for these firms regarding leverage are different (Alves & 
Francisco 2014). The time frame used for the research was from the 3rd Jan. 2005 to 
the 10th Nov. 2017. The sub-periods “pre-crisis”, “ in-crisis” and “post-crisis” were 
defined for the research. The retrieved stock prices of the companies were used for 
further calculation of the stocks’ returns. The calculations were implemented for 
each year individually as well as for the sub-periods. The formula for the calculation 
of the stock’s return was the following: 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 =
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑎𝑦 − 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑑𝑎𝑦
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑑𝑎𝑦
 
The outcome of the calculations was used in further calculations of the firms and 
their average annual returns, systematic risks and the firms’ beta and unsystematic 
risks (to be explained in 3.5).  
Risk-free rate of return was retrieved from Investing.com website. Government 
bonds were acknowledged to serve as a risk-free rate of return. Therefore, the rate 
of the government bonds of the country in which the company operated were drawn 
on the yearly basis in this work.  
Beta (described in sub-chapter 2.3.3) was calculated in the following way: the returns 
of a particular security, and the market return served as the base data for the 
regression analysis in Microsoft Excel (the function “SLOPE”). Beta was used for the 
further calculations of systematic risk (to be explained in 3.5).  
Cost of equity was calculated with the help of the CAPM model (described in sub-
chapter 2.3.4). In order to calculate cost of equity, the aforementioned “risk-free 
rate” was used. In addition, beta and average market return were calculated in 
advance.  
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WACC (described in sub-chapter 2.3.5) calculation required the numbers of total 
equity, total debt, calculated in advance cost of equity, cost of debt and the effective 
tax rate. The next sub-chapter provides the reader with more accurate information 
regarding the variables and their calculations. 
3.3 Definition of key variables 
The measurement, operationalization and source of the variables are listed below in 
Table 1. 
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Table 1. Definition of key variables 
Variable’s name Variable Measurement and Operationalization Source 
LnTE Total equity Natural logarithm of total equity Annual report 
LnTD Total debt  Natural logarithm of total debt Annual report 
LnTA Total assets Natural logarithm of total assets.  Annual report 
LnTS Total sales  Natural logarithm of total sales. Depicts the size of a company as one of 
the determinant of capital structure. 
Annual report 
LnRD R&D expenditure  Natural logarithm of R&D expenditure. Depicts the growth opportunities 
of a company as one of the determinant of capital structure. 
Annual report 
LnEBIT Earnings Before Interest and Taxes Natural log of operating profit. Annual report 
𝑹𝒇 Risk free rate  Government bond rate  www.investing.com 
FirmRet Firm's Return Firm’s return is a standardized value and it reflects change in the market 
value of the index over two-time periods. 
Annual report 
MarkRet Market return  Market return is a standardized value and it reflects change in the 
market value of the index over two-time periods. 
Nasdaq 

𝒊
 Equity beta  Measure of systematic risk is obtained by regressing the firm’s stock 
return on the market stock return. 
Nasdaq 
𝝈𝒎 Market SD  Standard deviation of annual market’s stock returns  Nasdaq 
UnsystRisk Unsystematic risk  Measure of unsystematic risk is obtained by regressing the firm’s stock 
return. This measure reflects the Earning Volatility of company – one of 
the determinants of capital structure.  
Nasdaq 
SystematicRisk Systematic risk  𝒊*𝝈𝒎 Nasdaq 
TotalRisk Total risk Unsystematic risk + systematic risk Nasdaq 
𝑹𝒆 Cost of equity  𝑅𝑒 =  𝑅𝑓 + 𝑖(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓) Annual report 
𝑹𝒅 Cost of debt Financial costs/total debt Annual report 
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FirmReturn/𝑹𝒆 Total Firm's Return-to-equity cost Firm's return/cost of equity Nasdaq, annual report 
ETR Effective corporate tax rate Total corporate tax paid/profit before taxes. Reflects corporate tax as 
one of the determinants of capital structure. 
Annual report 
ROE Return on equity Net operating profit/total equity.  Annual report 
ROA Return on assets Net operating profit/total assets. Reflects profitability of the company – 
one of the determinant of capital structure. 
Annual report 
FirmReturn/TotalRisk Total firm’s return-to-risk ratio Firm's return/total risk Nasdaq, annual report 
TangibleAssets/ 
TotalAssets 
Tangibility ratio Value of tangible assets/total assets. The ratio reflects the tangibility of 
the company – one of the determinants of capital structure.  
Annual report 
D/E Debt-to-equity ratio Total debt/total equity.  Annual report 
WACC Weighted average cost of capital  𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 =
𝐸
𝐸+𝐷
𝐾𝑒 +  
𝐷
𝐸+𝐷
𝐾𝑑(1 − 𝑡) Nasdaq, annual report 
Industrials Industry dummy variable: Industrial = 1 if the firm belongs to Industrial; = 0 otherwise. Industry classification 
is one of the determinants of capital structure.  
Nasdaq 
HealthCare Industry dummy variable: Health care = 1 if the firm belongs to Health care; = 0 otherwise.  Nasdaq 
RealEstate Industry dummy variable: Real estate = 1 if the firm belongs to Real estate; = 0 otherwise. Nasdaq 
Consumer Goods Industry dummy variable: Consumer goods = 1 if the firm belongs to Consumer goods; = 0 otherwise.  Nasdaq 
Technology Industry dummy variable: Technology = 1 if the firm belongs to Technology; = 0 otherwise.  Nasdaq 
ConsumerServices Industry dummy variable: Consumer 
services 
= 1 if the firm belongs to Consumer services; = 0 otherwise.  Nasdaq 
BasicMaterial Industry dummy variable: Basic material = 1 if the firm belongs to Basic material; = 0 otherwise.  Nasdaq 
Telecommunication Industry dummy variable: 
Telecommunication 
= 1 if the firm belongs to Telecommunication; = 0 otherwise.  Nasdaq 
Utilities Industry dummy variable: Utilities = 1 if the firm belongs to Utilities; = 0 otherwise.  Nasdaq 
Note:  Natural log values have been taken to analyse several absolute value based variables in order to avoid linearity.  
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3.4 Methods of data analysis  
This study paper encompasses several types of analysis. Foremost, the graphical 
interpretation is decomposed. The interpretation provides with the analysis of overall 
trends of risk variables, including systematic, unsystematic and total risk variables, 
across the sample companies within the timeframe from 2005 to 2017. The analysis also 
comprises the firm’s return over the same time period. The graphical analysis facilitates 
more comprehensive understanding of the tendencies among the main variables of the 
research and enables to answer the research questions.  
The analysis of the data was implemented with the help of SPSS analysis. Once the 
dependent and independent variables were assigned, the descriptive and inferential 
analysis was performed. The descriptive statistics table provides the researcher with 
factual overview of the dataset. Descriptive analysis is represented in the “Descriptive 
statistics” tables, which signify the information regarding the number of observations, 
maximum number, minimum number, mean and standard deviation of the examined 
variables. Maximum and minimum indexes show the extreme values of the variables 
among all the events. Mean value is the value indicating the arithmetic average, which is 
calculated by way of the total sum of values divided by the count. (William 1950, 221.) 
Standard deviation accounts for the average variation or dispersion from the mean of a 
set of data values (Bland & Altman 1996).  
Further to descriptive analysis, inferential analysis is presented in this study. Inferential 
analysis comprises the correlation and regression analysis. The relationship between two 
variables can be estimated with a more intuitive measurement which is called 
correlation coefficient. There are many options to measure the correlation coefficient, 
but one of the most used is the Pearson’s product-moment coefficient. This measure 
estimates the extent of a linear association between two variables. The coefficients vary 
from -1 to +1 describing how strong the linear relationship in this range. A value of -1 
distinguish total negative linear correlation, 0 is no linear correlation, and +1 is total 
positive linear correlation. It is widely utilised in the empirical research. (Pearson 1895.) 
The analyse was performed using SPSS platform; the collected variables data was 
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inserted in SPSS and analysed with the help of “Bivariate analysis” function. The 
outcome comprised values of Person correlation and significance level. The last value 
shows the probability that the relationship between the independent variable and the 
dependent variable has occurred by chance. (Saunders et al. 2009, 463.) 
Regression analysis of this work is represented in the multivariate ordinary least 
(hereafter, OLS) square estimation model. This model characterises and estimates the 
interrelation between one dependent and number of independent variables. The model 
is acknowledged as very practical for empirical studies similar to this sudy due to the 
possibility to include various independent variables and result in more flexible results. 
The multivariate OLS model enables the researcher to distinguish between effects of the 
specific independent variables. Thus, the variables adjust for each other’s effects and 
eliminate unappreciated variables apparent effects. (Dougherty 2011, 152-155.) The 
multiple OLS regression model for panel data employed in this work is based on the 
theory of Brooks (2008, 137): 
𝑦 𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎 + ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑘
𝑡=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ ∑ ∑ 𝑍𝑖𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
+  𝑢 𝑖𝑡 
Where: 
𝑦 𝑖𝑡 = dependent variable of firm 𝑖 in the time period 𝑡; 
𝑎 = intercept term; 
𝑥𝑖𝑡 = independent variable including explanatory and control variables of 
firm 𝑖 in the time period 𝑡; 
𝑍𝑖𝑡= industry-fixed effect of firm 𝑖 in the time period 𝑡; 
𝑗 = Number of industry category; 
𝑘 = number of classifications of time period; 
𝑚 = number of industry classification; 
𝑛 = number of firm; 
𝑢 = Disturbance Term. 
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The multivariate OLS regression technique is utilised to measure the following functional 
relationships of the models:  
𝐷
𝐸𝑖𝑡
=  𝛼𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽1(𝐿𝑛𝑇𝐸)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2(𝐿𝑛𝑇𝐷)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝐿𝑛𝑇𝐴)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4(𝐿𝑛𝑇𝑆)𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽5(𝐿𝑛𝑅𝐷)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6(𝐿𝑛𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8(𝜎𝑚)𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽9(𝑈𝑛𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽10(𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘)𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽11(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽12(𝑅𝑒)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽13(𝑅𝑑)𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽14 (
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛
𝑅𝑒
)
𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽15(𝐸𝑇𝑅)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽16(𝑅𝑂𝐸)𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽17(𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽18 (
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘
)
𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽19 (
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
)
𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽21(𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶)
 
𝑖𝑡
+ ∑ ∑ 𝑍𝑖𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽1(𝐿𝑛𝑇𝐸)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2(𝐿𝑛𝑇𝐷)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝐿𝑛𝑇𝐴)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4(𝐿𝑛𝑇𝑆)𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽5(𝐿𝑛𝑅𝐷)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6(𝐿𝑛𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8(𝜎𝑚)𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽9(𝑈𝑛𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽10(𝐷/𝐸)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽11(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘)𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽12(𝑅𝑒)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽13(𝑅𝑑)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽14 (
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛
𝑅𝑒
)
𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽15(𝐸𝑇𝑅)𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽16(𝑅𝑂𝐸)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽17(𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽18 (
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘
)
𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽19 (
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
)
𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽20(𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶)
 
𝑖𝑡
+ ∑ ∑ 𝑍𝑖𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 
𝑈𝑛𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽1(𝐿𝑛𝑇𝐸)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2(𝐿𝑛𝑇𝐷)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝐿𝑛𝑇𝐴)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4(𝐿𝑛𝑇𝑆)𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽5(𝐿𝑛𝑅𝐷)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6(𝐿𝑛𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8(𝜎𝑚)𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽9(𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽10(𝐷/𝐸)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽11(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘)𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽12(𝑅𝑒)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽13(𝑅𝑑)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽14 (
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛
𝑅𝑒
)
𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽15(𝐸𝑇𝑅)𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽16(𝑅𝑂𝐸)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽17(𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽18 (
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘
)
𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽19 (
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
)
𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽20(𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶)
 
𝑖𝑡
+ ∑ ∑ 𝑍𝑖𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
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𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽1(𝐿𝑛𝑇𝐸)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2(𝐿𝑛𝑇𝐷)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝐿𝑛𝑇𝐴)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4(𝐿𝑛𝑇𝑆)𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽5(𝐿𝑛𝑅𝐷)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6(𝐿𝑛𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8(𝜎𝑚)𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽9(𝐷/𝐸)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽11(𝑅𝑒)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽12(𝑅𝑑)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽13 (
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛
𝑅𝑒
)
𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽14(𝐸𝑇𝑅)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽15(𝑅𝑂𝐸)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽16(𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽17 (
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘
)
𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽18 (
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
)
𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽19 (
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
)
𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽20(𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶)
 
𝑖𝑡
+ ∑ ∑ 𝑍𝑖𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1(𝐿𝑛𝑇𝐴)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2(𝐿𝑛𝑇𝑆)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3(𝐿𝑛𝑅𝐷)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4(𝐿𝑛𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇)𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽5(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6(𝜎𝑚)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7(𝑈𝑛𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘)𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽8(𝐷/𝐸)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10(𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘)𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽11 (
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛
𝑅𝑒
)
𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽12(𝐸𝑇𝑅)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽13(𝑅𝑂𝐸)𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽14(𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽15 (
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘
)
𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽17 (
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
)
𝑖𝑡
 
+ ∑ ∑ 𝑍𝑖𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽1(𝐿𝑛𝑇𝐷)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝐿𝑛𝑇𝐴)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3(𝐿𝑛𝑇𝑆)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4(𝐿𝑛𝑅𝐷)𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽5(𝐿𝑛𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7(𝜎𝑚)𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽8(𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9(𝑈𝑛𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘)𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽10(𝐷/𝐸)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽11(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽12(𝑅𝑒)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽13(𝑅𝑑)𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽14 (
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛
𝑅𝑒
)
𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽15(𝐸𝑇𝑅)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽16(𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽17 (
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘
)
𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽18 (
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
)
𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽19(𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶)
 
𝑖𝑡
+ ∑ ∑ 𝑍𝑖𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
The OLS regression equations are represented in the coefficient model. In this model, 
the unstandardized coefficient (Beta), t-test, and significance levels are examined. 
Unstandardized beta coefficient depicts the regression coefficient, which displays all 
variables’ contributions to the model. Beta coefficient depicts the relative movements 
(both positive and negative) in dependent variable. If beta is represented by positive 
value, the relationship between dependent and independent variables is also positive. 
Whilst, the negative value highlights the negative relationship. The t-test value indicates 
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if any distinctions between means of two groups, which are statistically significant, can 
be determined. (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison 2007, 543.) The significance denotes the 
risk of being a type 1 error in the data when not rejecting the null hypothesis. For 
instance, a significance level of 1% means that all values that are extreme will appear 
with a probability of 1%. When implementing large financial data analysis, 5% of 
significance is commonly used, because standard errors, as a rule, decrease when using 
big data sets. In such works, it is recommended to set a 1% significance level. (Brooks 
2008, 171.) In this study both 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels are shown in the 
results. 
A primary assumption with the OLS model is the fact that the correlation between the 
residuals equals zero. If they aren’t the data suffers from autocorrelation, also called 
serial correlation. Durbin-Watson test is used with the purpose to order autocorrelation. 
This test determines the relationship between errors of present and past values. Hence, 
when the Durbin-Watson test is close to 2 it implies the perfect positive autocorrelation. 
On the other hand, the value near 4 shows perfect negative autocorrelation. (Brooks 
2008, 150.) 
The OLS regression analysis, in addition, includes r-squared value which depicts how well 
the regression model fits. Higher values of r-squared indicates the better fit. 
Nonetheless, low r-squared values are also considered sufficient if the estimated 
coefficients are statistically significant. (Dougherty 2011, 514.) 
3.5 Validity and reliability  
Jonathan Wilson (2010, 308) defines validity as the degree of how well the test 
measures what it intends to measure. It demonstrates the credibility and 
trustworthiness of the study. The quantitative research requires external and internal 
validity. External validity is the degree to which the results of a study can be colligated to 
a wider population. Whereas internal validity implies the fulfilment of initially targeted 
study goals and collation of the input of each variable with a complete change in the 
model (Moskal & Leydens 2000). 
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This study work followed a list of strategies in order to ensure the validity. Foremost, the 
sample of the companies were carefully chosen in order to correspond to the research 
nature. The total of 30 chosen companies are from Finland, Sweden, Denmark and 
Ireland (see Figure 1). They represent various business fields facilitating the research to 
be consistent and resumptive and allowing the research to avoid the generalisation of 
the results to be restrained to a particular industry sector (see Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 1. Countries of the sample companies 
 
Figure 2. Industry classification of the sample companies 
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Furthermore, previous studies in the similar areas were considered with the purpose to 
ensure the external validity of the study and obviate ambiguous notation of variables. 
In order to secure the internal validity and to avoid common statistical defects, the data 
sample was carefully selected in this study. The data was collected from the published 
annual reports, the Nasdaq database and Investing.com web-site, which are considered 
reliable sources. The hypotheses produced findings that were in line with the types of 
results expected. Hence, the validity of the research results is ensured. 
Saunders and co-workers define reliability as the ability of the research to produce 
consistent results for the same data set. In other words, other researchers must be able 
to implement similar research comprising the same conditions and leading to the same 
results. (2009, 156.) The reliability of this study is justified by the fact that the methods 
utilised in this work have been also utilised by many researchers of the similar area. 
Moreover, the variables employed in this work can be replaced by another samples and 
lead to the corresponding outcomes. The data utilized as a part of the investigation were 
gathered from solid sources: the official sites of the sample organizations. A few 
information must be scaled by a typical measure so as to represent estimate impact that 
may have hampered the outcomes significantly. Moreover, the information 
accumulation strategies and the examination procedure utilized as a part of this 
exploration were clarified in reasonable detail in order to make it effectively justifiable 
for any reader. Hence, the research paper can be considered reliable. 
4 Empirical findings 
The following chapter presents the empirical findings of the study. The chapter is divided 
into descriptive statistics and regression results. These findings are the foundation upon 
which the analysis and conclusions were built. This chapter begins with the graphical 
analysis of the risk and return indicators across the sample companies over the whole 
research period. The descriptive and inferential analysis is categorised by the pre-crisis, 
during-crisis and the post-crisis sub-periods and the whole period. 
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4.1 Graphical analysis  
Based on the secondary data, the following variables were calculated: company return, 
systematic risk, unsystematic risk and total risk for 30 companies in the Nasdaqnordic list 
for the period of 2005 - 2017. The graphical presentation of these variables was 
considered to be more clear and comprehensible by the author. Therefore, the thesis 
contains 30 visual graphs for each company individually indicating the company’s risk 
and return during the researched period (see Appendices 1-30). These graphs were 
especially valuable for the determination of certain trends which might appear. 
Foremost, the first pattern observed by the author was an explicit leap in risk indicators 
during the crisis period of 2007 and 2008. Market and unsystematic risks increased 
dramatically which prompted the total risk to increase as well. Generally, the systematic 
and unsystematic risk followed the same pattern throughout the whole period. The peak 
of the total risk was in 2008 and varied on average from 3% to 6%. The highest index was 
8.2% for the company BOLIDEN (see Appendix 15), whereas the total risk for the pre-
crisis sub-period was only 0-3% with the highest index equal to 3.3% at BETSSON B in 
2008 (see Appendix 13). The greatest figures for unsystematic and systematic risks were 
found for the BOLIDEN company (5.3% and 0.03% respectively). The peak accounted for 
the year 2008.  
Contrary to risk, company returns tended to decrease during the crisis. Hence, a slight 
decline equal to 1-3% was observed in the years 2007-08. Company returns varied from -
0.5% to 0% during this sub-period. Despite the distinct trend, the crisis benefited the 
ASTRAZENECA company (see Appendix 12), whose return climbed to 3.6% in 2008 from 
2.5% in 2006. This contradicted the distinct tendency of companies’ returns to decrease 
in an unstable economic environment.  
The two subsequent years after the crisis could be characterized as a significant slip back 
in the risk indicators while the company return indexes had a modest rise. Afterwards, 
another soar of the risk indexes was observed among the sample companies. The peak 
of the second rise was distinctive for 2011, which was explained by the European debt 
crisis (Wearden & Garside 2012). The highest total risk index in 2011 was distinctive to 
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CARGOTEC (see Appendix 17), which equalled to 6%. The 2007-08 crisis had a more 
notable impact on the risks and returns of the company. BOLIDEN was once again the 
most susceptible to the risks. Hence, the systematic risk was 2.7% and unsystematic - 3% 
in 2011 (see Appendix 15).  
In the majority of the companies, a fall in the 2014-2015 risk indicators could be noticed. 
This means that these years were the most stable in terms of the economic and financial 
environment. The ASTRAZENECA company (see Appendix 15) had the lowest figures of 
risks. Thus, the total risk was close to 0%, the systematic risk went slightly down to 0% 
and the unsystematic risk was also close to 0% in 2015 for ASTRAZENECA. During the 
whole post-crisis sub-period, there were fluctuations in the risk and return indexes. For 
some companies, an overall upward tendency of the risks indicators was observed (see 
Appendixes 3,5,13,25,27), whereas a downward trend was detected for a number of 
other companies (see Appendixes 1,2,7,14-17,28). All the other firms experienced slight 
risk movements, but the overall risk remained relatively constant. Furthermore, the 
firms’ returns fluctuated gently, albeit, no significant movements could be detected. 
4.2 Pre-crisis 
4.2.1 Descriptive statistics analysis 
The table 2 highlights the data set for pre-crisis period. The mean of the stock return was 
1.4% and the mean of the total risk was 1.92% with the unsystematic risk constituting 
for 1.73% and systematic for 0.2%. Debt-to-equity ratio’s mean was 148.93% implying 
that debt finance was prevailing over equity financing during the pre-crisis sub-period. 
The stable economic environment, thus, could be one of the urge for debt financing. In 
other words, when firms feel confident about market, they borrow more. The maximum 
percentage of debt financing over equity was 540% signifying that one company was 
able to borrow 5.4 Euro for every 1 Euro of equity. Mean index of the firm’s return-to-
total risk ratio was -24.5% for the pre-crisis period suggesting the that the higher the 
total risks, the less return for the company. Estimated cost of capital’s mean was 2.59% 
which means that the investors of the company expected to receive 2.59%, whereas the 
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actual return on equity was 15.98%. The index is considered to be very positive, since it 
demonstrates that companies had outperformed significantly. In average, the cost of 
equity was higher for the pre-crisis sub-period (2.59%) when compared to cost of debt 
(0.1%). This explains debt finance dominance in the capital structure of the companies. 
The weighted average cost of capital was 3.93%, which depicts the percentage the 
company had to pay to finance its assets to all its security and debt holders.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics - Pre-crisis sub-period 
  N Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
LnTE 60 6,11399 5,87914 11,99312 8,3388817 1,62304091 2,634 
LnTD 60 8,42 4,60 13,02 8,5740 1,88889 3,568 
LnTA 60 6,97 6,35 13,33 9,2015 1,71958 2,957 
LnTS 60 7,16 5,31 12,47 8,9728 1,75971 3,097 
LnRD 60 9,69 0,10 9,79 4,4099 2,46673 6,085 
LnEBIT 60 10,45 0,10 10,55 6,3877 2,39282 5,726 
FirmReturn 60 0,01 -0,01 0,00 0,0014 0,00149 0,000 
MarketReturn 60 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,0008 0,00015 0,000 
𝝈𝒎 60 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,0089 0,00166 0,000 
UnsystematicRisk 60 0,04 0,00 0,04 0,0173 0,00596 0,000 
SytematicsRisk 60 0,02 -0,01 0,01 0,0020 0,00287 0,000 
TotalRisk 60 0,05 0,00 0,05 0,0192 0,00770 0,000 
𝑹𝒆 60 0,10 0,00 0,11 0,0259 0,02015 0,000 
𝑹𝒅 60 2,12 -1,43 0,70 0,0010 0,20840 0,043 
FirmReturn/𝑹𝒆 60 0,94 -0,12 0,82 0,1137 0,16730 0,028 
ETR 60 12,10 -6,03 6,08 0,2047 1,14263 1,306 
ROE 60 0,54 -0,07 0,47 0,1598 0,11396 0,013 
ROA 60 0,33 -0,02 0,31 0,0732 0,06652 0,004 
FirmReturn/TotalRisk 60 44,44 -29,89 14,55 -0,2450 4,32169 18,677 
TangibleAssetsRatio 60 0,80 0,00 0,80 0,2739 0,20974 0,044 
D/E 60 5,19 0,21 5,40 1,4893 0,84351 0,712 
WACC 60 2,02 -0,23 1,79 0,0393 0,23351 0,055 
Industrial 60 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,4000 0,49403 0,244 
HelathCare 60 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,1333 0,34280 0,118 
RealEstate 60 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,0333 0,18102 0,033 
ConsumerGoods 60 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,1000 0,30253 0,092 
Technology 60 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,0333 0,18102 0,033 
ConsumerServices 60 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,0667 0,25155 0,063 
BasicMaterial 60 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,1667 0,37582 0,141 
Telecommunication 60 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,0333 0,18102 0,033 
Utilities 60 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,0333 0,18102 0,033 
Valid N (listwise) 60             
Note: LnTE: Log of total equity, LnTD: log of total debt; LnTA: Log of total assets, LnTS: Log of total sales, LnRD: Log of 
research and development expenses, LnEBIT: Log of earnings before interest and taxes, FirmReturn: Firm’s stock 
return, 𝝈𝒎: Market standard deviation, SysRisk: Systematic risk, UnsysRisk: Unsystematic risk, TotalRisk: Total 
risk, Re: Cost of equity, Rd: Cost of debt, FirmReturn/Re: Firm’s return-to-cost of equity, ETR: Effective corporate 
tax rate, ROE: Return on equity, ROA: Return on assets, FirmReturn/TotalRisk: Firm’s return-to-total risk, 
TangibleAssetsRatio: Tangibles assets-to-total assets, D/E: Debt-to-equity ratio, WACC: Weighted average cost of 
capital, Industrials: Industrials, HealthCare: Health care, RealEstate: Real Estate, ConsGoods: Consumer Goods, 
Technology: Technology, ConsServices: Consumer services, BasicMat: Basic material, Telecom: 
Telecommunication, Utilities: Utilities industry sector. 
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4.2.2 Correlation analysis 
Table 3 demonstrates the pairwise correlation highlighting all the variables used in this 
work. The table comprises the list independent variables, including LnTE, LnTD, LnTA, 
LnR&D, LnEBIT, LnTS, Rf, Re, Rd, Firm Return, Market Return, 𝝈𝒎, Firm Return/Re, ETR, 
ROA, FirmReturn/TotalRisk, TangibleAssetsRatio; independent variables implying 
industry classifications (Z1-Z9) and dependent variables: D/E, SystematicRisk, 
UnsystematicRisk, TotalRisk, WACC and ROE (Y1-Y6). The correlations only with 0.01% 
and 0.05% significance levels were considered. The association between independent 
variables are explained below:  
Total equity (LnTE) was strongly positively correlated with the following variables: total 
debt (LnTD), total assets (LnTA) and total sales (LnTS) (0,948, 0,984 and 0,882 
respectively). The total amount of equity depended on the total debt, the total assets 
figures as well as the total sales index. Besides natural log of total equity, LnTD was also 
positively correlated with LnR&D, LnTS. The higher the total sales of the company or the 
research and development expenditures were, the higher amount of debt was utilised 
by firms. The correlation table also emphasises the linear association between LnTS and 
LnTA, LnTS and LnEBIT. Furthermore, there was an absolute negative correlation 
between market return and market standard deviation. 
The results of correlation between dependent and independent variables are the 
following: 
Debt-to-equity ratio was correlated with total debt, total assets, total sales of the 
company and effective corporate tax rate. With return on assets there was a negative 
correlation. The table also illustrates the correlation with industrial sector implying that 
companies from this industry had highly leveraged capital structure in the pre-crisis 
period. Systematic and unsystematic risk showed high correlations with relation to the 
total risk (0,724, 0,948). The reason for that is the fact that total risk constitutes for both 
of the risks. The correlation coefficients show that unsystematic risk was more 
significant for the total risk index. Besides, systematic risk had negative significant 
correlation, and therefore causal relationship, with risk-free rate, market return and 
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effective rate. Positive correlation with the systematic risk were found with firm’s 
return, market standard deviation, firm’s return-to-cost of equity ratio. Systematic risk 
and return on equity were also positively correlated with significance level of 0.01%. 
Unsystematic risk was found to be negatively correlated with total equity, total debt, 
total assets, EBIT and total sales of the company. The positive correlations were with 
cost of equity, firm’s return-to-cost of equity, return on assets and technology and 
consumer services industries. Furthermore, the correlation matrix denotes that total risk 
was dependent on total debt, cost of equity, firm’s return, market return, market 
standard deviation and return-to-cost of equity. Technology sector was found to suffer 
the most from total risk. Cost of capital was higher for companies with high cost of debt 
or technology companies. This could be explained in correlation between those 
variables. According to the table, company’s EBIT, firm’s return, return-to cost of equity 
ratio, tangible assets ratio (positively), risk-free rate, cost of equity, ETR (negatively) 
affected return on equity. Moreover, it could be concluded that industrials and 
consumer services companies has higher ROE ratio compared to basic material 
companies.  
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Table 3. Correlation - Pre-crisis sub-period. Part 1. 
  X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12 X13 X14 X15 X16 
X1 1 ,948** ,984** ,376** ,689** ,882** ,377** ,320* 0,113 -0,005 -0,050 0,050 0,100 ,343** -0,139 -0,043 
X2 ,948** 1 ,988** ,342** ,680** ,925** ,395** ,325* 0,191 0,032 -0,039 0,039 0,092 ,389** -,279* -0,018 
X3 ,984** ,988** 1 ,367** ,691** ,917** ,391** ,326* 0,142 0,012 -0,045 0,045 0,103 ,380** -0,217 -0,029 
X4 ,376** ,342** ,367** 1 ,406** ,443** ,336** ,350** 0,080 0,086 -0,005 0,005 0,194 0,145 0,145 -0,089 
X5 ,689** ,680** ,691** ,406** 1 ,728** 0,219 0,131 0,140 0,200 -0,065 0,065 ,261* 0,180 0,239 -0,056 
X6 ,882** ,925** ,917** ,443** ,728** 1 ,333** 0,230 0,212 0,025 -0,062 0,062 0,153 ,311* -0,143 -0,037 
X7 ,377** ,395** ,391** ,336** 0,219 ,333** 1 ,933** 0,094 -0,143 -,265* ,265* -,391** ,372** -,325* 0,080 
X8 ,320* ,325* ,326* ,350** 0,131 0,230 ,933** 1 0,030 -,300* -0,137 0,137 -,476** ,441** -,363** 0,053 
X9 0,113 0,191 0,142 0,080 0,140 0,212 0,094 0,030 1 0,040 -0,171 0,171 0,049 -,270* -,310* -0,002 
X10 -0,005 0,032 0,012 0,086 0,200 0,025 -0,143 -,300* 0,040 1 -0,021 0,021 ,697** -0,148 ,348** -0,098 
X11 -0,050 -0,039 -0,045 -0,005 -0,065 -0,062 -,265* -0,137 -0,171 -0,021 1 -1,000** 0,067 0,031 -0,096 -0,175 
X12 0,050 0,039 0,045 0,005 0,065 0,062 ,265* 0,137 0,171 0,021 -1,000** 1 -0,067 -0,031 0,096 0,175 
X13 0,100 0,092 0,103 0,194 ,261* 0,153 -,391** -,476** 0,049 ,697** 0,067 -0,067 1 -0,119 ,387** -0,070 
X14 ,343** ,389** ,380** 0,145 0,180 ,311* ,372** ,441** -,270* -0,148 0,031 -0,031 -0,119 1 -,355** 0,026 
X15 -0,139 -,279* -0,217 0,145 0,239 -0,143 -,325* -,363** -,310* ,348** -0,096 0,096 ,387** -,355** 1 -0,096 
X16 -0,043 -0,018 -0,029 -0,089 -0,056 -0,037 0,080 0,053 -0,002 -0,098 -0,175 0,175 -0,070 0,026 -0,096 1 
X17 0,229 0,238 0,226 -,430** -0,107 0,195 -0,028 -0,061 0,080 -0,114 0,044 -0,044 -0,084 0,051 -,329* -0,010 
Z1 0,254 ,339** ,307* 0,180 ,393** ,397** 0,034 -0,077 0,043 0,213 0,000 0,000 0,174 0,031 0,057 -0,075 
Z2 0,003 -0,051 -0,024 0,232 -0,104 -0,087 ,292* ,390** 0,038 -,257* 0,000 0,000 -0,208 0,254 -0,172 0,022 
Z3 -0,001 0,005 -0,002 -,327* 0,059 -0,240 -0,133 -0,064 0,018 0,156 0,000 0,000 0,029 0,004 0,049 0,011 
Z4 -0,075 -0,009 -0,042 0,060 0,004 0,011 -0,073 -0,071 0,011 -0,107 0,000 0,000 -0,134 -0,035 -0,138 0,019 
Z5 -,257* -,314* -,292* 0,040 -0,098 -0,216 -0,133 -0,153 ,314* ,273* 0,000 0,000 ,280* -,504** ,296* 0,011 
Z6 -0,217 -,301* -0,252 -0,063 -0,105 -0,157 -0,192 -0,169 -,453** -0,158 0,000 0,000 -0,134 -0,016 ,359** 0,015 
Z7 0,023 0,027 0,017 -0,164 -,332** -0,006 -0,048 -0,022 0,031 -0,039 0,000 0,000 0,088 0,005 -0,209 0,031 
Z8 -0,133 -0,185 -0,167 -0,188 -0,075 -0,182 0,055 0,025 0,018 -0,015 0,000 0,000 -0,075 -0,001 0,016 0,011 
Z9 0,072 0,043 0,052 -0,127 0,067 -0,068 0,055 0,062 0,006 -0,031 0,000 0,000 -0,089 0,005 -0,025 0,011 
Y1 0,157 ,427** ,324* 0,088 0,177 ,395** 0,124 0,078 0,127 0,100 0,017 -0,017 0,157 ,290* -,405** 0,057 
Y2 0,072 0,080 0,081 -0,021 0,185 0,202 -,304* -,600** 0,151 ,473** -,271* ,271* ,543** -,278* ,305* 0,040 
Y3 -,306* -,391** -,348** -0,242 -,272* -,344** -0,169 -,274* -0,180 0,189 -0,220 0,220 ,323* -0,202 ,312* 0,167 
Y4 -0,210 -,273* -0,239 -0,195 -0,142 -0,191 -0,244 -,435** -0,083 ,322* -,271* ,271* ,452** -,260* ,355** 0,145 
Y5 -0,157 -0,178 -0,176 0,026 -0,041 -0,116 -0,069 -0,124 ,554** 0,069 -0,134 0,134 0,102 -,759** 0,187 0,008 
Y6 -0,104 -0,137 -0,123 0,208 ,400** 0,006 -,315* -,372** -0,149 ,420** -0,136 0,136 ,429** -,302* ,896** -0,074 
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Table 4. Correlation - Pre-crisis sub-period. Part 2. 
  X17 Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5 Z6 Z7 Z8 Z9 Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 
X1 0,229 0,254 0,003 -0,001 -0,075 -,257* -0,217 0,023 -0,133 0,072 0,157 0,072 -,306* -0,210 -0,157 -0,104 
X2 0,238 ,339** -0,051 0,005 -0,009 -,314* -,301* 0,027 -0,185 0,043 ,427** 0,080 -,391** -,273* -0,178 -0,137 
X3 0,226 ,307* -0,024 -0,002 -0,042 -,292* -0,252 0,017 -0,167 0,052 ,324* 0,081 -,348** -0,239 -0,176 -0,123 
X4 -,430** 0,180 0,232 -,327* 0,060 0,040 -0,063 -0,164 -0,188 -0,127 0,088 -0,021 -0,242 -0,195 0,026 0,208 
X5 -0,107 ,393** -0,104 0,059 0,004 -0,098 -0,105 -,332** -0,075 0,067 0,177 0,185 -,272* -0,142 -0,041 ,400** 
X6 0,195 ,397** -0,087 -0,240 0,011 -0,216 -0,157 -0,006 -0,182 -0,068 ,395** 0,202 -,344** -0,191 -0,116 0,006 
X7 -0,028 0,034 ,292* -0,133 -0,073 -0,133 -0,192 -0,048 0,055 0,055 0,124 -,304* -0,169 -0,244 -0,069 -,315* 
X8 -0,061 -0,077 ,390** -0,064 -0,071 -0,153 -0,169 -0,022 0,025 0,062 0,078 -,600** -,274* -,435** -0,124 -,372** 
X9 0,080 0,043 0,038 0,018 0,011 ,314* -,453** 0,031 0,018 0,006 0,127 0,151 -0,180 -0,083 ,554** -0,149 
X10 -0,114 0,213 -,257* 0,156 -0,107 ,273* -0,158 -0,039 -0,015 -0,031 0,100 ,473** 0,189 ,322* 0,069 ,420** 
X11 0,044 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,017 -,271* -0,220 -,271* -0,134 -0,136 
X12 -0,044 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,017 ,271* 0,220 ,271* 0,134 0,136 
X13 -0,084 0,174 -0,208 0,029 -0,134 ,280* -0,134 0,088 -0,075 -0,089 0,157 ,543** ,323* ,452** 0,102 ,429** 
X14 0,051 0,031 0,254 0,004 -0,035 -,504** -0,016 0,005 -0,001 0,005 ,290* -,278* -0,202 -,260* -,759** -,302* 
X15 -,329* 0,057 -0,172 0,049 -0,138 ,296* ,359** -0,209 0,016 -0,025 -,405** ,305* ,312* ,355** 0,187 ,896** 
X16 -0,010 -0,075 0,022 0,011 0,019 0,011 0,015 0,031 0,011 0,011 0,057 0,040 0,167 0,145 0,008 -0,074 
X17 1 -0,106 -0,117 -0,244 -0,106 -0,228 -0,190 ,500** 0,027 ,360** -0,017 0,004 -0,111 -0,084 -0,112 -,397** 
Z1 -0,106 1 -,320* -0,152 -,272* -0,152 -0,218 -,365** -0,152 -0,152 ,355** 0,248 -0,250 -0,101 -0,087 ,263* 
Z2 -0,117 -,320* 1 -0,073 -0,131 -0,073 -0,105 -0,175 -0,073 -0,073 -0,115 -,345** -0,002 -0,130 -0,053 -0,206 
Z3 -0,244 -0,152 -0,073 1 -0,062 -0,034 -0,050 -0,083 -0,034 -0,034 -0,032 -0,146 -0,005 -0,058 -0,017 0,087 
Z4 -0,106 -,272* -0,131 -0,062 1 -0,062 -0,089 -0,149 -0,062 -0,062 0,118 0,001 -0,153 -0,119 -0,045 -0,117 
Z5 -0,228 -0,152 -0,073 -0,034 -0,062 1 -0,050 -0,083 -0,034 -0,034 -0,220 0,167 ,279* ,278* ,690** 0,179 
Z6 -0,190 -0,218 -0,105 -0,050 -0,089 -0,050 1 -0,120 -0,050 -0,050 -0,197 0,060 ,278* 0,238 -0,104 ,265* 
Z7 ,500** -,365** -0,175 -0,083 -0,149 -0,083 -0,120 1 -0,083 -0,083 -0,065 -0,018 0,112 0,081 -0,043 -,322* 
Z8 0,027 -0,152 -0,073 -0,034 -0,062 -0,034 -0,050 -0,083 1 -0,034 -0,193 -0,015 -0,025 -0,025 -0,012 -0,052 
Z9 ,360** -0,152 -0,073 -0,034 -0,062 -0,034 -0,050 -0,083 -0,034 1 -0,097 -0,077 0,073 0,028 -0,017 -0,046 
Y1 -0,017 ,355** -0,115 -0,032 0,118 -0,220 -0,197 -0,065 -0,193 -0,097 1 0,097 -0,251 -0,158 -0,139 -0,090 
Y2 0,004 0,248 -,345** -0,146 0,001 0,167 0,060 -0,018 -0,015 -0,077 0,097 1 ,454** ,724** 0,218 ,335** 
Y3 -0,111 -0,250 -0,002 -0,005 -0,153 ,279* ,278* 0,112 -0,025 0,073 -0,251 ,454** 1 ,943** 0,174 0,162 
Y4 -0,084 -0,101 -0,130 -0,058 -0,119 ,278* 0,238 0,081 -0,025 0,028 -0,158 ,724** ,943** 1 0,216 0,250 
Y5 -0,112 -0,087 -0,053 -0,017 -0,045 ,690** -0,104 -0,043 -0,012 -0,017 -0,139 0,218 0,174 0,216 1 0,144 
Y6 -,397** ,263* -0,206 0,087 -0,117 0,179 ,265* -,322* -0,052 -0,046 -0,090 ,335** 0,162 0,250 0,144 1 
Note: ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05 
X1: LnTE, X2: LnTD, X3: LnTA, X4: LnRD, X5: LnEBIT, X6: LnTS, X7:  𝑹𝒇, X8: 𝑹𝒆, X9:  𝑹𝒅, X10: FirmReturn, X11: MarketReturn, X12: 𝝈𝒎, X13: FirmReturn/ 𝑹𝒆, X14: ETR, X15: ROA, X16: 
FirmReturn/TotalRisk, X17: TangibleAssetsRatio,  
Z1: Industrials, Z2: HelathCare, Z3: RealEstate, Z4: ConsumerGoods, Z5: Technology, Z6: ConsumerServives, Z7: BasicMaterial, Z8: Telecommunication, Z9: Utilities,  
Y1: D/E, Y2: SystematicRisk, Y3: UnsystematicRisk, Y4: TotalRisk, Y5: WACC, Y6: ROE. 
 Number of observations N = 60. 
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4.2.3 The multivariate OLS model analysis 
In the following table, the multivariate OLS regression results are shown for the pre-
crisis sub-period. The denotations of: *, ** or *** represents the 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance levels. The upper figures for variables are the estimated coefficients. If the 
figure is negative for a variable, the dependent and independent variables are negatively 
correlated. The same way positive value highlights the positive interrelation. Figures in 
parenthesis are the t-test values for each variable which compose the base for the 
significance level. 
Table 5 show the effects of independent variables on corporate capital structure, 
represented in this study as D/E ratio. The table covers the per-crisis sub-period, or 
2005-06 years. Similarly, this table indicates the influence of the same independent 
variables on Systematic risk, Unsystematic risk, Total risk, WACC and ROE.  
Significant variables that strongly associated with Debt-to-equity ratio were: total debt, 
total equity and total assets. The positive association of LnTA with D/E highlighted that 
the more assets company possesses, the higher proportion of borrowed capital there is 
in the company. The other variables were insignificant in relation to debt-to-equity ratio. 
The determinant of capital structure (explained in 2.3.2), such as size of the company 
(LnTS), earning volatility ( 𝝈𝒎 ), tangibility (tangible assets ratio), profitability (ROA), 
growth opportunities (LnRD) and industry classification did not show any significant 
interrelation with the capital structure. Neither the risk indexes showed the association 
with leverage (D/E) of the company.  
Systematic risk had high negative association with unsystematic risk which shows that 
the higher the market risk, the lower the risk of the company. Unsystematic risk, in turn, 
had also positive association with the total risk indicating that the market risk has more 
significant impact on the total risk. The total risk was also dependent on research and 
development expenses. Moreover, the total risk was higher when the cost of equity is 
relatively low which is explained in negative figure between the total risk and Re. This 
table represents the positive association of the Technology industry sector and weighted 
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average cost of capital. Thereby stating that technological companies had higher cost of 
capital when compared to other industries. Return on assets had very strong positive 
impact on return on equity.  
The r-squared values lied in the range 0,6-1 and suggest that the regression model of 
stock return was explained by between 60 - 100%. These are very good indicators of 
model fit. The Durbin Watson-test was in the range 1,928-2,381, suggesting that the 
data did not suffer from much autocorrelation (Brooks 2008). 
 
Table 5. OLS model - Pre-crisis sub-period 
Dependent 
variables                  
 
D/E SysRisk UnsysRisk TotalRisk WACC ROE 
(Constant) -2,821 
(-8,201) 
-1,382E-09 
(-1,225) 
-1,382E-09 
(-1,206) 
0,022 
(2,795) 
-0,064 
(-0,198) 
0,032 
(0,540) 
LnTE -4,042*** 
(-22,315) 
6,870E-11 
(0,130) 
6,870E-11 
(0,127) 
-0,002 
(-0,445) 
  
LnTD -1,411*** 
(-7,217) 
4,295E-12 
(0,007) 
4,294E-12 
(0,007) 
0,003 
(0,625) 
 
0,070 
(2,037) 
LnTA 5,453*** 
(16,500) 
  
 
0,030 
(0,399) 
-0,080* 
(-2,723) 
LnTS -0,004 
(-0,060) 
5,598E-11 
(0,175) 
5,598E-11 
(0,172) 
-0,001 
(-0,277) 
-0,059 
(-0,731) 
0,004 
(0,255) 
LnRD -0,003 
(-0,210) 
1,261E-11 
(0,150) 
1,261E-11 
(0,148) 
0,001* 
 (-2,700) 
0,025 
(0,981) 
0,005 
(1,319) 
LnEBIT 0,004 
(0,262) 
-5,888E-11 
(-0,753) 
-5,888E-11 
(-0,742) 
-0,001 
(-1,348) 
0,004 
(0,165) 
0,006 
(1,811) 
FirmReturn -20,665 
(-0,978) 
-5,032E-08 
(-0,448) 
-5,032E-08 
(-0,441) 
-1,313 
(-1,530) 
-50,334 
(-1,648) 
2,913 
(0,588) 
𝝈𝒎 14,038 
(1,173) 
7,117E-08 
(1,125) 
7,117E-08 
(1,108) 
0,522 
(1,139) 
0,517 
(0,027) 
6,133 
(2,347) 
UnsysRisk -4,798 
(-0,920) 
-1,000*** 
(-5908818,907) 
 
 
0,698 
(0,083) 
 
SysRisk -21,285 
(-0,724) 
 
-1,000*** 
(-5816212,033) 
  30,170 
(1,919) 
-17,268 
(-2,474) 
TotalRisk 
 
1,000 
(6506751,257) 
1,000*** 
(35730146,190) 
 
 
1,467 
(1,206) 
𝑹𝒆 -2,428 
(-0,242) 
-4,554E-08 
(-0,867) 
-4,554E-08 
(-0,854) 
-0,605*** 
(-4,553) 
 
-4,268 
(-1,916) 
 𝑹𝒅 0,197 
(1,205) 
-6,691E-10 
(-0,802) 
-6,691E-10 
(-0,790) 
-0,004 
(-0,609) 
 
0,074 
(2,358) 
FirmReturn/𝑹𝒆 0,691** 
(3,007) 
8,416E-10 
(0,646) 
8,416E-10 
(0,636) 
0,033*** 
(3,732) 
-0,270 
(-0,714) 
-0,004 
(-0,069) 
ETR -0,030 
(-0,948) 
-3,147E-12 
(-0,019) 
-3,147E-12 
(-0,019) 
0,001 
(0,830) 
 
0,000 
(-0,037) 
ROE -0,688 
(-0,885) 
1,429E-09 
(0,354) 
1,429E-09 
(0,348) 
-0,003 
(-0,115) 
1,230 
(1,133) 
 
ROA 1,254 
(0,905) 
-2,141E-09 
(-0,298) 
-2,141E-09 
(-0,294) 
0,009 
(0,163) 
-1,575 
(-0,896) 
1,650*** 
(15,316) 
FirmReturn/ 
TotalRisk 
0,000 
(-0,030) 
-4,071E-12 
(-0,228) 
-4,071E-12 
(-0,224) 
8,517E-05 
(0,596) 
-0,003 
(-0,469) 
0,000 
(0,450) 
Tangible 
AssetsRatio 
-0,157 
(-0,923) 
-2,609E-10 
(-0,290) 
-2,609E-10 
(-0,285) 
-0,019* 
(-2,909) 
0,339 
(1,136) 
-0,036 
(-0,903) 
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D/E 
 
-1,898E-11 
(-0,063) 
-1,898E-11 
(-0,062) 
-0,003 
(-1,312) 
0,004 
(0,070) 
0,022 
(2,319) 
WACC -0,079 
(-0,461) 
9,597E-11 
(0,107) 
9,597E-11 
(0,105) 
0,007 
(0,972) 
  
Industrials 
   
 
  
HelathCare 0,070 
(1,162) 
4,630E-10 
(1,471) 
4,630E-10 
(1,448) 
0,004 
(1,471) 
-0,004 
(-0,035) 
-0,001 
(-0,095) 
RealEstate -0,094 
(-0,501) 
3,339E-10 
(0,340) 
3,339E-10 
(0,334) 
-0,009 
(-1,140) 
0,192 
(0,682) 
-0,005 
(-0,117) 
ConsGoods -0,054 
(-0,929) 
1,357E-10 
(0,447) 
1,357E-10 
(0,440) 
0,001 
(0,232) 
-0,002 
(-0,024) 
-0,030 
(-2,453) 
Technology -0,052 
(-0,332) 
4,266E-10 
(0,525) 
4,266E-10 
(0,516) 
-9,970E-05 
(-0,015) 
1,080*** 
(5,743) 
-0,079 
(-2,602) 
ConsService -0,027 
(-0,258) 
-1,682E-10 
(-0,314) 
-1,682E-10 
(-0,309) 
0,007 
(1,617) 
-0,070 
(-0,491) 
0,009 
(0,368) 
BasicMat 0,019 
(0,299) 
8,040E-11 
(0,241) 
8,040E-11 
(0,237) 
0,003 
(1,335) 
0,024 
(0,219) 
-0,019 
(-1,291) 
Telecom 0,207 
(2,227) 
3,123E-10 
(0,641) 
3,123E-10 
(0,631) 
-0,004 
(-0,911) 
0,054 
(0,339) 
-0,005 
(-0,222) 
Utilities 0,190 
(1,493) 
-9,197E-11 
(-0,139) 
-9,197E-11 
(-0,136) 
0,009 
(1,926) 
-0,114 
(-0,544) 
0,006 
(0,204) 
R Square 0,992 1,000 1,000 0,813 0,604 0,973 
Durbin-Watson 2,381 1,928 1,928 2,160 1,966 1,941 
N 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Note:   OLS estimates are shown in above table (t-statistics appear in parentheses). 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.005; * p < 0.01 
D/E: Debt-to-equity ratio, SysRisk: Systematic risk, UnsysRisk: Unsystematic risk, TotalRisk: Total risk, WACC: Weighted 
average cost of capital, ROE: Return on equity, LnTE: Log of total equity, LnTD: log of total debt; LnTA: Log of total assets, LnTS: Log of 
total sales, LnRD: Log of research and development expenses, LnEBIT: Log of earnings before interest and taxes, FirmReturn: Firm’s 
stock return, 𝜎𝑚: Market standard deviation, Re: Cost of equity, Rd: Cost of debt, FirmReturn/Re: Firm’s return-to-cost of equity, ETR: 
Effective corporate tax rate, ROA: Return on assets, FirmReturn/TotalRisk: Firm’s return-to-total risk, TangibleAssetsRatio: Tangibles 
assets-to-total assets, Industrials: Industrials, HealthCare: Health care, RealEstate: Real Estate, ConsGoods: Consumer Goods, 
Technology: Technology, ConsServices: Consumer services, BasicMat: Basic material, Telecom: Telecommunication, Utilities: Utilities 
industry sector. 
 
4.3 During crisis 
4.3.1 Descriptive statistics analysis 
Table 6 depicts the descriptive statistics of 30 companies during crisis period, or 2007-08 
years. At this sub-period, the stock return’s mean was 0.07% which is extremely low 
when compared to the same figure in the pre-crisis sub-period (1.4%). The total risk 
index increased sharply to 3.4% in relation to 1.92% in 2005-06. Market risk equalled 
0.91% and company-specific risk – 2.52%. Debt-to-equity grew even higher (165.69%) 
during the crisis sub-period. This demonstrates that crisis prompted companies to 
borrow even more than before. Firm’s return-to-total risk was -19.30% indicating 
negative relation between risk and return among sample companies. The figure 
increased by 5.2% since the pre-crisis sub-period. This might be explained in overall 
increase of total risks and decrease in firm’s return indicators. Cost of equity mean, Re, is 
2.74%, the actual return on equity’s mean is 18.70%. The cost of equity did not rise 
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dramatically compared to pre-crisis, whilst the increase total of 2.72% can be noticed in 
return on equity mean index. The cost of debt was 1.86% which is considerably higher 
than before (0.1%). However, it was still lower than cost of equity resulting in greater 
proportion of debt over equity in capital structure of sample companies. The weighted 
average cost of capital is 1.92% for during the crisis sub-period. The figure has decreased 
from pre-crisis figure (3.93%). 
 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics - During crisis sub-period 
  N Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
LnTE 60 6,53577 6,03591 12,57168 8,4896357 1,75055183 3,064 
LnTD 60 7,96235 5,39426 13,35661 8,8691866 1,90194150 3,617 
LnTA 60 7,20918 6,52323 13,73241 9,4237358 1,80100799 3,244 
LnTS 60 6,72424 6,47536 13,19960 9,2765839 1,74926251 3,060 
LnRD 60 10,11600 0,10000 10,21600 4,6995121 2,57931369 6,653 
LnEBIT 60 7,83444 3,17805 11,01250 6,9420984 1,90454810 3,627 
FirmReturn 60 0,01083 -0,00470 0,00613 -0,0006860 0,00195649 0,000 
MarketReturn 60 0,00254 -0,00222 0,00032 -0,0009511 0,00128149 0,000 
𝝈𝒎 60 0,01315 0,01273 0,02588 0,0193050 0,00662884 0,000 
UnsysRisk 60 0,05335 0,00031 0,05365 0,0252309 0,01060595 0,000 
SysRisk 60 0,03215 -0,00220 0,02995 0,0091658 0,00838352 0,000 
TotRisk 60 0,08330 0,00030 0,08360 0,0343967 0,01817831 0,000 
𝑹𝒆 60 0,11445 -0,00891 0,10554 0,0274101 0,02380798 0,001 
𝑹𝒅 60 0,23924 -0,10191 0,13733 0,0186360 0,03360462 0,001 
FirmReturn/𝑹𝒆 60 5,98126 -4,03233 1,94892 -0,1099896 0,67306249 0,453 
ETR 60 14,99970 -3,48485 11,51485 0,3282472 1,56353523 2,445 
ROE 60 0,69161 -0,11941 0,57221 0,1870553 0,15622874 0,024 
ROA 60 0,34885 -0,05512 0,29373 0,0732012 0,06827905 0,005 
FirmReturn/TotalRisk 60 14,31569 -12,93036 1,38533 -0,1930412 1,68184266 2,829 
TangibleAssetsRatio 60 0,81070 0,00047 0,81117 0,2515135 0,20017511 0,040 
D/E 60 4,89460 0,33570 5,23030 1,6568752 0,82440875 0,680 
WACC 60 0,17630 -0,08326 0,09304 0,0192109 0,02589336 0,001 
Industrial 60 1,00000 0,00000 1,00000 0,4000000 0,49403218 0,244 
HelathCare 60 1,00000 0,00000 1,00000 0,1333333 0,34280333 0,118 
RealEstate 60 1,00000 0,00000 1,00000 0,0333333 0,18102033 0,033 
ConsumerGoods 60 1,00000 0,00000 1,00000 0,1000000 0,30253169 0,092 
Technology 60 1,00000 0,00000 1,00000 0,0333333 0,18102033 0,033 
ConsumerServices 60 1,00000 0,00000 1,00000 0,0666667 0,25154887 0,063 
BasicMaterial 60 1,00000 0,00000 1,00000 0,1666667 0,37582301 0,141 
Telecommunication 60 1,00000 0,00000 1,00000 0,0333333 0,18102033 0,033 
Utilities 60 1,00000 0,00000 1,00000 0,0333333 0,18102033 0,033 
Valid N (listwise) 60   
Note: LnTE: Log of total equity, LnTD: log of total debt; LnTA: Log of total assets, LnTS: Log of total sales, LnRD: Log of 
research and development expenses, LnEBIT: Log of earnings before interest and taxes, FirmReturn: Firm’s stock 
return, 𝝈𝒎: Market standard deviation, SysRisk: Systematic risk, UnsysRisk: Unsystematic risk, TotalRisk: Total 
risk, Re: Cost of equity, Rd: Cost of debt, FirmReturn/Re: Firm’s return-to-cost of equity, ETR: Effective corporate 
tax rate, ROE: Return on equity, ROA: Return on assets, FirmReturn/TotalRisk: Firm’s return-to-total risk, 
TangibleAssetsRatio: Tangibles assets-to-total assets, D/E: Debt-to-equity ratio, WACC: Weighted average cost of 
capital, Industrials: Industrials, HealthCare: Health care, RealEstate: Real Estate, ConsGoods: Consumer Goods, 
Technology: Technology, ConsServices: Consumer services, BasicMat: Basic material, Telecom: 
Telecommunication, Utilities: Utilities industry sector. 
 
  
54 
4.3.2 Correlation analysis 
Correlations were computed for 30 companies during 2007-08 constituting total of 60 
observations. Table 7 demonstrates these correlations. Similar to pre-crisis, log of total 
equity was strongly associated with total debt, total assets, total EBIT and total sales. 
LnTD was correlated significantly with LnTA, LnEBIT and LnTS. Natural log of total assets 
was correlated with natural logs of EBIT and of total sales. There was also a strong 
correlation between LnEBIT and LnTS. Cost of equity was heavily correlated with all risk 
indicators: systematic, unsystematic and total risk (0,746, 0,610 and 0,700 respectively). 
The correlation matrix states that the WACC and cost of debt showed significant 
correlation. The relation was positive implying that when the cost of debt increases, the 
cost of capital significantly rises as well. Market return was heavily correlated with all 
risk indicators. The correlation was negative indicating reverse relationship between 
market return and risks. Unsystematic and total risks as well as the total debt were 
positively correlated with market standard deviation (𝝈𝒎) signifying that market 
volatility react upon movements of those variables. Furthermore, return on assets and 
return on equity were associated positively, which demonstrated that the return on 
company’s assets are high when the return on equity to company’s shareholders are 
high too. 
The risk indicators were heavily correlated between each other; thus, systematic and 
unsystematic risks showed high association. Besides, there was high correlation between 
systematic and total risk as well as unsystematic and total risk.  
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Table 7. Pairwise correlation - During crisis sub-period. Part 1. 
  X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12 X13 X14 X15 X16 
X1 1 ,961** ,987** ,381** ,865** ,905** ,488** ,305* ,268* 0,078 -0,019 0,019 -0,016 0,075 -,292* -0,072 
X2 ,961** 1 ,992** ,388** ,873** ,940** ,468** ,269* ,292* 0,025 -0,040 0,040 -0,096 0,040 -,328* -0,093 
X3 ,987** ,992** 1 ,395** ,880** ,935** ,482** ,283* ,279* 0,051 -0,032 0,032 -0,060 0,055 -,313* -0,086 
X4 ,381** ,388** ,395** 1 ,438** ,484** ,408** ,299* 0,023 0,197 -0,021 0,021 -0,025 0,053 0,139 -0,173 
X5 ,865** ,873** ,880** ,438** 1 ,871** ,296* 0,094 0,215 0,180 0,010 -0,010 -0,035 -0,039 0,078 -0,124 
X6 ,905** ,940** ,935** ,484** ,871** 1 ,434** 0,207 ,282* 0,007 -0,043 0,043 -0,086 0,053 -0,207 -0,066 
X7 ,488** ,468** ,482** ,408** ,296* ,434** 1 ,770** ,286* -0,043 -0,139 0,139 -0,034 0,023 -,374** 0,108 
X8 ,305* ,269* ,283* ,299* 0,094 0,207 ,770** 1 0,134 0,254 0,243 -0,243 0,148 0,125 -,315* -0,019 
X9 ,268* ,292* ,279* 0,023 0,215 ,282* ,286* 0,134 1 -0,096 -0,126 0,126 -0,037 0,012 -,307* 0,071 
X10 0,078 0,025 0,051 0,197 0,180 0,007 -0,043 0,254 -0,096 1 ,463** -,463** ,457** -0,018 ,341** -0,205 
X11 -0,019 -0,040 -0,032 -0,021 0,010 -0,043 -0,139 0,243 -0,126 ,463** 1 -1,000** ,256* 0,092 0,084 -0,143 
X12 0,019 0,040 0,032 0,021 -0,010 0,043 0,139 -0,243 0,126 -,463** -1,000** 1 -,256* -0,092 -0,084 0,143 
X13 -0,016 -0,096 -0,060 -0,025 -0,035 -0,086 -0,034 0,148 -0,037 ,457** ,256* -,256* 1 0,003 0,124 -0,034 
X14 0,075 0,040 0,055 0,053 -0,039 0,053 0,023 0,125 0,012 -0,018 0,092 -0,092 0,003 1 -0,129 0,047 
X15 -,292* -,328* -,313* 0,139 0,078 -0,207 -,374** -,315* -,307* ,341** 0,084 -0,084 0,124 -0,129 1 -0,073 
X16 -0,072 -0,093 -0,086 -0,173 -0,124 -0,066 0,108 -0,019 0,071 -0,205 -0,143 0,143 -0,034 0,047 -0,073 1 
X17 0,068 0,045 0,052 -,430** -0,126 0,039 -0,079 -0,055 0,123 -0,246 0,038 -0,038 0,038 -0,020 -,387** 0,043 
Z1 ,280* ,384** ,347** 0,191 ,421** ,397** 0,027 -0,109 -0,044 0,173 0,000 0,000 -0,201 -0,116 0,060 -0,141 
Z2 -0,006 -0,099 -0,051 0,234 -0,030 -0,072 ,340** ,325* 0,211 0,002 0,000 0,000 0,050 -0,042 -0,071 0,045 
Z3 0,064 0,046 0,051 -,334** -0,015 -0,188 -0,116 -0,004 -0,005 0,043 0,000 0,000 0,030 -0,002 -0,118 0,023 
Z4 -0,068 -0,034 -0,053 0,028 -0,114 -0,034 -0,063 -0,047 -0,039 -0,145 0,000 0,000 -0,004 -0,059 -0,210 0,038 
Z5 -0,245 -,286* -,274* 0,052 -0,105 -0,190 -0,116 -0,094 -0,093 0,033 0,000 0,000 0,031 -0,006 ,590** 0,021 
Z6 -0,214 -0,251 -0,232 -0,052 -0,102 -0,117 -0,166 -0,085 -0,153 0,246 0,000 0,000 0,233 -0,030 ,380** 0,031 
Z7 -0,023 -0,036 -0,036 -0,176 -,275* -0,030 -0,088 -0,054 0,085 -,328* 0,000 0,000 0,024 ,278* -,370** 0,052 
Z8 -0,175 -0,180 -0,184 -0,181 -0,128 -0,208 0,016 0,071 0,026 -0,003 0,000 0,000 0,019 -0,012 0,058 0,021 
Z9 0,060 0,037 0,044 -0,111 0,060 -0,081 0,016 0,017 -0,104 0,031 0,000 0,000 0,006 -0,021 0,032 0,020 
Y1 0,027 ,282* 0,185 0,157 0,188 ,287* 0,027 -0,129 0,071 -0,135 -0,087 0,087 -0,233 -0,101 -0,134 -0,085 
Y2 0,000 0,035 0,025 -0,042 0,115 0,080 -0,191 -,746** 0,061 -,499** -,637** ,637** -,303* -0,134 0,095 0,126 
Y3 -0,240 -,261* -0,251 -0,230 -0,199 -0,224 -0,190 -,610** 0,021 -,538** -,610** ,610** -0,153 -0,056 0,069 ,273* 
Y4 -0,140 -0,136 -0,135 -0,153 -0,063 -0,093 -0,199 -,700** 0,040 -,544** -,650** ,650** -0,229 -0,094 0,084 0,217 
Y5 0,189 0,188 0,188 0,057 0,137 0,167 ,421** ,340** ,635** 0,033 0,012 -0,012 0,025 -,596** -0,190 0,051 
Y6 -0,202 -0,131 -0,159 0,247 0,230 -0,015 -,387** -,372** -,256* ,277* 0,062 -0,062 -0,002 -0,138 ,883** -0,142 
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Table 8. Pairwise correlation - During-crisis sub-period. Part 2. 
  X17 Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5 Z6 Z7 Z8 Z9 Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 
X1 0,068 ,280* -0,006 0,064 -0,068 -0,245 -0,214 -0,023 -0,175 0,060 0,027 0,000 -0,240 -0,140 0,189 -0,202 
X2 0,045 ,384** -0,099 0,046 -0,034 -,286* -0,251 -0,036 -0,180 0,037 ,282* 0,035 -,261* -0,136 0,188 -0,131 
X3 0,052 ,347** -0,051 0,051 -0,053 -,274* -0,232 -0,036 -0,184 0,044 0,185 0,025 -0,251 -0,135 0,188 -0,159 
X4 -,430** 0,191 0,234 -,334** 0,028 0,052 -0,052 -0,176 -0,181 -0,111 0,157 -0,042 -0,230 -0,153 0,057 0,247 
X5 -0,126 ,421** -0,030 -0,015 -0,114 -0,105 -0,102 -,275* -0,128 0,060 0,188 0,115 -0,199 -0,063 0,137 0,230 
X6 0,039 ,397** -0,072 -0,188 -0,034 -0,190 -0,117 -0,030 -0,208 -0,081 ,287* 0,080 -0,224 -0,093 0,167 -0,015 
X7 -0,079 0,027 ,340** -0,116 -0,063 -0,116 -0,166 -0,088 0,016 0,016 0,027 -0,191 -0,190 -0,199 ,421** -,387** 
X8 -0,055 -0,109 ,325* -0,004 -0,047 -0,094 -0,085 -0,054 0,071 0,017 -0,129 -,746** -,610** -,700** ,340** -,372** 
X9 0,123 -0,044 0,211 -0,005 -0,039 -0,093 -0,153 0,085 0,026 -0,104 0,071 0,061 0,021 0,040 ,635** -,256* 
X10 -0,246 0,173 0,002 0,043 -0,145 0,033 0,246 -,328* -0,003 0,031 -0,135 -,499** -,538** -,544** 0,033 ,277* 
X11 0,038 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,087 -,637** -,610** -,650** 0,012 0,062 
X12 -0,038 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,087 ,637** ,610** ,650** -0,012 -0,062 
X13 0,038 -0,201 0,050 0,030 -0,004 0,031 0,233 0,024 0,019 0,006 -0,233 -,303* -0,153 -0,229 0,025 -0,002 
X14 -0,020 -0,116 -0,042 -0,002 -0,059 -0,006 -0,030 ,278* -0,012 -0,021 -0,101 -0,134 -0,056 -0,094 -,596** -0,138 
X15 -,387** 0,060 -0,071 -0,118 -0,210 ,590** ,380** -,370** 0,058 0,032 -0,134 0,095 0,069 0,084 -0,190 ,883** 
X16 0,043 -0,141 0,045 0,023 0,038 0,021 0,031 0,052 0,021 0,020 -0,085 0,126 ,273* 0,217 0,051 -0,142 
X17 1 -0,187 -0,027 -0,235 -0,080 -0,202 -0,186 ,481** 0,047 ,345** -0,105 -0,030 -0,037 -0,036 0,179 -,392** 
Z1 -0,187 1 -,320* -0,152 -,272* -0,152 -0,218 -,365** -0,152 -0,152 ,438** 0,161 -0,072 0,032 -0,042 ,294* 
Z2 -0,027 -,320* 1 -0,073 -0,131 -0,073 -0,105 -0,175 -0,073 -0,073 -0,218 -0,197 -0,096 -0,147 ,410** -0,109 
Z3 -0,235 -0,152 -0,073 1 -0,062 -0,034 -0,050 -0,083 -0,034 -0,034 -0,084 -0,072 0,032 -0,015 -0,053 -0,147 
Z4 -0,080 -,272* -0,131 -0,062 1 -0,062 -0,089 -0,149 -0,062 -0,062 0,044 0,007 0,003 0,005 -0,078 -0,227 
Z5 -0,202 -0,152 -0,073 -0,034 -0,062 1 -0,050 -0,083 -0,034 -0,034 -0,194 0,036 0,127 0,091 -0,073 ,400** 
Z6 -0,186 -0,218 -0,105 -0,050 -0,089 -0,050 1 -0,120 -0,050 -0,050 -0,111 -0,038 0,047 0,010 -0,104 ,267* 
Z7 ,481** -,365** -0,175 -0,083 -0,149 -0,083 -0,120 1 -0,083 -0,083 -0,109 0,031 0,098 0,072 -0,137 -,418** 
Z8 0,047 -0,152 -0,073 -0,034 -0,062 -0,034 -0,050 -0,083 1 -0,034 -0,101 -0,059 -0,014 -0,035 0,056 0,025 
Z9 ,345** -0,152 -0,073 -0,034 -0,062 -0,034 -0,050 -0,083 -0,034 1 -0,098 0,004 -0,039 -0,021 -0,034 0,001 
Y1 -0,105 ,438** -0,218 -0,084 0,044 -0,194 -0,111 -0,109 -0,101 -0,098 1 0,190 -0,043 0,063 -0,004 ,266* 
Y2 -0,030 0,161 -0,197 -0,072 0,007 0,036 -0,038 0,031 -0,059 0,004 0,190 1 ,830** ,946** -0,147 0,162 
Y3 -0,037 -0,072 -0,096 0,032 0,003 0,127 0,047 0,098 -0,014 -0,039 -0,043 ,830** 1 ,966** -0,169 -0,003 
Y4 -0,036 0,032 -0,147 -0,015 0,005 0,091 0,010 0,072 -0,035 -0,021 0,063 ,946** ,966** 1 -0,166 0,073 
Y5 0,179 -0,042 ,410** -0,053 -0,078 -0,073 -0,104 -0,137 0,056 -0,034 -0,004 -0,147 -0,169 -0,166 1 -0,186 
Y6 -,392** ,294* -0,109 -0,147 -0,227 ,400** ,267* -,418** 0,025 0,001 ,266* 0,162 -0,003 0,073 -0,186 1 
Note: ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05 
X1: LnTE, X2: LnTD, X3: LnTA, X4: LnRD, X5: LnEBIT, X6: LnTS, X7:  𝑹𝒇, X8: 𝑹𝒆, X9:  𝑹𝒅, X10: FirmReturn, X11: MarketReturn, X12: 𝝈𝒎, X13: FirmReturn/ 𝑹𝒆, X14: ETR, X15: ROA, X16: 
FirmReturn/TotalRisk, X17: TangibleAssetsRatio,  
Z1: Industrials, Z2: HelathCare, Z3: RealEstate, Z4: ConsumerGoods, Z5: Technology, Z6: ConsumerServives, Z7: BasicMaterial, Z8: Telecommunication, Z9: Utilities,  
Y1: D/E, Y2: SystematicRisk, Y3: UnsystematicRisk, Y4: TotalRisk, Y5: WACC, Y6: ROE. 
 Number of observations N = 60. 
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4.3.3 The multivariate OLS model analysis 
Table 9 depicts the OLS regression model for the during crisis sub-period. Similar to the 
pre-crisis sub-period, strong association was determined between debt-to-equity ratio 
and total debt, total equity and total assets logs. All the other variables were 
insignificant to the capital structure. Size of the company (LnTS), earning volatility (𝝈𝒎), 
tangibility (tangible assets ratio), profitability (ROA), growth opportunities (LnRD) and 
industry classification are the determinants of capital structure according to the previous 
existing theories, however, they did not affect the leverage (D/E) in both sub-periods of 
the research. The risk indicators had no significant effect on capital structure of the 
company. The predictions, therefore, are not met in the work. Hypothesis 1 is not 
supported by the findings. The table depicts that systematic risk was not affected by 
capital structure of the company, nonetheless, total risk had positive impact and 
unsystematic risk had negative impact on systematic risk. 
During the crisis unsystematic risk, or risk specific to certain company was positively 
affected by total debt, total sales, market standard deviation, total risk, effective 
corporate tax rate, return on assets and WACC. The following variables showed negative 
impact on unsystematic risk: total equity, firm’s return, systematic risk, cost of equity, 
cost of debt, firm’s return-to-cost of equity and return on equity. However, debt-to-
equity ratio was affected unsystematic risk which contradicts the hypothesis 3. 
Unsystematic risk had strong negative association with health care, technology and 
telecommunication industry sectors, whereas real estate and utilities industries had 
positive coefficients. The interpretation is that companies from health care, technology 
and telecommunication are less vulnerable to firm-specific risk than real estate and 
utilities companies.  
Total risk was negatively associated with cost of equity implying that when the cost of 
equity is low, the total risk tends to increase. Other association with total risk was not 
determined during the crisis. The hypothesis 4 stating that total risk is affected by capital 
structure cannot be accepted. All the independent variables had insignificant association 
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with cost of capital (WACC). Hence, the WACC was not affected by capital structure 
either, the hypothesis 5 is rejected. 
Return on equity (ROE) was significantly positively affected by total debt and negatively 
affected by total assets and consumer goods industry. Moreover, debt-to-equity 
impacted significantly the return on equity which supports H5. The adjusted R-square 
value was very close to 1,000 with the exception of the WACC variable (R squared = 
0,395). The higher values indicate the better fir for the research, however, low figures 
are still considered sufficient if the estimated coefficients are statistically significant. 
Durbin-Watson index lays from 1,731 to 2,399 which is appropriate.  
 
Table 9. OLS model - During crisis sub-period 
 
D/E SysRisk UnsysRisk Total Risk WACC ROE 
(Constant) 
-4,116 
(-10,371) 
3,09171E-10 
(0,355394884) 
-5,069E-10 
(-2,656) 
0,031 
(2,425) 
-0,017 
(-0,394) 
0,057 
(0,834) 
LnTE 
-4,581*** 
(-20,586)   
-5,976E-10*** 
(-5,545) 
0,004 
(0,550)     
LnTD 
-2,408*** 
(-9084) 
7,615E-10 
(1,232) 
4,212E-10*** 
(3,954) 
-0,006 
(-0,753)   
0,125* 
(2,772) 
LnTA 
6,876*** 
(15,409) 
-8,057E-10 
(-1,263)     
0,000 
(0,015) 
-0,150** 
(-3,456) 
LnTS 0,119 
6,038E-11 
(0,270) 
1,163E-10 
(1,996) 
-0,002 
(-0,369) 
-0,005 
(-0,328) 
0,032 
(1,905) 
LnRD 
-0,003 
(-0,233) 
6,788E-11 
(1,707) 
6,871E-11*** 
(6,759) 
6,602E-05 
(0,085) 
-2,519E-05 
(-0,010) 
0,006 
(1,885) 
LnEBIT 
0,006 
(0,155) 
-2,609E-11 
(-0,218) 
5,825E-11 
(1,822) 
0,002 
(0,825) 
0,004 
(0,593) 
-0,002 
(-0,229) 
FirmRet 
-5,682 
(-0,403) 
-6,162E-08 
(-1,334) 
-5,683E-08*** 
(-4,828) 
-1,992 
(-2,350) 
1,254 
(0,469) 
-0,957 
(-0,261) 
𝝈𝒎 
1,512 
(0,363)   
3,099E-08*** 
(8,855) 
0,672 
(3,114) 
-0,077 
(-0,130)   
UnsystRisk 
-1,287 
(-0,306) 
-1,000*** 
(30894090,876)       
-0,387 
(-0,357) 
SysRisk 
6,967 
(0,582)   
-1,000*** 
(-80640841)   
  
 
0,620 
0,205 
Total Risk   
1,000*** 
(46402645,433) 
 1,000*** 
(284927974,95
3)       
𝑹𝒆 
3,873 
(0,772) 
-4,773E-09 
(-0,671) 
-3,147E-08*** 
(-7,647) 
-0,808*** 
(-7,328)   
-0,079 
(-0,064) 
 𝑹𝒅 
0,319 
(0,246) 
3,224E-10 
(0,082) 
-3,272E-09** 
(-3,007) 
-0,021 
(-0,255)   
-0,166 
(-1,107) 
FirmReturn/𝑹𝒆 
0,019 
(0,663) 
-2,361E-10 
(-2,537) 
-2,397E-10*** 
(-10,006) 
0,002 
(1,077) 
-0,001 
(-0,252) 
0,004 
(0,523) 
ETR 
0,017 
(0,579) 
7,313E-11 
(0,845) 
1,556E-10*** 
(6,429) 
0,001 
(0,537) 
  
 
0,004 
(1,262) 
ROE 
-0,270 
(-0,388) 
-3,494E-09 
(-1,592) 
-3,520E-09*** 
(-6,029) 
-0,014 
(-0,313) 
-0,006 
(-0,045) 
2,131 
(12,976) 
ROA 
0,909 
(0,567) 
7,450E-09 
(1,467) 
7,120E-09*** 
(5,324) 
-0,005 
(-0,046) 
-0,031 
(-0,100) 
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FirmReturn/ 
TotalRisk 
0,000 
(0,037) 
1,758E-11 
(0,529) 
2,943E-12 
(0,339) 
0,000 
(0,638) 
0,000 
(0,173) 
-0,001 
(-0,328) 
Tangible 
Assets/ 
TotalAssets 
0,032 
(0,188) 
-3,660E-11 
(-0,067) 
-3,259E-10 
(-2,271) 
-0,013 
(-1,160) 
0,064 
(1,930) 
0,018 
(0,448) 
D/E   
7,475E-11 
(0,532) 
-6,942E-11 
(-1,352) 
0,001 
(0,326) 
0,004 
(0,467) 
0,032** 
(3,027) 
WACC 
1,067 
(0,419) 
5,427E-09 
(0,721) 
1,300E-08*** 
(6,084) 
0,074 
(0,458)     
Industrials             
HelathCare 
-0,112 
(-1,291) 
-5,288E-10 
(-1,927) 
-7,350E-10*** 
(-10,285) 
-0,006 
(-1,185) 
0,021 
(1,458) 
0,041 
(2,084) 
RealEstate 
0,339 
(1,861) 
4,285E-10 
(0,728) 
5,618E-10*** 
(3,678) 
-0,002 
(-0,166) 
0,007 
(0,179) 
0,064 
(1,430) 
ConsGoods 
0,005 
(0,078) 
2,233E-11 
(0,097) 
7,138E-11 
(1,212) 
-0,004 
(-0,805) 
0,001 
(0,057) 
-0,045* 
(-2,718) 
Technology 
-0,053 
(-0,303) 
-6,213E-10 
(-1,099) 
-7,783E-10*** 
(-5,338) 
0,002 
(0,135) 
0,020 
(0,530) 
-0,100 
(-2,466) 
ConsServ 
-0,199 
(-1,732) 
4,998E-11 
0,140 
-1,276E-10 
(-1,348) 
0,000 
(0,018) 
0,010 
(0,417) 
-0,047 
(-1,720) 
BasicMat 
0,025 
(0,346) 
-2,954E-10 
(-1,278) 
-1,352E-10 
(-2,215) 
0,001 
(0,143) 
-0,014 
(-0,945) 
-0,034 
(-1,927) 
Telecom 
0,071 
(0,712) 
-3,405E-10 
(-1,033) 
-3,202E-10*** 
(-3,797) 
-0,001 
(-0,219) 
0,004 
(0,201) 
0,021 
(0,806) 
Utilities 
0,187 
(1,357) 
2,880E-10 
(0,650) 
4,816E-10*** 
(4,175) 
0,001 
(0,103) 
-0,033 
(-1,143) 
0,026 
(0,749) 
R Square 0,990 1,000a 1,000 0,907 0,395 ,990a 
Durbin- 
Watson 2,399 1,731 2,072 1,778 2,272 2,318 
N 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Note:   OLS estimates are shown in above table (t-statistics appear in parentheses). 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.005; * p < 0.01 
D/E: Debt-to-equity ratio, SysRisk: Systematic risk, UnsysRisk: Unsystematic risk, TotalRisk: Total risk, WACC: Weighted 
average cost of capital, ROE: Return on equity, LnTE: Log of total equity, LnTD: log of total debt; LnTA: Log of total assets, LnTS: Log of 
total sales, LnRD: Log of research and development expenses, LnEBIT: Log of earnings before interest and taxes, FirmReturn: Firm’s 
stock return, 𝜎𝑚: Market standard deviation, Re: Cost of equity, Rd: Cost of debt, FirmReturn/Re: Firm’s return-to-cost of equity, ETR: 
Effective corporate tax rate, ROA: Return on assets, FirmReturn/TotalRisk: Firm’s return-to-total risk, TangibleAssetsRatio: Tangibles 
assets-to-total assets, Industrials: Industrials, HealthCare: Health care, RealEstate: Real Estate, ConsGoods: Consumer Goods, 
Technology: Technology, ConsServices: Consumer services, BasicMat: Basic material, Telecom: Telecommunication, Utilities: Utilities 
industry sector. 
 
4.4 Post-crisis 
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
The table 10 emphasises the descriptive statistics for the post-crisis sub-period. The 
mean firm’s stock return was 0.09%, the index fell significantly when compared to the 
pre-crisis sub-period. Total risk’s mean is 2.04%. The index was less than during crisis, 
however more superior than in pre-crisis. This signifies that the crisis prompted unstable 
economic environment in which organisations experience turbulence even after the 
crisis. Market risk constituted for 0.28%, which is lower compared to during crisis, and 
unsystematic risk constitutes for 1.76%. The is explained that despite of the crisis 
consequences, the firm-specific risk is still higher than market risk. The D/E ratio 
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amounted for 130% which was slightly lower than in 2005-06 years (148.93%) and in 
2007-08 (165.69%). This emphasised the fact that debt finance constituted less 
significant proportion in corporate capital structures of the sample companies after the 
crisis. The firm’s return-to-total risk ratio amounted for 7.96%, the same ratio was 
negative in 2006-08 years. This ratio suggests that for the same amount of risk the 
company received higher rate than in the pre-crisis and during the crisis sub-periods. 
Cost of equity, equivalent to 1.13%, was still greater rate than cost of debt 0.89%. Return 
on equity dropped to 16.56% in the post-crisis sub-period in comparison to during the 
crisis (18.7%). This is an evidence that return on equity to company’s shareholders was 
notably higher despite market instability. The WACC, amounting for 1.11%, had had a 
downward trend over all the three sub-periods. 
 
Table 10. Descriptive statistics - Post-crisis sub-period 
 
N Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
LnTE 270 7,02052 6,17300 13,19352 8,9445656 1,69007840 2,856 
LnTD 270 7,97450 5,71057 13,68506 9,1128528 1,69059815 2,858 
LnTA 270 7,50092 6,66142 14,16234 9,7468596 1,67658548 2,811 
LnRD 270 10,85088 0,10000 10,95088 4,8346199 2,71256189 7,358 
LnEBIT 268 12,68090 -1,20397 11,47693 7,1629790 1,97915260 3,917 
LnTS 270 7,43575 6,17960 13,61535 9,4642422 1,69698987 2,880 
Rf 270 0,09465 -0,00960 0,08505 0,0138830 0,01888210 0,000 
Re 270 0,10210 -0,01612 0,08599 0,0112999 0,01781237 0,000 
Rd 270 1,93270 -1,39433 0,53837 0,0088759 0,09684307 0,009 
FirmRet 270 0,00924 -0,00177 0,00748 0,0008928 0,00116117 0,000 
MarkRet 270 0,00187 -0,00056 0,00131 0,0004945 0,00051754 0,000 
UnsysRisk 270 0,04341 0,00009 0,04350 0,0176329 0,00658849 0,000 
MarkSD 270 0,01391 0,00625 0,02017 0,0125332 0,00417522 0,000 
SysRisk 270 0,02851 -0,00223 0,02628 0,0027643 0,00457874 0,000 
TotRisk 270 0,05982 0,00010 0,05992 0,0203972 0,00940828 0,000 
RetTOCost 270 6,71623 -3,91455 2,80168 0,0801855 0,50196986 0,252 
ETR 270 20,48179 -9,12179 11,36000 0,1825870 0,94527908 0,894 
ROE 270 1,05900 -0,16945 0,88954 0,1656521 0,13575326 0,018 
ROA 270 0,39086 -0,07575 0,31510 0,0737566 0,06039740 0,004 
RetTORisk 270 20,15413 -9,68440 10,46973 0,0786099 1,09731970 1,204 
TangibleAssetsRatio 270 0,76812 0,00036 0,76847 0,2417963 0,20582663 0,042 
DtoE 270 5,51089 0,37604 5,88693 1,3003154 0,59763603 0,357 
WACC 270 0,40420 -0,17858 0,22561 0,0110779 0,02812179 0,001 
Industrial 270 1,00000 0,00000 1,00000 0,4000000 0,49080769 0,241 
HelathCare 270 1,00000 0,00000 1,00000 0,1333333 0,34056590 0,116 
RealEstate 270 1,00000 0,00000 1,00000 0,0333333 0,17983884 0,032 
ConsGoods 270 1,00000 0,00000 1,00000 0,1000000 0,30055710 0,090 
Technology 270 1,00000 0,00000 1,00000 0,0333333 0,17983884 0,032 
ConsServ 270 1,00000 0,00000 1,00000 0,0666667 0,24990705 0,062 
BasicMat 270 1,00000 0,00000 1,00000 0,1666667 0,37337006 0,139 
Telecom 270 1,00000 0,00000 1,00000 0,0333333 0,17983884 0,032 
Utilities 270 1,00000 0,00000 1,00000 0,0333333 0,17983884 0,032 
Note: LnTE: Log of total equity, LnTD: log of total debt; LnTA: Log of total assets, LnTS: Log of total sales, LnRD: Log of 
research and development expenses, LnEBIT: Log of earnings before interest and taxes, FirmReturn: Firm’s stock 
return, 𝝈𝒎: Market standard deviation, SysRisk: Systematic risk, UnsysRisk: Unsystematic risk, TotalRisk: Total 
risk, Re: Cost of equity, Rd: Cost of debt, FirmReturn/Re: Firm’s return-to-cost of equity, ETR: Effective corporate 
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tax rate, ROE: Return on equity, ROA: Return on assets, FirmReturn/TotalRisk: Firm’s return-to-total risk, 
TangibleAssetsRatio: Tangibles assets-to-total assets, D/E: Debt-to-equity ratio, WACC: Weighted average cost of 
capital, Industrials: Industrials, HealthCare: Health care, RealEstate: Real Estate, ConsGoods: Consumer Goods, 
Technology: Technology, ConsServices: Consumer services, BasicMat: Basic material, Telecom: 
Telecommunication, Utilities: Utilities industry sector. 
 
4.4.2 Correlation  
The results of the correlational analysis for the post-crisis sub-period indicated a highly 
significant correlation between log of total equity and log of total debt, log of total 
assets, log of total sales and log of EBIT. Debt was strongly correlated with assets, EBIT 
and sales. Log of EBIT was correlated with log of total sales. Regarding dependent 
variables, debt-to-equity ratio was highly correlated with log of total debt. Also, it was 
negatively correlated with tangible assets ratios which supports the theory of tangibility 
acting as a one of the capital structure determinants. The negative correlation means 
that the more tangible assets, the less leveraged firms are. Debt-to-equity ratio also 
correlated with the following industries: Industrials and health care (positive), 
technology and basic material (negative). The reviewed previous empirical findings 
argue that industry classification play significant role in capital structures, thus the 
research supports this argument. Debt-to-equity showed high positive correlation with 
and return on equity. This correlation supports hypothesis 7 predetermined in this work.  
Systematic risk had negative correlation with cost of equity, firm’s return and market 
return. This implies that systematic risk increases when mentioned variables decrease 
and conversely. Market standard deviation, unsystematic and total risk, in turn, had 
positive correlation with systematic risk.  
Unsystematic risk was significantly negatively correlated with log of total equity, log of 
total debt, log of total assets, log of R&D expenses, log of EBIT and risk-free rate of 
return. When the values of those variables were low, the firm-specific risk was superior. 
Firm and market return as well as market standard deviation was positively correlated 
with unsystematic risk. The table also illustrated negative correlation with industrials 
sector and positive with consumer services and technology. 
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Total risk had reverse dependence on total equity total debt, total assets, R&D expenses, 
EBIT and Risk-free rate. Whereas positive dependence showed market standard 
deviation, systematic and unsystematic risk.  
WACC was significantly correlated with firm’s equity, debt, assets, EBIT, sales, risk-free 
rate, cost of equity and cost of debt. Furthermore, the table suggested that health care 
companies had higher cost of capital, whereas consumer services companies had lower. 
Return on equity was higher when total equity total debt and total assets were not 
significant. Whilst, total sales, risk-free rate and return on assets showed direct 
dependency with return on equity. Return on equity was higher for consumer services 
and technology companies, but lower for consumer goods and basic material.  
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Table 11. Correlation - Post-crisis sub-period. Part 1. 
  X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12 X13 X14 X15 X16 
X1 1 ,969** ,991** ,402** ,817** ,893** ,309** ,353** 0,049 -0,051 -0,052 -0,056 0,050 -0,059 -,211** 0,030 
X2 ,969** 1 ,993** ,402** ,812** ,899** ,304** ,342** 0,052 -0,029 -0,040 -0,053 0,043 -0,064 -,241** 0,047 
X3 ,991** ,993** 1 ,409** ,821** ,905** ,310** ,351** 0,051 -0,040 -0,045 -0,055 0,045 -0,061 -,228** 0,040 
X4 ,402** ,402** ,409** 1 ,472** ,509** ,323** ,338** ,129* 0,077 -0,016 0,011 0,025 0,081 ,198** 0,067 
X5 ,817** ,812** ,821** ,472** 1 ,838** ,234** ,260** 0,079 -0,020 -0,064 -0,017 0,075 -0,002 ,183** 0,107 
X6 ,893** ,899** ,905** ,509** ,838** 1 ,317** ,346** 0,068 -0,023 -0,035 0,007 0,084 0,005 -0,042 0,028 
X7 ,309** ,304** ,310** ,323** ,234** ,317** 1 ,929** ,126* -0,011 0,053 ,319** 0,002 0,066 -,126* -0,024 
X8 ,353** ,342** ,351** ,338** ,260** ,346** ,929** 1 0,114 0,073 ,211** ,193** -0,001 0,058 -,146* -0,016 
X9 0,049 0,052 0,051 ,129* 0,079 0,068 ,126* 0,114 1 0,058 0,061 -0,013 0,023 -0,038 0,000 -0,024 
X10 -0,051 -0,029 -0,040 0,077 -0,020 -0,023 -0,011 0,073 0,058 1 ,505** ,120* ,169** -0,007 0,070 0,112 
X11 -0,052 -0,040 -0,045 -0,016 -0,064 -0,035 0,053 ,211** 0,061 ,505** 1 0,091 ,197** 0,040 -0,061 0,088 
X12 -0,056 -0,053 -0,055 0,011 -0,017 0,007 ,319** ,193** -0,013 ,120* 0,091 1 ,156* -0,008 0,074 0,073 
X13 0,050 0,043 0,045 0,025 0,075 0,084 0,002 -0,001 0,023 ,169** ,197** ,156* 1 -0,031 0,081 0,062 
X14 -0,059 -0,064 -0,061 0,081 -0,002 0,005 0,066 0,058 -0,038 -0,007 0,040 -0,008 -0,031 1 0,025 -0,024 
X15 -,211** -,241** -,228** ,198** ,183** -0,042 -,126* -,146* 0,000 0,070 -0,061 0,074 0,081 0,025 1 0,053 
X16 0,030 0,047 0,040 0,067 0,107 0,028 -0,024 -0,016 -0,024 0,112 0,088 0,073 0,062 -0,024 0,053 1 
X17 0,018 -0,061 -0,025 -,391** -0,097 0,000 -0,083 -0,079 -0,009 -0,042 0,006 0,022 0,011 -0,013 -0,116 -0,030 
Z1 ,284** ,388** ,343** ,217** ,281** ,384** 0,050 0,029 0,028 0,053 0,000 0,000 0,050 -0,046 -0,079 0,075 
Z2 0,025 -0,080 -0,024 ,241** 0,064 -0,011 ,181** ,213** ,129* 0,040 0,000 0,000 -,204** 0,035 ,161** -0,025 
Z3 0,046 0,063 0,054 -,325** -0,004 -,203** -0,095 -0,081 -0,034 -0,066 0,000 0,000 -0,008 -0,102 -0,088 -0,013 
Z4 -0,063 -0,057 -0,063 -0,052 -,129* -0,117 -0,096 -0,099 0,020 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,063 -0,057 -,208** -0,022 
Z5 -,211** -,242** -,230** 0,115 -0,069 -0,114 -0,095 -0,100 -0,012 0,027 0,000 0,000 0,043 0,016 ,443** -0,011 
Z6 -,179** -,179** -,179** -0,039 -0,063 -0,028 -,137* -0,119 -0,048 -0,050 0,000 0,000 0,007 -0,010 ,310** -0,008 
Z7 -0,051 -0,092 -0,077 -,216** -,137* -0,064 -0,019 -0,038 -0,109 0,024 0,000 0,000 0,067 ,120* -,249** -0,032 
Z8 -,237** -,213** -,228** -,172** -,140* -,235** 0,050 0,058 0,005 -0,054 0,000 0,000 -0,025 0,011 0,070 -0,005 
Z9 0,040 0,021 0,030 -0,077 -0,090 -0,107 0,050 0,049 -0,021 -0,111 0,000 0,000 -0,015 -0,003 -0,080 -0,013 
Y1 -0,107 ,122* 0,022 0,067 0,006 0,061 -0,023 -0,042 0,015 0,074 0,052 0,009 -0,048 -0,012 -0,088 0,077 
Y2 -0,021 -0,023 -0,024 -0,023 0,017 0,028 0,059 -,254** -0,095 -,207** -,426** ,438** 0,041 0,002 0,108 -0,041 
Y3 -,168** -,201** -,189** -,174** -,203** -0,118 ,159** 0,042 0,031 ,141* ,161** ,533** 0,115 0,020 -0,065 -0,105 
Y4 -,128* -,152* -,144* -,133* -,133* -0,069 ,140* -0,094 -0,025 -0,002 -0,095 ,586** 0,101 0,015 0,007 -0,094 
Y5 ,249** ,243** ,248** 0,118 ,249** ,234** ,354** ,380** ,474** 0,032 0,063 0,089 0,016 -,481** -0,082 -0,075 
Y6 -,234** -,187** -,208** ,197** ,181** -0,007 -,134* -,158** -0,008 0,065 -0,048 0,074 0,056 0,022 ,915** 0,074 
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Table 12. Correlation - Post-crisis sub-period. Part 2. 
  X17 Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5 Z6 Z7 Z8 Z9 Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 
X1 0,018 ,284** 0,025 0,046 -0,063 -,211** -,179** -0,051 -,237** 0,040 -0,107 -0,021 -,168** -,128* ,249** -,234** 
X2 -0,061 ,388** -0,080 0,063 -0,057 -,242** -,179** -0,092 -,213** 0,021 ,122* -0,023 -,201** -,152* ,243** -,187** 
X3 -0,025 ,343** -0,024 0,054 -0,063 -,230** -,179** -0,077 -,228** 0,030 0,022 -0,024 -,189** -,144* ,248** -,208** 
X4 -,391** ,217** ,241** -,325** -0,052 0,115 -0,039 -,216** -,172** -0,077 0,067 -0,023 -,174** -,133* 0,118 ,197** 
X5 -0,097 ,281** 0,064 -0,004 -,129* -0,069 -0,063 -,137* -,140* -0,090 0,006 0,017 -,203** -,133* ,249** ,181** 
X6 0,000 ,384** -0,011 -,203** -0,117 -0,114 -0,028 -0,064 -,235** -0,107 0,061 0,028 -0,118 -0,069 ,234** -0,007 
X7 -0,083 0,050 ,181** -0,095 -0,096 -0,095 -,137* -0,019 0,050 0,050 -0,023 0,059 ,159** ,140* ,354** -,134* 
X8 -0,079 0,029 ,213** -0,081 -0,099 -0,100 -0,119 -0,038 0,058 0,049 -0,042 -,254** 0,042 -0,094 ,380** -,158** 
X9 -0,009 0,028 ,129* -0,034 0,020 -0,012 -0,048 -0,109 0,005 -0,021 0,015 -0,095 0,031 -0,025 ,474** -0,008 
X10 -0,042 0,053 0,040 -0,066 0,001 0,027 -0,050 0,024 -0,054 -0,111 0,074 -,207** ,141* -0,002 0,032 0,065 
X11 0,006 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,052 -,426** ,161** -0,095 0,063 -0,048 
X12 0,022 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,009 ,438** ,533** ,586** 0,089 0,074 
X13 0,011 0,050 -,204** -0,008 0,063 0,043 0,007 0,067 -0,025 -0,015 -0,048 0,041 0,115 0,101 0,016 0,056 
X14 -0,013 -0,046 0,035 -0,102 -0,057 0,016 -0,010 ,120* 0,011 -0,003 -0,012 0,002 0,020 0,015 -,481** 0,022 
X15 -0,116 -0,079 ,161** -0,088 -,208** ,443** ,310** -,249** 0,070 -0,080 -0,088 0,108 -0,065 0,007 -0,082 ,915** 
X16 -0,030 0,075 -0,025 -0,013 -0,022 -0,011 -0,008 -0,032 -0,005 -0,013 0,077 -0,041 -0,105 -0,094 -0,075 0,074 
X17 1 -,222** 0,060 -,218** -,127* -0,111 -,178** ,470** 0,056 ,249** -,293** 0,023 0,112 0,090 0,052 -,187** 
Z1 -,222** 1 -,320** -,152* -,272** -,152* -,218** -,365** -,152* -,152* ,384** 0,076 -,174** -0,085 -0,017 0,038 
Z2 0,060 -,320** 1 -0,073 -,131* -0,073 -0,105 -,175** -0,073 -0,073 -,291** -0,113 0,006 -0,051 ,227** 0,064 
Z3 -,218** -,152* -0,073 1 -0,062 -0,034 -0,050 -0,083 -0,034 -0,034 0,027 -0,037 -0,038 -0,044 0,051 -0,081 
Z4 -,127* -,272** -,131* -0,062 1 -0,062 -0,089 -,149* -0,062 -0,062 -0,025 0,022 0,047 0,043 -0,001 -,221** 
Z5 -0,111 -,152* -0,073 -0,034 -0,062 1 -0,050 -0,083 -0,034 -0,034 -,121* 0,028 ,147* 0,117 -0,063 ,354** 
Z6 -,178** -,218** -0,105 -0,050 -0,089 -0,050 1 -,120* -0,050 -0,050 0,048 -0,049 -0,042 -0,053 -,125* ,326** 
Z7 ,470** -,365** -,175** -0,083 -,149* -0,083 -,120* 1 -0,083 -0,083 -,195** 0,065 ,230** ,193** -0,082 -,289** 
Z8 0,056 -,152* -0,073 -0,034 -0,062 -0,034 -0,050 -0,083 1 -0,034 0,054 -0,057 -0,094 -0,094 0,010 0,100 
Z9 ,249** -,152* -0,073 -0,034 -0,062 -0,034 -0,050 -0,083 -0,034 1 -0,074 -0,031 -0,049 -0,049 -0,037 -0,083 
Y1 -,293** ,384** -,291** 0,027 -0,025 -,121* 0,048 -,195** 0,054 -0,074 1 -0,041 -,140 -0,118 -0,026 ,257** 
Y2 0,023 0,076 -0,113 -0,037 0,022 0,028 -0,049 0,065 -0,057 -0,031 -0,041 1 ,400** ,767** -0,103 0,092 
Y3 0,112 -,174** 0,006 -0,038 0,047 ,147* -0,042 ,230** -0,094 -0,049 -,140 ,400** 1 ,895** 0,098 -0,119 
Y4 0,090 -0,085 -0,051 -0,044 0,043 0,117 -0,053 ,193** -0,094 -0,049 -0,118 ,767** ,895** 1 0,019 -0,039 
Y5 0,052 -0,017 ,227** 0,051 -0,001 -0,063 -,125* -0,082 0,010 -0,037 -0,026 -0,103 0,098 0,019 1 -0,105 
Y6 -,187** 0,038 0,064 -0,081 -,221** ,354** ,326** -,289** 0,100 -0,083 ,257** 0,092 -0,119 -0,039 -0,105 1 
Note: ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05 
X1: LnTE, X2: LnTD, X3: LnTA, X4: LnRD, X5: LnEBIT, X6: LnTS, X7:  𝑹𝒇, X8: 𝑹𝒆, X9:  𝑹𝒅, X10: FirmReturn, X11: MarketReturn, X12: 𝝈𝒎, X13: FirmReturn/ 𝑹𝒆, X14: ETR, X15: ROA, X16: 
FirmReturn/TotalRisk, X17: TangibleAssetsRatio,  
Z1: Industrials, Z2: HelathCare, Z3: RealEstate, Z4: ConsumerGoods, Z5: Technology, Z6: ConsumerServives, Z7: BasicMaterial, Z8: Telecommunication, Z9: Utilities,  
Y1: D/E, Y2: SystematicRisk, Y3: UnsystematicRisk, Y4: TotalRisk, Y5: WACC, Y6: ROE. 
 Number of observations N = 270. 
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4.4.3 The multivariate OLS model analysis 
Table 13 reveals the outcomes of the regression analysis for the last sub-period – post-
crisis. The association between dependent and independent variables are displayed.  
Identical to the previous sub-periods, debt-to-equity was strongly impacted by the 
amount of total equity, total debt and total assets in the company. Moreover, the 
relationship was negative for equity and debt and positive for assets, which coincided 
with the previous sub-periods. However, in this sub-period, the positive relationship 
between debt-to-equity and return on equity was determined. This indicated that during 
the post-crisis sub-period, companies tended to have more leveraged capital structure in 
cases when the return on equity was high. The negative association with return on 
assets, in turn, implied that debt was least favoured when the return on assets was high. 
Health care industry represented negative influence on capital structure. In other words, 
companies from health care sector had less borrowed capital in their corporate 
structures. This supported the existing theories covered in this work that industry 
classification has an impact on leverage of the company.  
Systematic risk showed high dependency on cost of equity, unsystematic risk (negative) 
and total risk (positive). From the table 13, it can also be concluded that technological 
firms as well as consumer services organisations were exposed to higher systematic risk. 
Unsystematic risk, consecutively, had greater impact on technological and consumer 
service companies. Besides, total risk, cost of equity and firm’s return-to-cost of equity 
showed significant positive association with unsystematic risk.  
According to the tables, total risk, in turn, was dependent on how much revenues (LnTS) 
the company performed or how much was spent on research and development (LnRD). 
Cost of equity was one of the determinants of total risk, similar as of the systematic and 
unsystematic risks. This highlighted that the higher the cost of equity, the more 
company was exposed to risks. From the table, it can be concluded that health care 
industry possessed higher weighted average cost of capital. Similar as in during the crisis, 
return on equity was dependent on the capital structure of the firm which supported H5. 
Besides leverage, log of total sales, ratio “firm’s return-to-total risk” and utilities industry 
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showed significant association with return on equity. The adjusted R-square value were 
0,255 to 1,000. The higher values indicated the better fir for the research work, 
however, low figures were still considered sufficient if the estimated coefficients were 
statistically significant. Durbin-Watson index laid from 1,936 to 2,222 which supported 
the validity of the study.  
 
Table 13. OLS model - Post-crisis sub-period 
 
D/E SysRisk UnsysRisk Tot Risk WACC ROE 
(Constant) 
-3,059 
(-16,257) 
-3,222E-10 
(-1,356) 
-3,222E-10 
(-1,286) 
0,006 
(1,471) 
-0,024 
(-1,314) 
-0,115 
(-4,239) 
LnTE 
-3,741*** 
(-30,615) 
2,173E-10 
(1,523) 
2,173E-10 
(1,444) 
0,001 
(0,338)   
LnTD 
-1,808*** 
(-14,526) 
-1,636E-10 
(-1,130) 
-1,636E-10 
(-1,072) 
-0,002 
(-0,933)  
-0,026 
(-1,269) 
LnTA 
5,586*** 
(23,242)    
-0,005 
(-1,128) 
0,008 
(0,370) 
LnTS 
-0,023 
(-1,299) 
 
-6,538E-11 
(-1,189) 
-6,538E-11 
(-1,127) 
0,003* 
(2,708) 
0,003 
(0,700) 
 
0,019*** 
(3,881) 
LnRD 
0,003 
(0,670) 
-2,169E-11 
(-1,716) 
-2,169E-11 
(-1,627) 
-0,001** 
(-2,938) 
0,000 
(-0,176) 
-0,001 
(-1,215) 
LnEBIT 
-0,003 
(-0,383) 
4,939E-11 
(1,852) 
4,939E-11 
(1,757) 
-0,001 
(-1,317) 
0,005 
(2,335) 
0,002 
(0,747) 
FirmRet 
2,026 
(0,300) 
2,454E-08 
(1,170) 
2,454E-08 
(1,110) 
0,627 
(1,845) 
1,163 
(0,882) 
-1,675 
(0,957) 
𝝈𝒎    
0,966*** 
(9,583) 
-0,096 
(-0,227) 
0,204 
(0,340) 
UnsystRisk  
-1,000*** 
(-82881813,299)    
-0,335 
(-0,848) 
SysRisk 
-8,023 
(-2,079)  
-1,000*** 
(-78599638,977)   
0,400 
(0,453) 
Total Risk 
3,049 
(2,225) 
1,000*** 
103804298,765 
1,000*** 
(222110472,231)    
𝑹𝒆 
-2,086 
(-1,044) 
-2,024E-08*** 
(-3,253) 
-2,024E-08** 
(-3,085) 
-0,719*** 
(-11,613)  
0,348 
(0,622) 
 𝑹𝒅 
-0,024 
(-0,300) 
-1,340E-10 
(-0,529) 
-1,340E-10 
(-0,502) 
-0,005 
(-1,062)  
0,014 
(0,605) 
FirmReturn/𝑹𝒆 
-0,016 
(-1,174) 
1,261E-10 
(2,945) 
1,261E-10* 
(2,793) 
4,273E-05 
(0,056) 
0,003 
(0,836) 
0,000 
(-0,126) 
ETR 
0,011 
(1,223) 
6,723E-11 
(2,391) 
6,723E-11 
(2,268) 
0,000 
(0,727)  
-0,005 
(-1,840) 
ROE 
1,428*** 
(6,690) 
-2,693E-10 
(-0,375) 
-2,693E-10 
(-0,355) 
-0,007 
(-0,555) 
-0,095 
(-1,712)  
ROA 
-2,565*** 
(-5,224) 
-1,718E-10 
(-0,107) 
-1,718E-10 
(-0,101) 
0,005 
(0,173) 
0,106 
(0,845) 
2,070*** 
(37,383) 
FirmReturn/ 
TotalRisk 
5,117E-05 
(0,009) 
-1,597E-11 
(-0,856) 
-1,597E-11 
(-0,812) 
-0,001 
(-1,947) 
-0,002 
(-1,501) 
0,000 
(-0,099) 
Tangible 
Assets/ TotalAssets 
0,034 
(0,633) 
1,400E-10 
(0,851) 
1,400E-10 
(0,807) 
-0,007 
(-2,336) 
0,027 
(2,125) 
-0,014 
(-0,972) 
D/E  
1,924E-10 
(1,729) 
1,924E-10 
(1,640) 
-0,001 
(-0,331) 
0,010 
(1,935) 
0,084*** 
(13,848) 
WACC 
0,502 
(1,309) 
5,494E-10 
(0,461) 
5,494E-10 
(0,437) 
0,035 
(1,649)  
-0,232 
(-2,181) 
Industrials       
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HelathCare 
-0,078* 
(-2,648) 
1,337E-10 
(1,494) 
1,337E-10 
(1,417) 
0,001 
(0,828) 
0,018** 
(2,857) 
0,014 
(1,680) 
RealEstate 
-0,042 
(-0,734) 
-4,007E-10 
(-2,264) 
-4,007E-10 
(-2,147) 
0,000 
(0,046) 
0,026 
(1,860) 
0,033 
(2,094) 
ConsGoods 
0,018 
(0,720) 
-1,402E-10 
(-1,848) 
-1,402E-10 
(-1,752) 
0,001 
(0,917) 
0,007 
(1,151) 
0,003 
(0,499) 
Technology 
0,008 
(0,169) 
4,561E-10** 
(3,048) 
4,561E-10** 
(2,891) 
0,006 
(2,259) 
0,011 
(0,957) 
-0,020 
(-1,450) 
ConsServ 
0,032 
(0,950) 
3,426E-10*** 
(3,238) 
3,426E-10** 
(3,071) 
-0,002 
(-1,008) 
0,003 
(0,327) 
-0,005 
(-0,504) 
BasicMat 
0,011 
(0,437) 
-3,381E-12 
(-0,044) 
-3,381E-12 
(-0,042) 
0,004 
(2,966) 
-0,008 
(-1,344) 
0,012 
(1,790) 
Telecom 
-0,024 
(-0,580) 
1,002E-10 
(0,784) 
1,002E-10 
(0,744) 
-0,001 
(-0,635) 
0,007 
(0,726) 
0,023 
(2,047) 
Utilities 
-0,045 
(-0,940) 
1,881E-10 
(1,277) 
1,881E-10 
(1,211) 
0,002 
(0,826) 
-0,003 
(-0,281) 
0,043*** 
(3,298) 
R Square 0,973 1,000 1,000 0,660 0,255 0,958 
Durbin- 
Watson 2,041 2,222 2,222 1,936 2,168 2,026 
N 270 270 270 270 270 270 
Note:   OLS estimates are shown in above table (t-statistics appear in parentheses). 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.005; * p < 0.01 
D/E: Debt-to-equity ratio, SysRisk: Systematic risk, UnsysRisk: Unsystematic risk, TotalRisk: Total risk, WACC: Weighted 
average cost of capital, ROE: Return on equity, LnTE: Log of total equity, LnTD: log of total debt; LnTA: Log of total assets, LnTS: Log of 
total sales, LnRD: Log of research and development expenses, LnEBIT: Log of earnings before interest and taxes, FirmReturn: Firm’s 
stock return, 𝜎𝑚: Market standard deviation, Re: Cost of equity, Rd: Cost of debt, FirmReturn/Re: Firm’s return-to-cost of equity, ETR: 
Effective corporate tax rate, ROA: Return on assets, FirmReturn/TotalRisk: Firm’s return-to-total risk, TangibleAssetsRatio: Tangibles 
assets-to-total assets, Industrials: Industrials, HealthCare: Health care, RealEstate: Real Estate, ConsGoods: Consumer Goods, 
Technology: Technology, ConsServices: Consumer services, BasicMat: Basic material, Telecom: Telecommunication, Utilities: Utilities 
industry sector. 
 
4.5 Full period 
4.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
The following table depicts the descriptive statistics regarding the whole period of the 
research covering 2005 – 2017 years. The company stock’s return varied from -0.1% to 
0.1% with the mean value equal to 0.07%. The total risk’s mean was 2.24%, whilst 
unsystematic risk was 1.87% and systematic – 0.36%. Debt-to-equity ratio’s mean was 
138.42 implying that debt finance have been predominating over equity finance within 
the whole period. The reason for that might be explained in higher costs for equity 
compared to debt (1.6% and 0.92% respectively). Mean index of the firm’s return-to-
total risk ratio was -1.3% suggesting the that the higher the total risk was, the less return 
the company received. The estimated cost of equity capital’s mean was 1.6% - the 
percentage investors expected to receive in average. The real return on equity was 
16.8% for the full period. Weighted average cost of capital was 1.67%.  
 
  
68 
Table 14. Descriptive statistics - Full period  
 
N Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
LnTE 390 7,31 5,88 13,19 8,7814 1,70334 2,901 
LnTD 390 9,09 4,60 13,69 8,9925 1,76229 3,106 
LnTA 390 7,81 6,35 14,16 9,6132 1,71124 2,928 
LnTS 390 8,30 5,31 13,62 9,3598 1,71957 2,957 
LnRD 390 10,85 0,10 10,95 4,7485 2,65392 7,043 
LnEBIT 387 12,68 -1,20 11,48 7,0104 2,05313 4,215 
FirmRet 390 0,01 -0,01 0,01 0,0007 0,00150 0,000 
MarkRet 390 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,0003 0,00086 0,000 
𝝈𝒎 390 0,02 0,01 0,03 0,0130 0,00529 0,000 
UnsysRisk 390 0,05 0,00 0,05 0,0187 0,00776 0,000 
SysRisk 390 0,04 -0,01 0,03 0,0036 0,00566 0,000 
TotRisk 390 0,08 0,00 0,08 0,0224 0,01212 0,000 
𝑹𝒆 390 0,12 -0,02 0,11 0,0160 0,02043 0,000 
𝑹𝒅 390 2,12 -1,43 0,70 0,0092 0,11519 0,013 
FirmReturn/𝑹𝒆 390 6,83 -4,03 2,80 0,0561 0,50236 0,252 
ETR 390 20,64 -9,12 11,51 0,2084 1,09059 1,189 
ROE 390 1,06 -0,17 0,89 0,1680 0,13596 0,018 
ROA 390 0,39 -0,08 0,32 0,0736 0,06246 0,004 
FirmReturn/TotRisk 390 44,44 -29,89 14,55 -0,0130 2,02819 4,114 
TangibleAssetsRatio 390 0,81 0,00 0,81 0,2482 0,20537 0,042 
D/E 390 5,68 0,21 5,89 1,3842 0,68996 0,476 
WACC 390 2,02 -0,23 1,79 0,0167 0,09498 0,009 
Industrial 390 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,4000 0,49053 0,241 
HelathCare 390 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,1333 0,34037 0,116 
RealEstate 390 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,0333 0,17974 0,032 
ConsumerGoods 390 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,1000 0,30039 0,090 
Technology 390 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,0333 0,17974 0,032 
ConsumerServices 390 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,0667 0,24976 0,062 
BasicMaterial 390 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,1667 0,37316 0,139 
Telecommunication 390 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,0333 0,17974 0,032 
Utilities 390 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,0333 0,17974 0,032 
Valid N (listwise) 387 
      
Note: LnTE: Log of total equity, LnTD: log of total debt; LnTA: Log of total assets, LnTS: Log of total sales, LnRD: Log of 
research and development expenses, LnEBIT: Log of earnings before interest and taxes, FirmReturn: Firm’s stock 
return, 𝝈𝒎: Market standard deviation, SysRisk: Systematic risk, UnsysRisk: Unsystematic risk, TotalRisk: Total 
risk, Re: Cost of equity, Rd: Cost of debt, FirmReturn/Re: Firm’s return-to-cost of equity, ETR: Effective corporate 
tax rate, ROE: Return on equity, ROA: Return on assets, FirmReturn/TotalRisk: Firm’s return-to-total risk, 
TangibleAssetsRatio: Tangibles assets-to-total assets, D/E: Debt-to-equity ratio, WACC: Weighted average cost of 
capital, Industrials: Industrials, HealthCare: Health care, RealEstate: Real Estate, ConsGoods: Consumer Goods, 
Technology: Technology, ConsServices: Consumer services, BasicMat: Basic material, Telecom: 
Telecommunication, Utilities: Utilities industry sector. 
 
4.5.2 Correlation  
Table 16 highlights the correlation analysis covering the whole period of the research. In 
terms of dependent variables, the following correlations were identified:  
Debt-to-equity ratio was highly positively correlated with total debt, total sales and risk-
free rate. Return on assets showed the negative correlation with the ratio. Firms’ 
leverage was also dependent on industrials, health care, technology and basic material 
industry. This supported the idea of industry classification playing major role in capital 
structure. Tangible assets ratio was negatively correlated with the ratio which 
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demonstrated reverse relationship between capital structure and tangibility. This 
contradicted many previous empirical research, for instance works of Friend – Lang 
(1988), Rajan – Zingales (1995) and Titman – Wessels (1988). Systematic risk and return 
on equity also demonstrated positive correlation with debt-to-equity ratio. These 
correlations assisted in acceptance of hypotheses 1 and 7.  
Systematic risk had positive correlation with risk-free rate, market standard deviation, 
unsystematic risk, total risk, return on assets and return on equity. Negative relationship 
was found for cost of equity, cost of debt, firm’s return, market return and health care 
industry.  
Unsystematic risk was strongly positively correlated with risk-free rate, market standard 
deviation, systematic, total risks, technology and basic material sectors. negatively 
correlated with total equity, total debt, total assets, R&D expenses, EBIT, total sales, 
firm’s return and market return. The table illustrated that technology and basic material 
companies were more susceptible to the unsystematic risk when compared to 
industrials. Total risk was negatively associated with equity, debt, assets and R&D 
expenses of the company as well as with cost of equity, firm’s return, market return. The 
returns both company and market were in reverse relation with risk which illustrated 
that the increased total risk reduced the returns. Positive correlation included risk-free 
rate, market standard deviation, technology and basic material sector. The latter one 
demonstrated that companies from mentioned industries were more vulnerable to the 
total risk influence.  
The weighted average cost of capital had positive correlation with cost of debt and 
negative with effective corporate tax rate. The results also suggested that for the 
technology sector, the cost of capital was significantly higher.  
Return on equity had negative correlation with equity, debt, assets of the company., 
risk-free rate, cost of equity and tangibility ratio. The latter case proposed that 
companies with more tangible assets had higher return on equity. Negative correlations 
with ROE comprised R&D expenses and EBIT of the company. Besides, industrials, 
technology, consumer services industries had superior ROE comparing to consumer 
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goods and basic material companies. was is positive significant correlation between 
debt-to-equity ratio and systematic risk with return on equity which supported the 
hypotheses 7 and 8. 
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Table 15. Correlation - Full period. Part 1. 
  X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12 X13 X14 X15 X16 
X1 1 ,962** ,989** ,398** ,800** ,893** ,212** ,263** 0,070 0,003 0,002 -0,031 0,043 0,030 -,210** -0,001 
X2 ,962** 1 ,992** ,392** ,797** ,911** ,237** ,267** ,101* -0,005 -0,022 -0,006 0,014 0,037 -,261** 0,005 
X3 ,989** ,992** 1 ,403** ,806** ,912** ,230** ,269** 0,082 -0,002 -0,012 -0,018 0,027 0,034 -,239** 0,002 
X4 ,398** ,392** ,403** 1 ,456** ,497** ,259** ,292** ,099* 0,089 -0,014 0,020 0,021 0,081 ,179** -0,018 
X5 ,800** ,797** ,806** ,456** 1 ,823** ,154** ,151** ,101* 0,048 -0,037 0,020 0,057 0,023 ,176** 0,011 
X6 ,893** ,911** ,912** ,497** ,823** 1 ,239** ,248** ,113* -0,010 -0,026 0,029 0,048 0,064 -0,086 -0,004 
X7 ,212** ,237** ,230** ,259** ,154** ,239** 1 ,877** ,103* -,192** -,279** ,361** -0,082 ,108* -,161** -0,012 
X8 ,263** ,267** ,269** ,292** ,151** ,248** ,877** 1 0,075 -0,019 0,020 ,104* -0,017 ,144** -,205** -0,014 
X9 0,070 ,101* 0,082 ,099* ,101* ,113* ,103* 0,075 1 0,015 -0,021 0,039 0,010 -0,095 -,105* -0,006 
X10 0,003 -0,005 -0,002 0,089 0,048 -0,010 -,192** -0,019 0,015 1 ,565** -,294** ,306** -0,050 ,167** -0,024 
X11 0,002 -0,022 -0,012 -0,014 -0,037 -0,026 -,279** 0,020 -0,021 ,565** 1 -,611** ,251** 0,016 -0,005 -0,001 
X12 -0,031 -0,006 -0,018 0,020 0,020 0,029 ,361** ,104* 0,039 -,294** -,611** 1 -0,059 -0,008 0,026 0,056 
X13 0,043 0,014 0,027 0,021 0,057 0,048 -0,082 -0,017 0,010 ,306** ,251** -0,059 1 -0,030 ,103* 0,014 
X14 0,030 0,037 0,034 0,081 0,023 0,064 ,108* ,144** -0,095 -0,050 0,016 -0,008 -0,030 1 -0,077 0,008 
X15 -,210** -,261** -,239** ,179** ,176** -0,086 -,161** -,205** -,105* ,167** -0,005 0,026 ,103* -0,077 1 -0,023 
X16 -0,001 0,005 0,002 -0,018 0,011 -0,004 -0,012 -0,014 -0,006 -0,024 -0,001 0,056 0,014 0,008 -0,023 1 
X17 0,049 0,000 0,020 -,404** -,109* 0,031 -0,044 -0,051 0,021 -0,084 0,015 -0,007 0,011 -0,003 -,195** -0,013 
Z1 ,276** ,376** ,335** ,208** ,318** ,386** 0,037 -0,013 0,026 0,095 0,000 0,000 0,003 -0,048 -0,033 -0,014 
Z2 0,017 -0,078 -0,028 ,238** 0,020 -0,032 ,181** ,245** 0,095 -0,017 0,000 0,000 -,142** 0,052 0,068 0,004 
Z3 0,041 0,050 0,044 -,326** 0,006 -,205** -0,086 -0,059 -0,015 -0,003 0,000 0,000 0,002 -0,061 -0,071 0,002 
Z4 -0,064 -0,045 -0,057 -0,024 -,102* -0,084 -0,073 -0,079 0,013 -0,045 0,000 0,000 0,036 -0,053 -,196** 0,003 
Z5 -,221** -,259** -,245** 0,094 -0,079 -,141** -0,086 -,100* 0,075 0,063 0,000 0,000 0,050 -0,072 ,443** 0,002 
Z6 -,188** -,210** -,198** -0,044 -0,075 -0,062 -,124* -,112* -,160** -0,002 0,000 0,000 0,046 -0,015 ,329** 0,006 
Z7 -0,035 -0,063 -0,055 -,202** -,192** -0,049 -0,027 -0,036 -0,051 -0,059 0,000 0,000 0,056 ,134** -,263** 0,005 
Z8 -,209** -,202** -,210** -,175** -,125* -,222** 0,039 0,051 0,009 -0,032 0,000 0,000 -0,017 0,004 0,059 0,004 
Z9 0,047 0,027 0,035 -0,089 -0,040 -0,096 0,039 0,042 -0,015 -0,058 0,000 0,000 -0,014 -0,005 -0,052 0,001 
Y1 -0,056 ,195** 0,090 0,077 0,058 ,150** ,118* 0,030 0,058 -0,036 -0,097 0,085 -0,097 0,032 -,158** 0,023 
Y2 -0,030 -0,004 -0,015 -0,024 0,053 0,046 ,169** -,278** -0,004 -,374** -,628** ,603** -,115* -0,045 ,106* 0,005 
Y3 -,207** -,230** -,219** -,179** -,193** -,162** ,206** -0,076 -0,009 -,205** -,362** ,599** -0,013 -0,015 0,017 0,042 
Y4 -,147** -,149** -,147** -,126* -0,099 -0,082 ,211** -,179** -0,007 -,306** -,525** ,665** -0,062 -0,030 0,060 0,029 
Y5 -0,011 -0,027 -0,021 0,030 0,022 -0,001 0,090 0,068 ,461** 0,040 0,006 0,010 0,018 -,416** 0,049 -0,007 
Y6 -,212** -,168** -,187** ,206** ,220** -0,006 -,135** -,207** -0,049 ,125* -0,047 0,066 0,048 -0,059 ,900** -0,014 
 
  
72 
Table 16. Correlation - Full period. Part 2. 
  X17 Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5 Z6 Z7 Z8 Z9 Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 
X1 0,049 ,276** 0,017 0,041 -0,064 -,221** -,188** -0,035 -,209** 0,047 -0,056 -0,030 -,207** -,147** -0,011 -,212** 
X2 0,000 ,376** -0,078 0,050 -0,045 -,259** -,210** -0,063 -,202** 0,027 ,195** -0,004 -,230** -,149** -0,027 -,168** 
X3 0,020 ,335** -0,028 0,044 -0,057 -,245** -,198** -0,055 -,210** 0,035 0,090 -0,015 -,219** -,147** -0,021 -,187** 
X4 -,404** ,208** ,238** -,326** -0,024 0,094 -0,044 -,202** -,175** -0,089 0,077 -0,024 -,179** -,126* 0,030 ,206** 
X5 -,109* ,318** 0,020 0,006 -,102* -0,079 -0,075 -,192** -,125* -0,040 0,058 0,053 -,193** -0,099 0,022 ,220** 
X6 0,031 ,386** -0,032 -,205** -0,084 -,141** -0,062 -0,049 -,222** -0,096 ,150** 0,046 -,162** -0,082 -0,001 -0,006 
X7 -0,044 0,037 ,181** -0,086 -0,073 -0,086 -,124* -0,027 0,039 0,039 ,118* ,169** ,206** ,211** 0,090 -,135** 
X8 -0,051 -0,013 ,245** -0,059 -0,079 -,100* -,112* -0,036 0,051 0,042 0,030 -,278** -0,076 -,179** 0,068 -,207** 
X9 0,021 0,026 0,095 -0,015 0,013 0,075 -,160** -0,051 0,009 -0,015 0,058 -0,004 -0,009 -0,007 ,461** -0,049 
X10 -0,084 0,095 -0,017 -0,003 -0,045 0,063 -0,002 -0,059 -0,032 -0,058 -0,036 -,374** -,205** -,306** 0,040 ,125* 
X11 0,015 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,097 -,628** -,362** -,525** 0,006 -0,047 
X12 -0,007 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,085 ,603** ,599** ,665** 0,010 0,066 
X13 0,011 0,003 -,142** 0,002 0,036 0,050 0,046 0,056 -0,017 -0,014 -0,097 -,115* -0,013 -0,062 0,018 0,048 
X14 -0,003 -0,048 0,052 -0,061 -0,053 -0,072 -0,015 ,134** 0,004 -0,005 0,032 -0,045 -0,015 -0,030 -,416** -0,059 
X15 -,195** -0,033 0,068 -0,071 -,196** ,443** ,329** -,263** 0,059 -0,052 -,158** ,106* 0,017 0,060 0,049 ,900** 
X16 -0,013 -0,014 0,004 0,002 0,003 0,002 0,006 0,005 0,004 0,001 0,023 0,005 0,042 0,029 -0,007 -0,014 
X17 1 -,198** 0,019 -,224** -,116* -,143** -,181** ,476** 0,050 ,280** -,191** 0,007 0,047 0,033 -0,019 -,248** 
Z1 -,198** 1 -,320** -,152** -,272** -,152** -,218** -,365** -,152** -,152** ,376** 0,098 -,146** -0,048 -0,038 ,112* 
Z2 0,019 -,320** 1 -0,073 -,131** -0,073 -,105* -,175** -0,073 -0,073 -,236** -,134** -0,017 -0,074 0,044 -0,001 
Z3 -,224** -,152** -0,073 1 -0,062 -0,034 -0,050 -0,083 -0,034 -0,034 -0,005 -0,048 -0,016 -0,033 0,002 -0,070 
Z4 -,116* -,272** -,131** -0,062 1 -0,062 -0,089 -,149** -0,062 -0,062 0,015 0,014 0,010 0,013 -0,020 -,208** 
Z5 -,143** -,152** -0,073 -0,034 -0,062 1 -0,050 -0,083 -0,034 -0,034 -,149** 0,037 ,146** ,110* ,243** ,337** 
Z6 -,181** -,218** -,105* -0,050 -0,089 -0,050 1 -,120* -0,050 -0,050 -0,028 -0,031 0,018 -0,003 -0,069 ,306** 
Z7 ,476** -,365** -,175** -0,083 -,149** -0,083 -,120* 1 -0,083 -0,083 -,149** 0,042 ,169** ,128* -0,038 -,314** 
Z8 0,050 -,152** -0,073 -0,034 -0,062 -0,034 -0,050 -0,083 1 -0,034 -0,022 -0,046 -0,061 -0,061 0,000 0,067 
Z9 ,280** -,152** -0,073 -0,034 -0,062 -0,034 -0,050 -0,083 -0,034 1 -0,081 -0,023 -0,028 -0,029 -0,015 -0,063 
Y1 -,191** ,376** -,236** -0,005 0,015 -,149** -0,028 -,149** -0,022 -0,081 1 ,106* -0,059 0,012 -0,056 ,204** 
Y2 0,007 0,098 -,134** -0,048 0,014 0,037 -0,031 0,042 -0,046 -0,023 ,106* 1 ,622** ,865** 0,014 ,140** 
Y3 0,047 -,146** -0,017 -0,016 0,010 ,146** 0,018 ,169** -0,061 -0,028 -0,059 ,622** 1 ,931** 0,060 -0,033 
Y4 0,033 -0,048 -0,074 -0,033 0,013 ,110* -0,003 ,128* -0,061 -0,029 0,012 ,865** ,931** 1 0,045 0,044 
Y5 -0,019 -0,038 0,044 0,002 -0,020 ,243** -0,069 -0,038 0,000 -0,015 -0,056 0,014 0,060 0,045 1 0,014 
Y6 -,248** ,112* -0,001 -0,070 -,208** ,337** ,306** -,314** 0,067 -0,063 ,204** ,140** -0,033 0,044 0,014 1 
 
Note: ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05 
X1: LnTE, X2: LnTD, X3: LnTA, X4: LnRD, X5: LnEBIT, X6: LnTS, X7:  𝑹𝒇, X8: 𝑹𝒆, X9:  𝑹𝒅, X10: FirmReturn, X11: MarketReturn, X12: 𝝈𝒎, X13: FirmReturn/ 𝑹𝒆, X14: ETR, X15: ROA, X16: 
FirmReturn/TotalRisk, X17: TangibleAssetsRatio,  
Z1: Industrials, Z2: HelathCare, Z3: RealEstate, Z4: ConsumerGoods, Z5: Technology, Z6: ConsumerServives, Z7: BasicMaterial, Z8: Telecommunication, Z9: Utilities,  
Y1: D/E, Y2: SystematicRisk, Y3: UnsystematicRisk, Y4: TotalRisk, Y5: WACC, Y6: ROE. 
 Number of observations N = 390. 
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4.5.3 The multivariate OLS model analysis 
The multivariate OLS analysis provided analysis of dependent variables and their 
regression with independent variables. The table 18 denotes the regression matrix for 
the full period. From the table, it can be concluded that debt-to-equity ratio or 
company’s leverage was highly dependent on total equity, total debt and total assets of 
the company. The former two had negative association and latter one – positive. It was 
also visible that return on equity had causal relationship with debt-to-equity. The 
negative association with capital structure showed return on assets ratio and health care 
industry. Regarding systematic risk, there was negative association with unsystematic 
risk and cost of equity. Whereas the total risk had positive causal relationship with 
systematic risk. Total risk had high dependence on company’s total debt, total sales, 
R&D expenses and tangibility. Hence, total risk was increased when total debt, R&D and 
the number of tangible assets were low, but conversely when total sales were raised. 
The table revealed strong causal relationship between return on equity and return on 
assets showing that the higher return on assets, the higher return on equity of the 
company. The adjusted R-square value varied from 0,766 to 1,000 which was reasonable 
and denoted to the fit of the study. Durbin-Watson index varied from 1,814 to 2,196 
which made research paper valid. 
 
Table 17. OLS model - Full period 
 D/E SysRisk UnsysRIsk TotalRisk WACC ROE 
(Constant) -3,120 
(-24,305) 
-4,401E-10 
(-2,359) 
-4,401E-10 
(-1,968) 
0,008 
(2,528) 
0,041 
(0,780) 
0,044 
(0,731) 
LnTE -3,886*** 
(-48,740) 
-5,826E-12 
(-0,055) 
-5,826E-12 
(-0,046) 
0,003 
(1,783) 
-0,009 
(-0,718) 
0,076 
(1,197) 
LnTD -1,730*** 
(-21,340) 
3,037E-11 
(0,283) 
3,037E-11 
(0,236) 
-0,005* 
(-2,761) 
 
0,069 
(1,977) 
LnTA 5,623*** 
(36,606) 
    
-0,167 
(-1,736) 
LnTS 0,006 
(0,380) 
8,790E-12 
(0,182) 
8,790E-12 
(0,152) 
0,003** 
(3,072) 
0,003 
(0,198) 
0,000 
(0,137) 
LnRD 0,001 
(0,199) 
-8,985E-12 
(-0,781) 
-8,985E-12 
(-0,652) 
-0,001*** 
(-3,536) 
-0,001 
(-0,231) 
0,003 
(1,486) 
LnEBIT 0,002 
(0,274) 
9,215E-12 
(0,447) 
9,215E-12 
(0,373) 
0,000 
(-1,300) 
0,007 
(1,237) 
0,019 
(4,219) 
FirmRet 1,868 
(0,406) 
9,810E-09 
(0,713) 
9,810E-09 
(0,595) 
0,173 
(0,722) 
 
-1,461 
(-1,102) 
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𝝈𝒎 0,485 
(0,300) 
5,497E-09 
(1,139) 
5,497E-09 
(0,950) 
0,864 
(12,004) 
-0,876 
(-0,670) 
0,835 
(1,796) 
UnsystRisk 1,332 
(1,107) 
-1,000*** 
(-99244879,576) 
   
-0,691 
(-1,996) 
SysRisk -0,652 
(-0,228) 
 
-1,000*** 
(-82783076,698) 
 
0,176 
(0,092) 
-0,130 
(-0,157) 
Total Risk 
 
1,000*** 
(116924260,722) 
1,000 
(231474013,790) 
 
0,209 
(0,214) 
 
𝑹𝒆 0,392 
(0,265) 
-1,157E-08* 
(-2,627) 
-1,157E-08 
(-2,191) 
-0,735 
(-18,318) 
 
-0,211 
(-0,494) 
 𝑹𝒅 0,139 
(2,202) 
-5,536E-11 
(-0,300) 
-5,536E-11 
(-0,250) 
-0,004 
(-1,281) 
 
0,023 
(1,281) 
FirmReturn/𝑹𝒆 -0,002 
(-0,169) 
-2,114E-12 
(-0,057) 
-2,114E-12 
(-0,047) 
0,000 
(0,502) 
0,005 
(0,473) 
-0,002 
(-0,604) 
ETR 0,004 
(0,628) 
4,098E-11 
(2,236) 
4,098E-11 
(1,865) 
0,000 
(0,517) 
-0,054 
(-0,361) 
-0,002 
(-0,911) 
ROE 0,885*** 
(5,000) 
-4,597E-10 
(-0,844) 
-4,597E-10 
(-0,704) 
-0,019 
(-2,009) 
-0,095 
(-0,291) 
 
ROA -1,672*** 
(-4,257) 
7,870E-10 
(0,655) 
7,870E-10 
(0,546) 
0,031 
(1,461) 
0,013 
(0,337) 
1,998*** 
(41,236) 
FirmReturn/ 
TotalRisk 
0,000 
(-0,140) 
-8,060E-13 
(-0,095) 
-8,060E-13 
(-0,079) 
2,413E-05 
(0,160) 
0,000 
(-0,155) 
-5,448E-05 
(-0,066) 
Tangible 
Assets/ TotalAssets 
0,033 
(0,679) 
3,853E-11 
(0,265) 
3,853E-11 
(0,221) 
-0,009*** 
(-3,567) 
 
-0,018 
(-1,290) 
D/E 
 
7,851E-11 
(1,083) 
7,851E-11 
(0,903) 
0,002 
(1,359) 
-0,001 
(-0,090) 
0,074*** 
(5,000) 
WACC 0,000 
(0,006) 
1,362E-10 
(0,576) 
1,362E-10 
(0,481) 
0,002 
(0,538) 
 
-0,028 
(-1,238) 
Industrials 
      
HealthCare -0,011* 
(-0,465) 
1,027E-10 
(1,449) 
1,027E-10 
(1,208) 
0,002 
(1,383) 
0,011 
(0,615) 
0,014 
(2,064) 
RealEstate 0,023 
(0,449) 
-1,366E-10 
(-0,881) 
-1,366E-10 
(-0,735) 
0,001 
(0,473) 
0,013 
(0,311) 
0,035 
(2,343) 
ConsGoods 0,024 
(1,110) 
-1,123E-11 
(-0,172) 
-1,123E-11 
(-0,144) 
0,001 
(0,546) 
-0,004 
(-0,248) 
-0,012 
(-1,894) 
Technology 0,060 
(1,384) 
2,716E-10 
(2,085) 
2,716E-10 
(1,739) 
0,004 
(1,879) 
0,149*** 
(4,260) 
-0,032 
(-2,544) 
ConsServ -0,001 
(-0,041) 
1,662E-10 
(1,799) 
1,662E-10 
(1,501) 
-0,002 
(-1,335) 
-0,005 
(-0,220) 
-0,009 
(-1,046) 
BasicMat 0,040 
(1,794) 
4,134E-11 
(0,624) 
4,134E-11 
(0,521) 
0,004 
(3,658) 
-0,012 
(-0,665) 
0,002 
(0,285) 
Telecom 0,026 
(0,703) 
8,930E-11 
(0,822) 
8,930E-11 
(0,686) 
-0,001 
(-0,623) 
0,002 
(0,071) 
0,018 
(1,706) 
Utilities 0,033 
(0,771) 
1,653E-10 
(1,287) 
1,653E-10 
(1,074) 
0,004 
(1,704) 
-0,007 
(-0,190) 
0,041*** 
(3,319) 
R Square 0,975 1,000 1,000 0,766 0,087 0,945 
Durbin- 
Watson 
2,108 2,196 2,196 1,814 1,977 2,004 
N 390 390 390 390 390 390 
Note:   OLS estimates are shown in above table (t-statistics appear in parentheses). 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.005; * p < 0.01 
D/E: Debt-to-equity ratio, SysRisk: Systematic risk, UnsysRisk: Unsystematic risk, TotalRisk: Total risk, WACC: Weighted 
average cost of capital, ROE: Return on equity, LnTE: Log of total equity, LnTD: log of total debt; LnTA: Log of total assets, LnTS: Log of 
total sales, LnRD: Log of research and development expenses, LnEBIT: Log of earnings before interest and taxes, FirmReturn: Firm’s 
stock return, 𝜎𝑚: Market standard deviation, Re: Cost of equity, Rd: Cost of debt, FirmReturn/Re: Firm’s return-to-cost of equity, ETR: 
Effective corporate tax rate, ROA: Return on assets, FirmReturn/TotalRisk: Firm’s return-to-total risk, TangibleAssetsRatio: Tangibles 
assets-to-total assets, Industrials: Industrials, HealthCare: Health care, RealEstate: Real Estate, ConsGoods: Consumer Goods, 
Technology: Technology, ConsServices: Consumer services, BasicMat: Basic material, Telecom: Telecommunication, Utilities: Utilities 
industry sector. 
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5 Conclusions 
This section intends to clarify the summary of the examination performed so as to 
answer the research questions and test predetermined hypotheses. Besides, the section 
explains the practical implications of this study along with its limitations. Towards the 
finish of the section, a few suggestions have been accommodated for the future 
research. 
5.1 Summary of key findings 
The primary goal of the thesis was to determine the effects of the financial crisis on 
corporate capital structures. The theoretical and empirical analysis assisted the author in 
achieving the main targets of the work. To sum up the key findings of the research work, 
the research questions are individually answered in this sub-section. 
1. Has the corporate capital structure changes during the financial crisis and post crisis 
when compared to the same in pre-crisis sub-period?  
In order to answer this question, the author resorted to the descriptive statistics of three 
sub-periods. Since the capital structure of the firm is represented in the debt-to-equity 
ratio, this ratio was used for the thorough analysis. The statistics suggested that debt-to-
equity ratio has been fluctuating throughout the whole period. Hence, when figures of 
during crisis and post-crisis were compared to the same in pre-crisis period, solid 
changes could be distinguished.  
2. What type of changes corporate capital structure has experienced? 
Answering this question, it is crucial to show the numeric outcomes of the descriptive 
statistics. Thus, debt-to-equity ratio’s mean had the following values in pre-crisis, during 
and post-crisis sub-periods respectively: 148.93%, 165.69% and 130.00%. The figure for 
the full period was 138.42%. The numbers signified the sharp increase in proportion of 
debt financing during the financial crisis – the change was in 16.76%. This suggests that 
there was a trend of borrowing more money from lending institutions during the 
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financial instability. After the crisis, however, there was a substantial drop in the debt-
to-equity ratio even when compared to the pre-crisis period (decrease by 18.93%). This 
illustrates that from 2009 to 2017, in average, debt financing was less significant than 
before the crisis. Hereby, the corporate capital structure has increased by 16.76% during 
the crisis and declined by 18.93% after the crisis in comparison to the pre-crisis sub-
period. 
3. What are the effects of changing corporate capital structure on the risk and return 
during three sub-periods. 
With the respect to the latter research question, it is worth to test the hypotheses of the 
study beforehand relying on the results of the inferential analysis during three sub-
periods. 
The first hypothesis states that: “The nature risk faced by the firm affects its capital 
structure”. The hypothesis must be rejected because the correlation and multivariate 
OLS analysis did not show any significant interdependencies between debt-to-equity 
ratio and risks variables, including systematic, unsystematic and total risks.  
The second hypothesis suggests that: “Systematic risk of a firm is affected by its capital 
structure.” In order to test this hypothesis, the inferential statistics, particularly 
systematic risk correlation and regression with debt-to-equity ratio was evaluated. 
Nonetheless, no significant correlation or association was found. The hypothesis, 
therefore, is rejected. 
Hypotheses three and four are the following:  
H3: Unsystematic risk of a firm is affected by its capital structure.  
H4: Total risk of a firm is affected by its capital structure.  
Similarly to the systematic risk, the analysis was implemented with the regard to the 
unsystematic and the total risks. However, no significant correlation or association was 
detected. Hence, these hypotheses are rejected. 
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Hypotheses five and six are concerning the weighted average cost of capital and the 
relationship with the capital structure and its nature of risk: 
H5: Cost of capital of a firm is affected by its capital structure; 
H6: Cost of capital of a firm is affected by its nature of risk. 
Thereby, the relationship between the WACC figure and debt-to-equity ratio as well as 
the WACC and risk values were researched. However, the correlation matrix and OLS 
regression models did not denote any significant relationships regarding the WACC 
indicators. The hypotheses five and six, hence, are rejected. 
Last two hypotheses were aimed at testing the relationship of return on equity with the 
capital structure and the risks values: 
H7: Return on equity of a firm is affected by its capital structure; 
H8: Return on equity of a firm is affected by its nature of risk; 
The outcomes (see tables 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 16 and 17) showed that there was significant 
correlation between return on equity and debt-to-equity ratio during crisis (0,266 with 
1% significance level), post-crisis (0,257 with 5% significance level) and during full period 
(0,204 with 5% significance level). Besides, OLS models also signified strong association 
between the two variables. Thus, the estimated coefficient for during crisis was 0,032 
with 5% significance level, in the post crisis sub-period – 0,084 with 1% significance level 
and during the full period – 0,074 with 1% significance level (see tables 6,10,14 and 18). 
Moreover, the relation between return on equity and systematic risk was identified. In 
the pre-crisis, correlation coefficient was 0,335 and during full periods – 0,140 both with 
1%significance level. Consequently, the hypotheses seven and eight are accepted.  
To conclude, the corporate capital structure experienced changes from very high 
leverage ratios in pre-crisis to further higher during crisis to the least significant figure 
after the crisis. The results disclosed that changes in the capital structure has not 
influenced the risk and returns of the companies except for the return on equity ratio. 
Besides, the work revealed that the risks did not impact the capital structure either. 
Thereby, the results represented only one positive association with capital structure 
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which is the association with return on equity. It was also explored that systematic risk 
has causal relationship with return on equity.  
5.2 Practical implications 
Financial crisis and its impact, in general, has been one of the major research topics once 
the global economic shakedown took place. Besides, the capital structure and the 
decision of the company affecting its capital structure has always been a subject of 
interest for many researches and organisations. There have been mixed results on the 
evidence of factors that impact the capital structure of a company. Furthermore, the 
effect of financial crisis of 2007-08 has not been explored thoroughly before. This 
particular study can be an advantage to the already extensive literature regarding the 
capital structure theories. However, the results are particularly concerned with the 
Nordic countries, namely Finland, Denmark, Sweden and Ireland.  
Foremost, the finding of the research may be of interest to financial and business 
researchers. Since the results of the thesis introduced some concrete aspects regarding 
capital structure to take into consideration.  
Furthermore, these results of this thesis are particularly useful for corporations. By 
acknowledgement of the finding of this study might allow the firms to consider the 
trends of other companies during crisis and afterwards. The work illustrates how the 
crisis affected companies’ capital structure, risks and returns. By thoroughly studying the 
tremendous effects of the crisis, the companies might be able to be prepared whenever 
any new financial instability hits the economy.  
Besides researches and companies, the research might be useful for the investors and 
financial analysts. The work is beneficial since it provides with the companies’ behaviour 
which reflects in the returns for the investors. Thereby, the investors who familiarise 
themselves with the research might obtain some advantages of predicting the future 
company’s or market moves. 
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5.3 Limitations and recommendations 
The list of limitations and recommendation based on them are represented in this 
chapter. The thesis is limited to using only 30 sample companies in Nordic countries. 
Overall, the research doesn’t cover all existing companies and it could not represent the 
full market picture. It could also be difficult to apply research results to another 
countries or companies. However, for companies across Nordic, or any other companies 
with similar business culture the results could be applicable. The fact that financing 
decisions are grounded primarily on international terms enhances the argument. 
Besides, there are risks such as the relationship between variables could suffer from a 
reversed association problem. The reversed association problem is present if one 
variable affects another one at the same time the second one affects the first one. The 
existence of reversed association might obstruct the validity of the results, as it makes 
the outcome less reliable.  
The limitations of the research broaden the opportunities for the future research. In this 
work, debt-to-equity ratio was used as the measure of capital structure. A way to dig 
deeper into the subject is to do similar research with other variables, for instance, with 
debt-to-total assets. It could be interesting to implement research with other 
explanatory variables. Since there is a large amount of existing studies on the topic there 
is also a large amount of control variables that could have been investigated on other 
data or in other combinations. Besides, the research is limited regarding distinguishing 
between shot-term and long-term debt. Therefore, this could be considered in the 
future. Since one of the limitation mentioned is sampling, the recommendation for 
future research could be to perform similar analysis for all Nordic countries to see the 
full market conditions. It could also be interesting and valuable to see similar research 
for other parts of the world. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. ABB LTD Risk & Return 
 
Note: Calculations are made by the author. The data is retrieved from 
the ABB LTD company’s annual report.
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Appendix 2. ALFA LAVAL Risk & Return 
 
Note: Calculations are made by the author. The data is retrieved from 
the ALFA LAVAL company’s annual report.
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Appendix 3. AUTOLIV SDV Risk & Return 
 
Note: Calculations are made by the author. The data is retrieved from 
the AUTOLIV SDV company’s annual report. 
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Appendix 4. ALK-ABELLO B Risk & Return 
 
Note: Calculations are made by the author. The data is retrieved from 
the ALK-ABELLO B company’s annual report. 
  
93 
Appendix 5. AMBU Risk & Return 
 
Note: Calculations are made by the author. The data is retrieved from 
the AMBU company’s annual report. 
  
94 
Appendix 6. AMER SPORTS Risk & Return 
 
Note: Calculations are made by the author. The data is retrieved from 
the MAER SPORTS company’s annual report. 
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Appendix 7. ASSA ABLOY B Risk & Return 
 
Note: Calculations are made by the author. The data is retrieved from 
the ASSA ABLOY B company’s annual report. 
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Appendix 8. ATLAS COPCO A Risk & Return 
 
Note: Calculations are made by the author. The data is retrieved from 
the ATLAS COPCO A company’s annual report. 
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Appendix 9. ATRIUM LJUNGBERG B Risk & Return 
 
Note: Calculations are made by the author. The data is retrieved from 
the ATRIUM LJUNGBERG B company’s annual report. 
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Appendix 10. AXFOOD Risk & Return 
 
Note: Calculations are made by the author. The data is retrieved from 
the AXFOOD company’s annual report. 
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Appendix 11. AXIS Risk & Return 
 
Note: Calculations are made by the author. The data is retrieved from 
the AXIS company’s annual report. 
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Appendix 12. ASTRAZENECA Risk & Return 
 
Note: Calculations are made by the author. The data is retrieved from 
the ASTRAZENECA company’s annual report. 
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Appendix 13. BETSSON B Risk & Return 
 
Note: Calculations are made by the author. The data is retrieved from 
the BETSSON B company’s annual report. 
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Appendix 14. BILLERUDKORNAS Risk & Return 
 
Note: Calculations are made by the author. The data is retrieved from 
the BILLERUDKORNAS company’s annual report. 
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Appendix 15. BOLIDEN Risk & Return 
 
Note: Calculations are made by the author. The data is retrieved from 
the BOLIDEN company’s annual report. 
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Appendix 16. CARLSBERG Risk & Return 
 
Note: Calculations are made by the author. The data is retrieved from 
the CARLSBERG company’s annual report. 
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Appendix 17. CARGOTEC Risk & Return 
 
Note: Calculations are made by the author. The data is retrieved from 
the CARGOTEC company’s annual report. 
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Appendix 18. COLOPLAST Risk & Return 
 
Note: Calculations are made by the author. The data is retrieved from 
the COLOPLAST company’s annual report. 
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Appendix 19. DFDS Risk & Return 
 
Note: Calculations are made by the author. The data is retrieved from 
the DFDS company’s annual report. 
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Appendix 20. DSV Risk & Return 
 
Note: Calculations are made by the author. The data is retrieved from 
the DSV company’s annual report. 
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Appendix 21. ELISA Risk & Return 
 
Note: Calculations are made by the author. The data is retrieved from 
the ELISA company’s annual report. 
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Appendix 22. FORTUM Risk & Return 
 
Note: Calculations are made by the author. The data is retrieved from 
the FORTUM company’s annual report. 
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Appendix 23. KEMIRA Risk & Return 
 
Note: Calculations are made by the author. The data is retrieved from 
the KEMIRA company’s annual report. 
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Appendix 24. KONE Risk & Return 
 
Note: Calculations are made by the author. The data is retrieved from 
the KONE company’s annual report. 
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Appendix 25. A.P.MOLLER-MAERSK Risk & Return 
 
Note: Calculations are made by the author. The data is retrieved from 
the A.P.MOLLER-MAERSK company’s annual report. 
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Appendix 26. MAREL Risk & Return 
 
Note: Calculations are made by the author. The data is retrieved from 
the MAREL company’s annual report. 
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Appendix 27. OSSUR Risk & Return 
 
Note: Calculations are made by the author. The data is retrieved from 
the OSSUR company’s annual report. 
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Appendix 28. STORA ENSO OYJ Risk & Return 
 
Note: Calculations are made by the author. The data is retrieved from 
the STORA ENSO OYJ company’s annual report. 
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Appendix 29. UPM-KYMMENE OYJ Risk & Return 
 
Note: Calculations are made by the author. The data is retrieved from 
the UPM-KYMMENE OYJ company’s annual report. 
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Appendix 30. WARTSILA OYJ Risk & Return  
 
Note: Calculations are made by the author. The data is retrieved from 
the WARTSILA company’s annual report. 
 
 
